Towards a Conversation Across Civilisations

It has become increasingly difficult to engage in reasonable discussions about the state of the world amid rising international tensions. The present environment of global instability and conflict has emerged over the course of the past fifteen years driven by, on the one hand, the growing weakness of the principal North Atlantic states, led by the United States – which we call the West – and, on the other, the increasing assertion of large developing countries, exemplified by the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). This group of states, along with several others, have built the material conditions for their own development agendas, including for the next generation of technology, a sector that had previously been the monopoly of Western states and firms through the World Trade Organisation’s intellectual property rights regime. Alongside the BRICS, the construction of regional trade and development projects in Africa, Asia, and Latin America that are not controlled by the Western states or Western-dominated institutions – including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (2001) the Belt and Road Initiative (2013), the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (2011), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (2022) – heralds the emergence of a new international economic order.

Since the world financial crisis of 2007–08, the United States and its North Atlantic allies have become acutely aware that their hegemonic status in the world has deteriorated. This decline is the consequence of three key forms of overreach: first, military overreach through both enormous military expenditure and warfare; second, financial overreach caused by the rampant waste of social wealth into the unproductive financial sector along with the widespread imposition of sanctions, dollar hegemony, and control of international financial mechanisms (such as SWIFT); and, third, economic overreach, due to the investment and tax strike of a minuscule section of the world’s population, who are solely fixated on filling their already immense private coffers. This overreach has led to the fragility of the Western states, which are less able to exercise their authority around the world. In reaction to their own weakness and the new developments in the Global South, the United States has led its allies in launching a comprehensive pressure campaign against what it considers to be its ‘near peer rivals’, namely China and Russia. This hostile foreign policy, which includes a trade war, unilateral sanctions, aggressive diplomacy, and military operations, is now commonly known as the New Cold War.

In addition to these tangible measures, information warfare is a key element of the New Cold War. In Western societies today, any effort to promote a balanced and reasonable conversation about China and Russia, or indeed about the leading states in the developing world, is relentlessly attacked by state, corporate, and media institutions as disinformation, propaganda, and foreign interference. Even established facts, let alone alternative perspectives, are treated as matters of dispute. Consequently, it has become virtually impossible to engage in constructive discussions about the changing world order, the new trade and development regimes, or the urgent matters which require global cooperation such as climate change, poverty, and inequality, without being dismissed. In this context, dialogue between intellectuals in countries such as China with their counterparts in the West has broken down. Similarly, dialogue between intellectuals in countries of the Global South and China has also been hampered by the New Cold War, which has strained the already weak communication channels within the developing world. As a result, the conceptual landscape, terms of reference, and key debates that are taking place within China are almost entirely unknown outside of the country, which makes the holding of rational cross-country discussions very difficult.

The New Cold War has led to an enormous spike in Sinophobia and anti-Asian racism in the Western states, frequently egged on by political leaders. The rise in Sinophobia has deepened the lack of genuine engagement by Western intellectuals with contemporary Chinese perspectives, discussions, and debates; and due to the immense power of Western information flows around the world, these dismissive attitudes have also grown in many developing countries. Although there are increasing numbers of international students in China, these students tend to study technical subjects and generally do not focus on or participate in the broader political discussions within and about China.

In the current global climate of conflict and division, it is essential to develop lines of communication and encourage exchange between China, the West, and the developing world. The range of political thinking and discourse within China is immense, stretching from a variety of Marxist approaches to the ardent advocacy of neoliberalism, from deep historical examinations of Chinese civilisation to the deep wells of patriotic thought that have grown in the recent period. Far from static, these intellectual trends have evolved over time and interact with each other. A rich variety of Marxist thinking, from Maoism to creative Marxism, has emerged in China; although these trends all focus on socialist theories, history, and experiments, each trend has developed a distinct school of thought with its own internal discourse as well as debates with other traditions. Meanwhile, the landscape of patriotic thinking is far more eclectic, with some tendencies overlapping with Marxist trends, which is understandable given the connections between Marxism and national liberation; whereas others are closer to offering culturalist explanations for China’s developmental advances. This diversity of thought is not reflected in external understandings or representations of China – even in the scholarly literature – which instead largely reproduces the postures of the New Cold War.

To contribute to the development of a better understanding of and engagement with the thinking and discussions taking place within China, Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research and Dongsheng have partnered with?Wenhua Zongheng?(文化縱橫), a leading journal of contemporary Chinese political and cultural thought. Founded in 2008, the journal is an important reference for debates and intellectual developments taking place in the country, publishing issues every two months which feature articles by intellectuals from a range of professions across the entire country. In this partnership, Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research and Dongsheng will publish an international edition of?Wenhua Zongheng, releasing four issues per year in English, Portuguese, and Spanish, which will be curated by our joint editorial team. The international edition will include translations of a selection of articles from the original Chinese editions that hold particular significance for the Global South. Additionally, Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research will run a column in the Chinese edition of?Wenhua Zongheng, bringing voices from Africa, Asia, and Latin America in dialogue with China (some of which will also be published in the international edition). We are excited to undertake this project and hope that it will introduce readers to the vibrant discourse underway in China, share important perspectives from the Global South with a Chinese audience, and enrich international dialogue and understanding. Instead of the global division pursued by the New Cold War, our mission is to learn from each other towards a world of collaboration rather than confrontation.

尊敬的讀者朋友們：

自2008年創刊以來，《文化縱橫》始終堅持“以中國為方法”，致力于圍繞中國發展經驗開展理論探索。世界百年未有之大變局下，《文化縱橫》國際傳播系列希望以中國人自己的聲音，向世界各國特別是廣大發展中國家介紹中國的發展道路，呈現中國式現代化的進程與面貌，并展示中國思想界在國際體系變化之際的態度與思索。

《文化縱橫》

不是Beijing Cultural Review

而是Wén huà zòng héng

《文化縱橫》國際傳播系列由三大洲社會研究所（Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, 網站：www.thetricontinental.org）和東聲（Dongsheng News，網站：www.dongshengnews.org)協作翻譯并制作，有英語、西語、葡語三個版本。每期根據不同主題，從《文化縱橫》雜志過往發表文章中，選擇3-5篇文章進行編譯，預計每季度發布一期。2023年第1期主題為“重構現代世界體系”，主要分析全球緊張局勢加劇背景下的俄烏戰爭的全球影響，追溯中西關系的歷史軌跡，并探討團結廣大第三世界國家、推動構建新型國際體系的可能性。包括以下四篇文章：

The Ukraine Crisis and the Building of a New International System

‘The Ukraine Crisis and the Building of a New International System’ was originally published as the lead article of the June 2022 issue of?Wenhua Zongheng?(文化縱橫). The article urges China, amid the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, to consider the dangers of the current international system that it has been striving to integrate into and the possibilities of building a new international system.

The outbreak of the Ukraine crisis has not merely altered the geopolitical landscape, it has severely disrupted the current international order. Particularly, the imposition of extensive sanctions on Russia by the United States and other Western countries has compromised the rules of the existing international system and revealed its true, coercive nature. This crisis should provide a strong reminder to China that it must deepen its ‘worst-case scenario thinking’ (底線思維, dǐxiàn sīwéi) and seriously contemplate, as a major strategic aim, building a new international system parallel to the current Western-dominated order.

▍Preparing for Looming Crises

The current international system is one that is dominated by the Western countries, led by the United States, and liberal capitalist in nature. During periods when liberal capitalism functions smoothly, this system expands globally and appears to be rules-based and fair, able to include most countries and regions of the world. However, during periods of crisis, liberal capitalism will contort itself, abandoning established international rules or seeking to create new ones, exemplified by increasing nativism or deglobalisation where the hegemonic nation relinquishes its purported duties of leadership and returns to power politics.

Amidst the Ukraine crisis, the US and the Western countries have disregarded international norms by forcibly casting Russia out of the global financial architecture, namely the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), confiscating Russian state and personal assets, and freezing the country’s foreign exchange reserves. Such measures go far beyond the typical nonviolent means of confrontation employed by nation states such as trade wars, technology blockades, and oil embargoes, and blatantly contradicts the timeless liberal principles that ‘debts must be paid’ and ‘private property is sacrosanct’, among others. These flagrant violations of the so-called ‘rules-based order’ have laid bare the arbitrary, unlawful, and biased character of the international system and the manner in which it can be manipulated by the US and its allies to violently discipline other countries.

From the Chinese perspective, the Ukraine crisis is a warning to China that it must prepare for scenarios in which it is subject to such hostile measures. It is necessary to re-examine the present international order to grasp an accurate understanding of both its benefits and drawbacks, giving up any illusions in its fairness and long-term viability, and, whilst participating in and maximising the utility of the current system, simultaneously making preparations for the construction of a new international order.

Given the size of China, the task of national rejuvenation requires much more than an economic strategy of mere ‘domestic circulation’ (內循環, nèi xúnhuán). To achieve industrialisation and modernisation, China must engage with the world and develop a broader ‘international circulation’ (外循環, wài xúnhuán) by accessing external resources, technologies, and markets. The central task of China’s reform and opening-up policy over the past four decades has been to open the country to the outside world and participate in the global system in order to promote an international environment more favourable to the pursuit of modernisation.?At the same time, China has had to take necessary actions when hostile aspects of the current system have threatened the country’s fundamental interests. In the current situation, it is necessary that China, on the one hand, fights steadfastly against the manipulation of the existing system by the US and the Western countries, and, on the other hand, begins to build a new, more democratic and just global system, in partnership with developing countries.

▍China’s Historical Destiny Is to Stand With the Third World

The present world order has not only been shaped by China, Russia, the United States, and Europe, the countries and regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America have also created a multitude of new regional networks amid the decline of US power. Working with other developing countries is necessary for China to strengthen efforts to build a new international system. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), since it was proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013, has in fact laid the foundation for such cooperation and for the realisation of a new system.

Since the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, the Third World has consistently provided China with new spaces to survive and grow and new sources of strength whenever it has faced pressure from superpowers, including the national liberation movements of Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s, the Bandung Conference of 1955 and the Non-Aligned Movement, Mao Zedong’s Three Worlds theory developed in the 1970s, the emphasis on South-South cooperation during the early stages of reform and opening up in the 1980s, the establishment of the BRICS mechanism at the turn of the century, and, most recently, the development of the BRI in the last decade. Over the past 70 years, China has had adopted a wide range of foreign policies, from the ‘lean to one side’ (一邊倒, yībiāndǎo) policy with the Soviet Union in the 1950s to the ‘integrating with the world’ (與國際接軌, yǔ guójì jiēguǐ) (or with the US, to be exact) policy at the turn of the century; however, China has, consciously or unconsciously, consistently turned to the Third World whenever it has felt that its independence and sovereignty were threatened.

This relationship with the Third World is China’s historic destiny. Today, as China becomes an important pole in the world and is faced with the hostile containment strategy of the hegemonic United States, it cannot follow the alliance politics pursued by the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Dividing the world into antagonistic blocs would drive humanity to the brink of war and global catastrophe; instead, China should continue to pursue an independent and nonaligned foreign policy, focused on bringing together the many countries of the Third World – which constitute the global majority – to foster new forms of partnership, establish new multilateral networks, and create a new international system.

Reflecting upon the practices and experiences of the BRI until now and accounting for the challenges posed by the Ukraine crisis, China’s approach towards building a new international system should be guided by the following considerations:

First, China’s orientation should be based on strategic rather than commercial interests. China cannot merely be concerned with exporting its production capacity and capital or securing access to external resources and markets for Chinese enterprises; but rather it must prioritise what is necessary to ensure strategic survival and national development. By adopting such a strategic perspective, it becomes clear that the approach taken by many Chinese firms and local governments towards other nations and regions, as part of the BRI, is not sustainable as it has prioritised commercial interests and tended to ignore political-strategic interests.

Second, the creation of the new international system requires the development of a new vision, philosophy, and ideology to guide and inspire efforts to build it. In this regard, the BRI’s principles of ‘consultation, contribution, and shared benefits’ (共商共建共享, gòngshāng gòngjiàn gòngxiǎng) are insufficient. While the United States today rallies the Western camp under the banner of ‘democracy versus authoritarianism’, China must clearly uphold the flag of peace and development, uniting and leading the vast developing world whilst appealing to and persuading more European states to join this cause. President Xi Jinping’s global call for the ‘building of a community with a shared future for humanity’ (人類命運共同體, rénlèi mìngyùn gòngtóngtǐ) should be adapted to the new international situation. The Chinese concept of ‘common prosperity and common development’ should be shared with the world and promoted as a core value in building a new international system.

Third, a ‘Development International’ (發展國際, fāzhǎn guójì) should be set up as an institutional entity to create a new global system. Unlike the Western alliance mechanisms, such as the Group of Seven (G7) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) which are dominated by a minority of wealthy countries, a new global system must address the fundamental issue that the overwhelming majority of the world faces: how developing countries can be more effectively organised under the principle of nonalignment. Loosely organised and nonbinding initiatives such as conferences and declarations are wholly inadequate for this task; an institutional mechanism such as a ‘Development International’ should be promoted and constructed to drive more powerful organisational action and to develop networks of knowledge and culture, of media and communication, of economic cooperation, as well as other projects. In a nutshell, forms of organisational action under the mandate of peace and development should be established and experimented with.

▍The Relationship Between the Two Systems

Building a new system does not mean abandoning the present one.

In the forty years of reform and opening up, China’s direction and goal have been to integrate into the existing international order. As a latecomer to industrialisation and modernisation, China has had no choice but to learn from the Western countries and take in their advanced knowledge and experience. Breaking away from this system would inevitably drive China back to the old road of the ‘closed-door’ (閉關鎖國, bìguānsuǒguó) policy of the 1960s and 1970s, cutting the country off from the advanced economies of the present world.

Nowadays, China has travelled a long way down the road of globalisation and has benefited from it; reform and opening up has become bound up with the Chinese people’s basic interests. For this reason, it is neither desirable nor feasible to give up the benefits derived from participating in the current system.

But this by no means negates the urgent necessity of preparing for the threat of the US-led Western alliance sabotaging the present global system. The development of a new international system and the active participation in the present system are two processes that can be implemented simultaneously without conflict, in which the two systems are bound to overlap and interpenetrate each other. When the quantitative changes accumulated by the new system begin to transform into qualitative changes, a brand-new world order will naturally emerge.

烏克蘭危機與新型國際體系構建

烏克蘭危機的爆發，在改變地緣政治格局的同時，也動搖了現行國際秩序。尤其當美國等西方國家對俄羅斯施加了大量違背現行國際體系規則的制裁時，這一體系的暴力本質便暴露無遺。它強烈地提醒中國人，必須加大底線思維力度，認真思考構建與現行以西方為主導的國際體系相平行的新型國際體系這一重大戰略問題。

▍應為可能的危機預作準備

現行國際體系，是以美國為首的西方主導控制的國際體系，其實質是自由主義資本主義國際體系。當自由資本主義運轉順暢時，這一體系向著全球覆蓋，并顯現出規則性和中立性，能夠將大多數國家和地區容納進來。而當自由資本主義運轉不暢，這一體系便會扭曲，逆全球化上升，霸主國家放棄領導責任，實力政治回歸，或拋棄國際規則，或另起爐灶重建規則。

此次烏克蘭危機，美國等西方國家違背國際規則，強行將俄羅斯踢出國際金融結算系統（SWIFT），沒收俄羅斯國家或個人資產，凍結俄羅斯外匯儲備，其手段遠超貿易戰、技術封鎖、石油禁運等原有的民族國家間非暴力對抗手段，而是公然違背“欠債還錢”“私有財產神圣不可侵犯”等古老又現代的原則，充分暴露出現行國際體系非規則性、非中立性的一面，以及美國西方操控的國際體系的暴力政治的本質。

烏克蘭危機提示中國人，必須為類似的危機預作準備。其中的核心要義，在于重新審視當今國際秩序，準確把握其中的利與弊，放棄幻想，在參與并用好現有的國際體系的同時，盡快準備新型國際體系的構建。

以中國的體量，欲完成民族復興偉業，僅僅局限于“內循環”是不夠的。中國的工業化和現代化，必然要走出去，通過利用外部資源、技術和市場，形成廣泛的外循環。中國近40年改革開放的核心任務之一，就是對外開放，加入現有國際體系，搭建有利于中國現代化的國際關系網絡。然而，當現行國際體系發生扭曲變形，并可能傷害到中國的根本利益時，中國當然要有所行動。一方面，要通過堅定的斗爭，抗衡美國等西方國家對現行國際體系的操控；另一方面，則應逐漸搭建以中國為主導的新型國際體系。

▍選擇第三世界國家是中國的歷史宿命

當今世界，中、俄、美、歐之外，是廣大的亞、非、拉國家和地區，是美國力量收縮之后的大量新中間地帶。向這些國家和地區尋找新的力量源泉，是中國建構新型國際體系的當然選擇。起自2013年，由習近平主席倡導的“一帶一路”倡議，事實上已經構成了新型國際體系的實現基礎。

新中國成立以來，每當中國在超級大國壓迫之下欲尋找新的生存發展空間和新的力量來源時，第三世界國家便會自動成為不二選擇。從上世紀50~60年代的亞非拉民族解放運動，到70年代毛澤東的“三個世界理論”，從80年代改革開放時代對于“南南合作”的熱情推動，到世紀之交“金磚五國”機制的探索，乃至最近10年的“一帶一路”倡議。這70多年間，雖然經歷了50年代對蘇聯的“一邊倒”，經歷了世紀之交的“與國際接軌”（實質是與美國接軌），但只要中國感受到獨立自主地位面臨威脅時，便會自覺不自覺地轉向廣大的第三世界。

這恐怕就是中國的歷史宿命。當今日中國已經崛起為世界一極，并面臨霸主美國的全面遏制之時，它的選擇并不會重復蘇聯和美國的結盟政治道路，以集團對抗助推世界走向危險的戰爭邊緣，而是始終保持不結盟的獨立自主姿態，同時將更廣大的第三世界國家團結起來，構建新型伙伴型關系，由此形成獨特的新型國際關系網絡和新型國際體系。

總結“一帶一路”迄今為止的實踐，面對烏克蘭危機之際的挑戰，這一新型國際體系應該具備如下特質：

第一，這一體系應該是戰略性的，而非商業性的。它不僅是中國的產能輸出與資本輸出需求，也不僅是中國企業走出去尋找外部資源與外部市場的需求，而且是服從于中國的戰略發展與戰略生存的根本需求。在這樣的戰略目標下，目前中國許多企業和地區對“一帶一路”沿線國家只講商業利益、不講政治戰略利益的行為便是不可持續的。

第二，新型國際體系的構建必須有新的理念和愿景，必須有新型意識形態的指引，工具方法層面的“共商、共建、共享”是遠遠不夠的。今日美國，以“民主vs威權”為旗幟團結西方陣營，中國應鮮明地舉起“和平與發展”的旗幟，團結帶領廣大的發展中世界，并說服影響更多的歐洲國家。“人類命運共同體”在新的形勢下應得到新的解釋，中國的“共同富裕與共同發展”模式應該在構建新型國際體系時作為核心價值輸出到全世界。

第三，新型國際體系應以“發展國際”作為組織載體。相比于G7、北約等西方國家結盟機制，廣大發展中國家在不結盟機制下如何進行高效的組織動員，是擺在新型國際體系構建面前的一個關鍵課題。在這方面，僅有松散的論壇、項目等組織形式是遠遠不夠的，應推動形成類似“發展國際”的組織機制，推動更加強有力的組織行動，并在此基礎上，形成發展國際知識與文化網絡、發展國際媒體與傳播網絡、發展國際工商企業合作網絡等組織機制。總之，要探索和形成以“和平與發展”為主題的國際性的組織行動。

▍如何處理兩種國際體系的關系

構建新型國際體系，并不意味著拋棄現有的國際體系。

改革開放40年，中國就是以融入現有國際體系為方向和目標的。由于中國在工業化和現代化道路上后來者的身份，向西方世界學習，吸收其先進的知識和經驗，就成為不二選擇。一旦脫離這一體系，中國勢必會回到上世紀60~70年代“閉關鎖國”的道路，與現有世界的先進部分喪失聯系。

今天，中國已經在全球化的道路上愈走愈遠，成為全球化的受益者，改革開放已經成為中國人民的根本利益。因此，放棄這一參與現行國際體系而來的根本利益，既不可取，也不可行。

但這絕不意味著我們對于以美國為首的西方世界破壞現行國際秩序的危險不做準備。應該認識到，發展建設新型國際體系是可以與積極參與建設現行國際體系并行不悖、互不沖突的。新的體系是增量，舊的體系是存量，它們一定會你中有我，我中有你。當新體系的發展由量變達到質變的時刻，一個嶄新的世界秩序就會自然形成。

本文發表于《文化縱橫》2022年6月刊，該期目錄如下，歡迎訂閱紙刊查看更多內容：

— ?2022年6月新刊目錄??—

▍編輯手記

烏克蘭危機與新型國際體系構建

《文化縱橫》編輯部

▍域外

擺脫“資源詛咒”？——海灣六國的工業化與經濟多元化

張若楓

白宮新一代對華戰略操盤手的思想素描

楊博文

▍封面選題：巨變來臨——俄烏沖突改變世界

俄烏沖突在2022 年爆發，以出人意料的方式改變著整個世界格局。沖突爆發以來，以美國為首的西方把國際規則作為武器對俄進行輪番制裁，深刻且全面地動搖“二戰”后幾十年來的國際治理體系，和平與發展的時代主題面臨前所未有的挑戰。俄烏沖突后的世界將向何處去？

跨越俄烏沖突陷阱：重新思考以規則為核心的國際秩序

曹遠征

構建“新三環”：面對全面脫鉤可能的中國選擇

程亞文

作為帝國間沖突的俄烏戰爭

張昕

歐洲為什么不能掌控自己的命運？

魏南枝

重振領導力：俄烏沖突中的英國戰略

孔元

▍專題：人類文明新形態

強世功

正是在這短短十幾年中，中國看待世界的眼光和心態也悄然發生了變化：從凸顯中國特色的特殊主義敘事，轉向更為包容世界的普遍主義敘事；從追求被西方承認的刻意努力，轉向平和心態的自我認同。這種變化最直觀地體現在兩次奧運會的開幕式上。

王立勝、晏擴明

▍觀念

史觀重建：從“主旋律”到“新主流”

陶慶梅

2021年《覺醒年代》《山海情》等作品的出現，不但打破了“主旋律”與大眾文化之間的界限，在市場上創造出良好的口碑；更重要的是，它們通過開辟一種新的歷史敘事方式，呼應了這個時代被掩藏著的某種社會情緒，帶動了更多年輕觀眾的情感，造就了屬于這個時代的主流價值。

周安安、吳靖

從“未來人”到“頑童”——日本動漫與社會秩序的張力

潘妮妮

從不同時期的代表性作者與作品中，我們看到了日本動漫文化中未成年人位置的變遷：從改造世界的“未來人”，到被教養的未成年人，再到輕視成人世界并主動疏離的“頑童”。這反映了并不存在一個價值統一的日本動漫文化，正如戰后日本成人社會的思潮也并非始終如一。

▍社會結構變遷

“波蘭尼時刻”在當代中國

酈菁

中國無法避免全球“波蘭尼時刻”重現帶來的社會壓力和不確定性；并且，由于自身龐大的經濟體量和重要的政治地位，中國必將在其中扮演重要的角色。

▍公益理論與公益實踐

社會組織專業化的中國實踐：慈弘基金會的探索

張婧

▍反思美國模式

重新審視“地緣政治學”——一個世界史的視角

方旭

韓國“單一民族”的神話與現實

鄭立菲

《文化縱橫》國際傳播系列由三大洲社會研究所（Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, 網站：www.thetricontinental.org）和東聲（Dongsheng News，網站：www.dongshengnews.org)協作翻譯并制作，有英語、西語、葡語三個版本。每期根據不同主題，從《文化縱橫》雜志過往發表文章中，選擇3-5篇文章進行編譯，預計每季度發布一期。2023年第1期主題為“重構現代世界體系”，主要分析全球緊張局勢加劇背景下的俄烏戰爭的全球影響，追溯中西關系的歷史軌跡，并探討團結廣大第三世界國家、推動構建新型國際體系的可能性。

Building the New ‘Three Rings’: Reconfiguring China’s Foreign Relations in the Face of Decoupling

The ‘special military operation’ launched by Russia against Ukraine, along with the attendant stalemate that has set in between the West and Russia, are landmark events that signal the approaching end of the globalisation wave that began in the 1980s. The absurd efforts of the United States to bully its allies into enacting murderous sanctions against Russia and to browbeat other countries into taking sides in this conflict, have brought the world to a state reminiscent of the deadly global struggles of the twentieth century ago. These developments pose a major challenge to China; the end of this wave of globalisation means that the country will no longer have the same external environment for development that it has enjoyed for the past forty years, and that the US will likely intensify its push to re-establish its domination over the international system and to decouple from China and Russia. The world has undergone a paradigm shift.?In the face of a potential forced and complete decoupling from the United States and Western countries, China must take initiative and adjust its foreign strategic orientation, reprioritising the countries that it engages with in order to develop a new international order that would safeguard against the repercussions of this decoupling.

The Unspoken Rule of the International Order: The Centre-Periphery Power Structure

During the three decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union, relations between Russia and the West have vacillated. Initially, Russia pursued friendly ties with the US and Western countries, then it gradually grew apart from them, and now it has entered into a fierce confrontation. The evolution of this relationship reflects the political limits of globalisation. Unlike the romantic notions of globalisation that were ascendant following the end of the Cold War, in reality, this era saw the establishment of US hegemony and the dismemberment of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp. This process of globalisation and the US pursuit of global supremacy are two sides of the coin; they condition and promote each other. The inability of this system to promote international equality, with developed and developing countries locked into a relationship of dominator and follower states, means that it cannot continue endlessly. On the one hand, globalisation is abandoned, reversed, or redesigned when it backfires on its initiators, threatening their superiority; on the other hand, countries will continue to resist when powerful states relentlessly pursue domination.?Russia’s special military operation against Ukraine was the result of the domineering nature of this round of globalisation, and has brought the US-dominated system to a standstill.

The decades-long eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was the main reason for Russia’s preemptive strike. This military buildup was not only a security issue but also an economic issue, as part of US efforts to marginalise Russia. Russia’s efforts to leverage globalisation to achieve national development and become a central country in the world order, ran counter to the logic of US-led globalisation. Global capital, financial capital in particular, has mainly concentrated on Russia’s energy, grains, and minerals, sectors which it can exploit for extravagant profits. However, during the tenure of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, the state has strengthened its grip on key sectors concerning national security and people’s livelihoods, and has sought to build a Eurasian economic union to create space for its own economic growth; all of this has upset foreign capital. NATO’s eastward expansion is a manifestation of capital’s control over politics to achieve market expansion. If Russia cannot respond effectively to the efforts to squeeze its development space and exacerbate its marginalisation, it will become even more deeply confined to being a producer of primary goods and lose access to great power politics, increasing the likelihood of a domestic political crisis, which Russian elites wish to avoid.

The power structure of the contemporary world order has been laid bare by NATO’s eastern expansion and the comprehensive sanctions regime imposed by Western countries on Russia. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the European colonial system began to fade out and, during the last half of the twentieth century, the world order became centred on the United Nations and international law, namely the principle of the sovereign equality of states. However, the hierarchical centre-periphery order of the European colonial system has not actually disappeared, but instead continues to exist in an implicit and hidden manner. The absolute power hierarchies which were enforced by colonial diktat have been replaced by an international order based on ‘common but differentiated’ responsibilities, in which states are sovereign equals on the surface but unequal in their actual operation of power.?Although the United States and its allies refer to this international system as a ‘rules-based’ order where every nation is bound to observe the same rules, in fact, it revolves around the West rather than the UN and international law.

Post-war US hegemony is the modern incarnation of the global centre-periphery order. The international Group of Seven (G7), established in the 1970s, holds annual meetings at which Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States discuss not only the affairs of these seven countries, but also global issues for which they negotiate and determine international rules. The so-called rules-based order is indeed an order based on the rules made by Western countries and their allies. What matters here is who makes the rules. In this global system, the division of labour, money supply, industrial production, and rulemaking are the exclusive purview of a select few countries. The advantageous position of these countries would be broken up if other countries attempted to join their club, disrupting the rulemaking authority, monetary dominance, and technological superiority maintained through the intellectual property rights regime. China’s unexpected economic rise in recent decades has broken precisely this post-war centre-periphery world order, threatening the structural privileges of the Western countries, which had never imagined that China could enter the centre of the global stage (even if China is only approaching this position and has not yet arrived). As a result, the United States has labelled China as its ‘strategic competitor’ in recent years and demonstrated its willingness to use any means to halt China’s development.

Both NATO’s eastward expansion and Washington’s attempt to contain China suggest that the US and Western countries only seek to maintain and reinforce their own positions of power in the world order. The Russia-Ukraine conflict and the comprehensive Western sanctions against Russia have further underscored the truth about the global system: the majority of the world find themselves in the ‘countryside’ of the global periphery whereas only a select few countries sit in the ‘cities’ of the global centre, at the core of which is the United States. These countries do not wish to see the ‘countryside’ turn into ‘cities’, as they are. China and Russia hinder the global ‘city centre’ in two key aspects: on the one hand, due to their strong capacity to control capital, the two countries are the largest remaining territories in the world that have not been subject to the arbitrary domination of capitalist globalisation; on the other hand, their national strength is much greater than most countries and impedes efforts of the ‘city centre’ to further control the ‘countryside’ of the global periphery. During this wave of globalisation, China has departed from the ‘countryside’ for the ‘city’ with its strong economic growth and overall growth in national strength. The countries at the centre, despite their earlier enthusiastic praise for globalisation, are now leading ‘deglobalisation’ efforts, exposing the limits of the universality of the post-war international order. China and the other nations of the ‘countryside’ joining the ‘cities’ is simply intolerable to the central countries.

The Base of Support for Multilateralism Is in the Global South

Since the 1980s, China has pursued reform and opening up and promoted international cooperation, including, over the last decade, advancing a proposal for the building of ‘a community with a shared future for humanity’ (人類命運共同體, rénlèi mìngyùn gòngtóngtǐ). These efforts can be traced back to the ancient Chinese idea of ‘the great unity under heaven’ (天下大同, tiānxià dàtóng); however, this ‘great unity’ cannot be achieved by China’s desire alone. In the current context of all-out hostility from the US-led West towards Russia and China, the world can no longer be viewed in a mechanical manner and simply assumed to be united around peace and development. Instead, it is necessary to seriously consider the threats of competition, conflict, and war; even if war is excluded from the likely outcomes, it is clear that it is no longer possible for China to continue to pursue its path of development in the Western-dominated system of globalisation. As such, China must reassess its answer to the primary question in foreign relations: which countries are potential partners for China, now and in the future, and which countries will China find it difficult to establish or maintain partnerships with?

As a well-known Chinese idiom goes, similar things group together and similar people fit together (or, birds of a feather flock together). The same applies to nations; those nations which share similar experiences, contexts, and challenges are more likely to form an enduring cooperative relationship. Since the nineteenth century, the world has undergone a global transformation driven by three key components, industrialisation, rational state-building, and ideologies of progress, shifting from a polycentric world with no dominant centre to a highly interlinked and hierarchical core-periphery order in which the centre of gravity resided in the West.?Between the mid-to-late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, imperialism and globalisation were two sides of the same coin: imperialism has driven globalisation while globalisation reinforced imperialism. Together, these related processes have trapped the peripheral nations of the world in a prison of underdevelopment, from which it is extremely difficult to break free. The West, as the former centre of the international system and the birthplace of imperialism, produced both the modern colonial order as well as the system of US hegemony that has dominated the world since the mid-to-late twentieth century. Meanwhile, many revolutionary movements, namely the anti-colonial struggles of the past century, have fought to overcome the inequality and injustice of this global centre-periphery power structure.

In this unequal world order, the central countries do not fairly welcome peripheral countries to the centre and oppose revolutions in the periphery. Consequently, to liberate themselves from subordination and exploitation, peripheral countries have to work together and, occasionally, exploit the rifts between those states at the centre, tactically cooperating with central states when it can advance the struggle. Over the past century, during the Chinese Revolution and the consolidation of state power, the main external forces that China depended on for support came from the global periphery. In the first half of the twentieth century, the Communist Party of China (CPC) was a member of the Communist International, an alliance of state and nonstate actors among the colonised and oppressed peoples of the world. During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (1931–45), China joined the World Anti-Fascist War, upheld the anti-imperialist banner, and furthered the struggle to dismantle the unequal global structures created by imperialist states. After the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949, China placed a great deal of emphasis on cooperation with the countries of the Third World and supported the anti-colonial movements and post-independence development across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Of particular importance was China’s active participation in the Bandung Conference of 1955 – an important step in the eventual creation of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 – where its proposal of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (和平共處五項原則, hépíng gòngchǔ wǔ xiàng yuánzé) for international relations was well received; the conference became a milestone in China’s relations with the Global South, where cooperation and solidarity gained positive momentum.?It was with the support of peripheral countries that the PRC regained its rightful seat in the United Nations in 1971 and became a permanent member of the Security Council.

The mutual solidarity and support between China and the countries of Asia Africa, and Latin America has remained a key feature of China’s approach to international relations, which emphasises multilateral cooperation with developing countries of the Global South to defend national sovereignty and development in a joint struggle against the unequal and unjust international order structured by the central countries. Despite focusing on relations with peripheral countries, under the framework of ‘omnidirectional diplomacy’ (全方位外交, quán fāngwèi wàijiāo), China remains open to engaging and developing friendly cooperation with Western developed countries and other major powers. However, it should be noted that, in the past, the interaction and cooperation between China and the countries at the centre always bore two preconditions: on the one hand, China insisted on developing foreign relations premised on independence, equality, and mutual benefit, and opposed the existing power hierarchies in international relations; on the other hand, the central countries placed a ceiling on their collaboration with China, namely, the position of Western countries at the centre of the global power structure could not be altered. Whenever either of these two preconditions were not met, China, as a member of the developing world, faced serious challenges in deepening its cooperation with the Western countries, especially on political matters.

Adjusting the Geographic Priorities of China’s Foreign Relations

Over the last forty years, setting aside ideological differences and institutional disparities between countries, China has sought to work with all the other nations. Gradually, China’s international relations came to be guided by the following logic: the major powers are the key; surrounding areas are the first priority; developing countries are the foundations; and multilateral forums are the important stage. However, as the current era of globalisation comes to an end, this approach has increasingly encountered obstacles. The US-initiated process of decoupling from China in terms of economic, technological, knowledge, and people-to-people exchanges – a process that Washington has coerced other Western countries into joining – is unlikely to be reversed and instead, due to the Russia-Ukraine war, it could intensify even further.

Since its founding in 1949, the PRC has undergone several significant shifts in its foreign policy direction, all of which occurred in response to specific historical situations; from the advocacy of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the early years of the PRC, to the Three Worlds Theory proposed amid the normalisation of the China-US relations in the 1970s, to the emphasis on developing partnerships with Western countries as part of the transition to reform and opening up after 1978. The contemporary situation is defined by, what China’s President Xi Jinping has called, ‘major changes unseen in a century’ (百年未有之大變局, bǎinián wèi yǒu zhī dà biànjú) and the increasing tendency of Western states to suppress challenges to their authority. Especially in the period since war broke out between Russia and Ukraine, Western states have revealed their willingness to gang up on, pressure, and contain developing countries, a feature of the current Western-dominated order that will undermine international relations for some time. China cannot help but be highly alarmed by the punitive measures that the West has imposed on Russia, as they could also be imposed on China in a similar manner in the future. For this reason, it is urgently necessary that China re-examines its multilateralist tradition and re-orients the geographic configuration of its foreign relations, strengthening its partnerships with developing countries of the Global South to foster a new international environment that is conducive to China’s national security and long-term development.

In 1974, Mao Zedong set forth his Three Worlds Theory, which categorised the countries of the world into three major groupings, each necessitating a distinct approach to engagement from China. The third grouping, the developing countries of the Third World, were the main focus of China, which itself was also part of the Third World; the Chinese government and people firmly supported the just struggles of all the oppressed peoples and nations. Drawing on China’s previous practices and experiences in foreign relations, the theory outlined spatial priorities for China’s ties with other countries and provided an important ideological guide to the country’s approach to South-South cooperation. This theory remains highly relevant and should guide the present-day reconfiguration of the spatial priorities of China’s foreign relations. Contrary to the emphasis placed on working with Western countries since reform and opening up began four decades ago, China now needs to foreground the advancement of the South-South project.

Whether it concerns diplomatic affairs, long-term development, or national rejuvenation, for a considerable period of time, China’s foreign strategic arrangements will have to prioritise engaging with countries of the Global South. China should configure its foreign relations and promote the construction of a new global order under the ‘three-ring’ (三環, sān huán) framework. The first ring refers to China’s neighbouring regions of East Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East, which present important resource, energy, and security considerations; the second ring refers to the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, with which China engages in trade, investment, and infrastructure projects, and to which China mainly delivers its foreign aid; finally, the third ring refers to the United States, European countries, and other industrialised countries with which China exchanges industrial products, technologies, and knowledge.

Within the new ‘three ring’ framework, China’s first and foremost priority in helping to build a new international system should be the first ring, namely East Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. To further promote East Asian economic integration and linkages with Central Asia and the Middle East, it is necessary to strengthen engagement and cooperation between Asian countries.. In recent years, by promoting economic diplomacy, China has made considerable progress in advancing East Asian economic integration and economic cooperation with many Asian countries. The latest breakthrough in East Asian economic integration was realised on 1 January 2022, when, after years of negotiation, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) finally entered into force. However, economic exchanges among East Asian countries have been increasingly affected by extra-regional forces and security issues in recent years, with disputes over maritime rights in the South China Sea and Washington’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ strategy fuelling uncertainty in the region. To prevent external forces from exploiting internal problems in Asia, China should move away from the ‘GDP supremacy’, or a narrow focus on economic matters, which it prioritised previously in its foreign relations, and pay greater attention to political and security agendas in the region, promotinge more security cooperation among Asian countries.

South-South Cooperation is the Material Basis of the New ‘Three Rings’

The material basis for the new ‘three rings’ framework is South-South cooperation, a concept that emerged in the late twentieth century regarding mutual interests, support, and solidarity among Third World countries.?In the twenty-first century, a new foundation for South-South cooperation is being laid, making the concept more achievable in reality. The main reason for this is that, in recent decades, a number of developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have been able to industrialise or quasi-industrialise by ‘climbing up the borrowed ladder’, seizing the opportunities afforded by the wave of globalisation. Among these countries, a new global system of material production and circulation has taken shape, and is on track to eclipse the original ‘ladder’ of globalisation built by Western countries. This new global system has manifested in two important respects.

First, the share of developing countries in the global economy has changed significantly. In 1980, developed countries accounted for 75.4 percent of global GDP while developing countries accounted for less than 25 percent; however, by 2021, the former group’s share of global GDP had fallen to 57.8 percent while the latter’s share rose to 42.2 percent.?The combined GDP of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) plus Turkey, South Korea, and Indonesia, in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, jumped from 21 percent of the global economy in 1992 to 37.7 percent in 2021, while the combined share of G7 countries declined from 45.8 percent to 30.7 percent in the same period.

Second, trade and reciprocal investment between developing countries have also become pivotal. From 1997 to 2010, trade between China and African states increased 22.4 times and trade with Latin American states increased roughly 22 times; and from 2010 to 2021, China-Africa and China-Latin America trade increased another 2 times and 2.5 times respectively.?From 2000 to 2018, trade between China and Arab states ballooned from $15.2 billion to $244.3 billion, a 16-fold increase in less than twenty years.?Other emerging economies, such as Brazil and India, have sharply increased their trade with developing countries. From 2003 to 2010, Brazil’s trade with Arab states increased four-fold, while its trade with African states increased five-fold, reaching a total of $26 billion, a figure higher than Brazil’s trade with traditional trading partners such as Germany and Japan; and from 2010 to 2019, Brazil’s trade with Arab and African states increased by 98 percent and 68 percent, respectively.?Similarly, since 2001, India’s trade with African states has grown at an average annual rate of 17.2 percent and, from 2011 to 2021, it increased 2.26 times.?India’s trade with Latin American states as well as the Middle East and North Africa region, has experienced similar growth. Trade volumes between developing countries are growing at a faster rate than the global average, while trading with developed countries continues to decline.

Within the developing world, a particularly important network of economic cooperation has emerged in Asia, centring around China. This is demonstrated in the following four trends:

1. Asia is once again the world economy’s centre of gravity. In 1980, the developing countries of Asia accounted for only 13.7 percent of global GDP, however, their share would rise to 24.7 percent in 2010 and reach 35.8 percent in 2021.?For East Asian countries (including China, Japan, South Korea, and ten Southeast Asian countries), in 1980 their share of global GDP was only about 16.2 percent, but by 2020 it had more than doubled, reaching 30 percent.?Meanwhile, among the fifteen member countries of the RCEP, by 2020, their combined population reached 2.27 billion, cumulative GDP hit $26 trillion, and total imports and exports surpassed $10 trillion, accounting for about 30 percent of the global total.?According to HSBC, the cumulative size of the RCEP economies is estimated to expand to 50 percent of the world economy by 2030.
2. Global trade and investment are also shifting to Asia, with its share in global trade having steadily increased from 15.7 percent in 1980, to 22.2 percent in 1990, to 27.3 percent in 1995, to 26.7 percent in 2000, to 25.6 percent in 2001, and further to 36 percent by 2020. Today, Asia is the world’s leading trading region.
3. The level of intra-regional trade dwarfs that of extra-regional trade in Asia. Between 2001 and 2020, Asia’s total internal trade jumped from $3.2 trillion to $12.7 trillion, with an average annual nominal growth rate of 7.5 percent; during the same period, Asia’s share of total world trade increased from 25.6 percent to 36.0 percent.?In 2020, Asia’s intra-regional trade has accounted for nearly 58.5 percent of its entire foreign trade.
4. East and West Asia are growing closer economically; the main destinations of Middle Eastern energy have shifted from the United States and Europe to East and South Asia.

Today, developing countries have formed the preliminary structure for a new global economic system, but further synergy between them is needed to achieve a higher degree of economic connectivity as well as greater political influence in the international arena and freedom from Western control and coercion. This past decade, China has become the world’s largest real economy (concerning the production and exchange of goods and services) and the second largest economy overall, as well as the largest trading partner of most countries in the world. In 2021, the global share of China’s manufacturing sector was nearly 30 percent. As the country that produces the most material goods in the world, China is in a similar position as the United States was in the post-Second World War period (at its peak, in 1953, the US accounted for roughly 28 percent of global industrial output). What China can and should do is to take initiative in driving a global strategy to improve the system of global material exchange among developing countries, that is, to truly realise South-South cooperation.

However, deficiencies still remain. Current trade and investment between developing countries still rely heavily on Western-led financial and monetary networks. If developing countries are to further enhance their economic and political autonomy, and if emerging economies are to gain levels of political influence in the world system commensurate with their economic scales, they must overcome their financial and monetary dependence on the West. Therefore, to build a ‘new three ring’ international system, developing countries must consider not only traditional geopolitical factors, but also the global systems of finance and information. In recent years, China has explored this by developing currency swaps with several emerging market economies. A higher-level and broader mechanism for financial and monetary cooperation should be created among developing countries. To this end, it is important to take advantage of existing platforms and mechanisms that can enhance South-South cooperation, including: upgrading and transforming the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB) established by the BRICS countries to advance an autonomous international payment system; strengthening security and financial cooperation within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), particularly between China, Russia, India, and Iran cooperation (it should be noted that Russia is also a developing country and that the Chinese and Russian economies are highly complementary); further promoting East Asian economic integration under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with special efforts to consolidate the achievements of the RCEP; building a common energy market in Asia, so that buyers in East and South Asia and sellers in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Russia can share the same energy trading and payment network; making proper use of the BRICS Summit mechanism, thus deepening South-South cooperation; and promoting the diversification of the international monetary system and the internationalisation of the RMB in the context of South-South cooperation, as well as supporting the international status of the euro while hedging against the hegemony of the US dollar.

One hundred years ago, the CPC leaders proposed the revolutionary strategy of ‘encircling the cities from the rural areas’ (農村包圍城市, nóngcūn bāoweí chéngshì). In the present era of ‘major changes unseen in a century’, China and developing countries need to dismantle the centre-periphery world order, overcome the hostility of Western countries, and improve solidarity and cooperation within the global ‘countryside’. The deepening of South-South cooperation will create favourable conditions and mobilise resources for the construction of a new ‘three ring’ global system, which can ease international tensions and allow developing countries, including China, to take their rightful places at the centre of the world economic and political order. After more than forty years of reform and opening up, China must adjust its understanding of ‘opening up’ and transform its thinking about foreign relations. Of course, China should still try to maintain its cooperation with the West as long as possible and as long as they do not make the choice to go completely against China.

構建“新三環”：面對全面脫鉤可能的中國選擇

俄羅斯對烏克蘭發起“特別軍事行動”，以及隨之而來的西方國家與俄羅斯陷入全面對立，是20世紀80年代以來的全球化大潮走向終結的一起標志性事件。美國挾持盟友對俄羅斯展開欲置之于死地的制裁，威逼世界其他國家在西方國家與俄羅斯之間選邊站隊，已使世界正在重現百年前你死我活的爭斗場景，也給中國帶來巨大挑戰。“全球化終結”使中國不再擁有過去四十年來的外部發展環境可資利用，美國推動重建以其為主導的國際體系并與中國和俄羅斯“脫鉤”的進程，未來極有可能進一步強化。當今世界的時代特征，已發生范式性變革。面對被動全面脫鉤的可能情況，中國需要在對外戰略安排上主動做出調整，在國家交往優先性上重新做出選擇，以塑造有利于對沖西方國家對華脫鉤負面影響的新型國際體系。

▍國際秩序的潛規則是中心-邊緣權力結構

蘇聯解體后三十年間，俄羅斯由起初積極向美國和西方國家靠攏，到逐漸與之疏離，以至當前不惜激烈對抗，凸顯出全球化的政治限度。與人們對全球化的浪漫想象不同，最新一輪的全球化最初是美國霸權的投資品，部分服務于瓦解蘇聯和社會主義陣營的目的，這決定了它不可能無限擴展。從全球化的主導型國家與跟隨型國家，或發達國家與發展中國家的關系來說，則存在著國際政治的平等限度：當全球化對發起者發生反噬，威脅到其權力優勢時，全球化必然會發生“逆轉”，運行路徑會被重新設計。最近幾十年來的全球化進程與美國的權力優勢追求是一枚硬幣的正反面，二者互為條件、彼此共進。俄羅斯對烏克蘭發動“特別軍事行動”，是這一輪全球化已經完全暴露其權力本相的結果，也給由美國主導的全球化畫上了句號。

北約東擴是俄羅斯主動出擊的主要理由。這看起來是個安全問題，其實也是全球化進程中的經濟問題。將蘇聯在全球體系中外圍化，是美國發起的全球化進程的目標，俄羅斯意欲借助全球化實現國家復興、成為中心地帶國家，顯然與其發生和演進邏輯正相違背。全球資本特別是金融資本對俄羅斯的興趣，更多集中在能源、糧食和礦產等方面，這是金融資本可以從中謀取巨利的領域。但普京執政以來，俄羅斯加強了對關乎國家安全和基本民生的關鍵產業的控制，并致力于構建歐亞經濟聯盟，塑造一個適合于自己的經濟發展空間，這是外部資本不樂見的。北約東擴正是資本左右政治實現市場擴張的體現，其不斷擠壓俄羅斯的發展空間，加劇俄羅斯的外圍化，如不能做出有效應對，俄羅斯將被進一步定格在初級產品提供者的位置，喪失參與大國政治的能力，甚至出現內政危機。這是俄羅斯精英階層不愿看到的。

北約東擴以及當前西方國家抱團對俄羅斯瘋狂制裁，已將當代世界的權力結構顯露無遺。“二戰”結束以后，歐洲殖民體系逐漸瓦解，20世紀下半葉以來國際秩序的明規則，是以聯合國和國際法為中心，體現的是國家主權平等原則。但歐洲殖民體系下的中心-邊緣等級性國際秩序并沒有真的消失，而是作為潛規則和隱秩序一直延續至今，只是以往以直接驅使為特征的絕對等級性權力關系已不復存在，代之以“共同而有差別”的國際秩序，即所有國家在明面上主權一律平等，但在實際運行上仍存在著權力差別。“以規則為基礎的秩序”是這種秩序的主要表達，所有的國家都需要遵守相同的規則，但這個規則的真實內涵，并不是以聯合國和國際法為中心，而是以西方國家為中心。

戰后以來的美國霸權和20世紀70年代后建立起來的七國集團，是當代版本的全球性中心-邊緣秩序的主要體現，七國集團每年的年會，討論的不僅僅是七個國家的事情，也是整個世界的事情，它們商議好了再推動轉變為全球規則。“以規則為基礎的秩序”，其實是“以西方國家制定的規則為基礎的秩序”，誰是規則制定者，才是關鍵所在。在全球性的分工體系中，規則制定、貨幣供給和工業品生產，是少數處于中心地帶的國家的事情，其他國家如果也想加入其中，就有可能瓦解少數國家的優勢地位，這是掌握規則制定權和貨幣主導權，并以知識產權維持技術優勢的國家不愿意看到的。中國在最近幾十年來出人意料的經濟增長，所打破的正是戰后以來的中心-邊緣國際秩序，威脅到了以西方國家為中心的潛規則，近些年來美國將中國定義為主要“戰略競爭對手”，擺出一副不將中國打垮不罷休的架勢，主要原因就是中國的發展已經觸動美國和其他西方國家的奶酪，后者從沒有設想過中國也可以“走進世界舞臺中央”，哪怕目前其實只是“走近”。

無論是北約東擴還是美國將中國選定為重點打壓對象，都反映出美國和西方國家想要維持和強化的是自身的權力優勢。俄烏沖突以及西方國家對俄無所不用其極的制裁措施進一步凸顯的實相，是全球大多數國家處在邊緣地帶的“農村”，少數國家處在中心地帶的“城市”，美國又是全球“城市中心”中的“市中心”，“城市”并不想看到“農村”也像它們一樣變成“城市”。中國和俄羅斯對全球“城市中心”的妨礙，既在于兩國對資本的強管控能力，成為資本主義全球化最后兩塊最大的未自由支配之地；也在于兩國因其相較大多數國家強大得多的國家實力，而成為“城市中心”進一步控制全球“農村”邊緣地帶的障礙。在這一輪全球化進程中，中國以其強勁的經濟增長和國家實力的全面提升，表現出由“農村”向“城市”進發的趨勢，中心地帶國家一反早期對全球化的溢美，轉而在近年來成為“逆全球化”的引領者，這將戰后國際秩序的“共同”限度暴露無遺。中國也成為“城市”中的一員，是中心地帶國家所無法容忍的。

▍中國開展多邊合作的基本盤在非西方國家

在《毛澤東選集》的首篇《中國社會各階級的分析》中，開篇提出一個問題：“誰是我們的敵人？誰是我們的朋友？這個問題是革命的首要問題。”中國過去四十多年來進行改革開放，以及近幾年來倡議建設人類命運共同體，在國際交往中已不再刻意強調敵友之分，而是希望在“各美其美，美人之美”中推進“美美與共，天下大同”。但天下能否達成“大同”，并不由中國一家的愿望決定。在以美國為首的西方國家與俄羅斯、中國展現出全面對抗態勢的情況下，當代世界的時代特征，已不能機械地認為還是“和平與發展”，而需要嚴肅地考慮“競爭”甚至“戰爭”——即便戰爭的情況可以排除，想一如既往地在由西方國家主導的全球化體系中實現更好的發展，已經沒有可能。中國不得不重新思考對外往來中的“首要問題”：誰是當下和未來中國的可能合作者，誰是中國無法拉住的合作對象？

物以類聚，人以群分。國家也是一樣，有著相似經歷、處境和訴求的國家，更有可能形成長久合作關系。在當代國際關系話語體系中，西方國家vs非西方國家、發達國家vs發展中國家、北方國家vs南方國家是對國家類型的常見區分，發達國家、北方國家大多是西方國家，南方國家、發展中國家都是非西方國家。與發達國家vs發展中國家、北方國家vs南方國家的區分偏向經濟層面不同，西方國家vs非西方國家的區分還指向政治和文化層面，暗含了全球權力關系。19世紀以來，在工業化、理性國家建設和“進步的意識形態”三個關鍵要素的作用下，世界經歷了一次“全球轉型”(Global Transformation)：以往處于離散狀態的“無中心的多元世界”，轉向了一個高度關聯而又等級化的“中心-邊緣”全球性國際體系，西方是這一秩序的中心。19世紀后期到20世紀上半葉的革命時代，被頻繁談論的“帝國主義”，就是對這種秩序關系的描述和定性。帝國主義與19世紀中后期到20世紀前期的全球化，乃是一體兩面，帝國主義隨全球化而來，全球化則強化了帝國主義，二者共同給處于邊緣地帶的國家設置了一個“鐵桶陣”，想從中逸出，殊為不易。西方國家以往是全球體系的中心，也是帝國主義的發生地，近代世界的殖民秩序、20世紀中下葉以來的美國霸權，都由此而來；與此同時，近代以來的諸多革命，包括20世紀中下葉的反殖民運動，要打破的，就是這種不平等不公正的中心-邊緣權力結構。

在中心-邊緣的全球權力結構中，中心地帶國家不可能真心幫助邊緣地帶國家的革命，也不會歡迎邊緣地帶國家以平等的方式加入到中心地帶國家之列，邊緣地帶國家欲擺脫被支配、被剝奪的命運，只能依靠邊緣地帶國家間的抱團取暖，在偶然情況下也要利用中心地帶國家間的罅隙，爭取與后者實現斗爭中的合作。20世紀上半葉的中國革命和20世紀下半葉的政權鞏固，中國所依靠的主要外部力量，正是來自全球體系中的邊緣地帶。中國共產黨曾經參與的共產國際網絡，是當時被殖民被壓迫民族的非政權性力量間的同盟；在抗日戰爭中，中國借參與世界反法西斯戰爭之機，延續之前中國革命的“反帝”訴求，進一步推動廢除帝國主義國家強加于中國頭上的各種不平等權利；1949年中華人民共和國成立后，中國高度重視與“第三世界”國家的合作，支持亞非拉世界的反殖民運動和獨立后的國家建設，尤其是1955年積極參與萬隆會議和提出和平共處五項原則，得到亞非拉國家的良好呼應，也成為此后中國與亞非拉國家關系進入良性循環的重要節點，在后者的支持配合下，中國于1971年重返聯合國并成為安理會常任理事國。

中國與亞非拉國家在反抗殖民統治和國家建設中的相互聲援、幫助，奠定了近代以來中國多邊主義的一個關鍵特點，即高度重視與非西方發展中國家的合作，在共同反抗中心國家構建的不平等不公正國際秩序中捍衛國家獨立自主和發展進步。在以非西方發展中國家為依托所展開的全方位外交中，中國并不排斥與西方發達國家和其他大國的往來甚至發展友好合作關系。但也要看到，中國以往與中心地帶國家的交往和合作始終有兩個前提：一是從中國的角度來論，中國堅持在獨立自主、平等互惠的前提下發展對外關系，反對國際關系中的權力等級；二是從中心地帶國家來論，它們與中國合作，始終也有一個天花板，那就是不能動搖以西方國家為中心的全球權力結構。當這兩個前提中的任何一個發生改變時，作為發展中國家一員的中國，就很難繼續與西方國家深入發展合作關系，尤其是政治上的合作關系。

過去四十年間，中國放棄意識形態歧異、回避國家制度差別，致力于與所有國家開展合作，逐步形成了“大國是關鍵、周邊是首要、發展中國家是基礎、多邊是重要舞臺”的對外交往格局。但這一格局在“全球化終結”時刻到來之際，已遭遇重重障礙。美國裹挾其他西方國家發起的與中國在經濟、技術、知識、人員往來等方面的“脫鉤”，不太可能因俄烏戰火而撤回，相反可能變本加厲。

中華人民共和國成立以來，已經歷多次外交方向的轉變，從剛建國時的“一邊倒”，到20世紀70年代的“一條線，一大片”和“三個世界”劃分，再到1978年后轉向改革開放、重點發展與西方國家的合作，都因應了當時情勢。在當前“百來未有之大變局”之際，西方國家表現出越來越強的打壓潛在挑戰者的意向，特別是俄烏戰火爆發后，西方國家群體集結、全方面壓制非西方國家的態勢暴露無遺，并將成為未來較長時間內國際關系的結構性存在。中國不能不高度警惕西方國家對俄羅斯無所不用其極的制裁打壓手段未來會如法炮制施加于中國。為此，重新審視中國以往的多邊主義傳統，調整對外交往的空間格局，加強與非西方發展中國家的合作，以創造有利于保障中國國家安全和長遠發展的新型國際環境，迫在眉睫。

1974年毛澤東提出“三個世界”的劃分，對當時世界的三種類型國家及中國可以與之交往的方式做了辨析，“第三世界”的發展中國家是中國的主要交往對象，中國自身也是“第三世界”國家中的一員，中國政府和人民堅決支持一切被壓迫人民和被壓迫民族的正義斗爭。“三個世界”理論承接了之前的中國對外交往經驗，為當時中國的對外往來在空間優先性上作了排序，也是中國以往參與南南合作的重要思想指導，它對當前中國重構對外往來的空間優先性，依然有很強的啟發意義。相比于改革開放以來中國更加重視與西方國家的合作，中國今后要將推動南南合作放在突出位置。無論是尋求外交突圍、長遠發展還是國家復興，在未來相當長時間內，中國的對外戰略安排都要把主要精力放到推動建設以亞洲及其周圍地區為依托的新的全球性體系。其最終結果，是要形成保障中國國家安全和發展的“三環”國際體系：第一環是中國周邊的東亞、中亞和中東，東亞連接世界財源，中國與此區域內國家已形成緊密產業分工體系，中亞和中東連接世界資源，中國要背靠此區域內國家獲得穩定的能源供應和可靠的安全屏障；第二環是亞非拉廣大發展中國家，中國與之進行原材料和工業品交換，中國的對外援助也應主要面向這些國家；第三環則擴展到以歐洲和美國為主的傳統工業化國家，中國與之進行工業品、技術和知識交換。以這“三環”結構來安排對外往來的輕重緩急和前后左右，重新規劃對外交往的方向和內容。

構建“新三環”國際體系的首要和關鍵是在“第一環”，即亞洲兩翼：一翼是東亞，另一翼是中亞、中東。而要繼續深入推進東亞經濟一體化進程，加強與中亞、中東的聯動，又要以豐富與亞洲國家間的交往議題為前提。過去這些年，中國致力于推進與其他國家間的經濟外交，有力推進了東亞經濟一體化及與亞洲很多國家的經濟合作。東亞經濟一體化最新的、有突破意義的進展，是經過多年談判，區域全面經濟伙伴關系協定（RCEP）終于達成并于2022年1月1日正式生效。但東亞國家的經濟往來，近年越來越多地受到域外勢力和安全因素的影響，圍繞南海海洋權益引發的爭端、美國的“印太”戰略，都給東亞經濟一體化進程增添了不確定性。中國應走出以往國際交往中的“GDP至上主義”，重視政治、安全議題，推動亞洲國家間更多的安全合作，避免亞洲內部問題繼續被外部力量利用。

▍“新三環”的物質基礎：“南南合作”正在塑造新的全球性體系

中國推動建構“新三環”國際體系的國際關系基礎是“南南合作”，它是一個老概念，強調的是非西方“第三世界”國家間的相互合作、共同扶持。在20世紀下半葉，南南合作的意義更多是政治性的，發展中國家由于普遍經濟不發達、技術水平也較低，相互間的貿易往來、技術交流對彼此的幫助有限，對全球經濟的影響也不大。20世紀90年代以來，“南南合作”的概念已逐漸淡出人們視野，中國的國際關系學界對它也已關注不多，但實際上，“南南合作”在新世紀以來正在建立起新的基礎，在今天已更加具有現實可能性。主要原因是，最近幾十年時間，亞非拉發展中國家在追趕全球化浪潮“借梯上屋”也變成工業化或準工業化國家，從全球物質生產和流通來說，亞非拉發展中國家之間已構成一個新的全球性體系，原先的那只由西方國家搭起來的全球化“梯子”，在它們眼中已褪去神彩。這個新的全球性體系主要有以下表現：

首先，發展中國家的經濟體量全球占比今非昔比。1980年，發達國家GDP占全球的78.9％，而發展中國家僅占21％；2021年，發達國家占全球GDP的比重跌至 57.8％，發展中國家則上升至42.2 ％。由巴西、俄羅斯、印度、中國組成的金磚四國（BRIC）再加上土耳其、韓國和印度尼西亞，這七個國家按購買力平價計算的國內生產總值總和占全球經濟的比重，從1992年18%上升到2021年的 37.36%，而七國集團同期則由51%下降到44%。

其次，發展中國家間的貿易往來和相互投資也已舉足輕重。中國與非洲之間的貿易量在1997~2010年間增加了22.6倍，與拉美的貿易增長了22倍；到2021年，中非、中拉貿易相比2010年又分別增長2倍、2.5倍。2000年，中阿貿易額僅為152億美元，到2018年達到2443億美元，不到20年增長了16倍。巴西與阿拉伯國家之間的貿易額自2003年至2010年增加了4倍，與非洲的貿易額則增加了5倍，總額達到260億美元，這一數字高于巴西與德國或日本等傳統貿易伙伴的貿易額；到2019年，巴西與阿拉伯國家、非洲的貿易相比2010年又分別增長 0.98倍、0.68倍。2001年以來，印度與非洲貿易額年均增長17.2%，2021年比2011年增長2.26倍。印度與拉丁美洲、中東北非國家的貿易，也經歷了類似的增長。印度、巴西等新興經濟體之間的相互貿易和投資也都在迅速升溫，發展中國家間的貿易量增長速度高于全球平均增速，而與發達國家的貿易往來則持續下降，這些國家間在初級產品和工業品生產上的分工合作，復制了歷史上的全球化物質產品交換方式。

再有，從中國周圍來看，亞洲已形成一張共在的經濟合作網絡。具體表現在：

一、亞洲重新成為世界經濟重心。1980年亞洲的發展中國家GDP僅占全球的 12.7％，2010年上升至 20.6％，到2021年已達到31.2 ％。其中東亞國家（包括中日韓和東南亞10國）1980年GDP全球占比僅13.7%左右，而到了2020年達到了 28.8%，翻了一倍多。2020年，RCEP15個成員國總人口達22.7億，GDP達26萬億美元，進出口總額超過10萬億美元，均占全球總量約30%。匯豐銀行預測，到2030年，RCEP經濟圈的經濟體量全球占比將提高至50%。

二、全球貿易和投資重心也不斷向亞洲轉移。亞洲在全球貿易中的份額由1980年的 15.7％提高到1990年的22.2%、1995年的27.3%、2000年的26.7%、2001年的25.6 ％，而到2020年又進一步上升到占世界貿易份額的36%，成為世界主要的貿易集團。

三、亞洲內部貿易水平超出與域外貿易。2001~2020年間，亞洲區域內貿易總額從3.2萬億美元躍升至12.7萬億美元，年均名義增長率達7.5%。同一時期，亞洲占世界貿易總額的比重從25.6%提升至36.0%。2020年，亞洲域內貿易占對外貿易的比重已近58.5 %。

四、亞洲兩翼在經濟上正在成為一個世界，中東能源的流向已由以往主要向歐美轉向東亞和南亞。

時至今日，發展中國家已初步形成全球性的經濟體系，但它們之間要達成更高程度的經濟聯結，以及在國際舞臺上產生更為強大的政治影響和擺脫西方國家的控制或強制，還有賴于在經濟、政治上進一步聯合。這又有賴于少數先走一步、經濟社會發展水平更為突出的國家發揮帶動作用。21世紀第二個十年以來，中國在成為世界第一大實體經濟體、第二大經濟體的同時，也已成為世界上絕大多數國家的最大貿易伙伴；中國制造業全球貢獻率2021年已接近30%，作為全球生產物質產品最多的國家，所扮演的乃是美國在“二戰”結束之際的角色（美國工業產值在其巔峰的1953年，占了全球28%左右）。中國可以做，也應該做的，是在全球戰略上積極推動發展中國家間的全球性物質交換體系的完善，即真正實現南南合作。

但還有欠缺。當前發展中國家的貿易往來與相互投資，仍然嚴重依賴于西方國家提供的金融和貨幣網絡。發展中國家的經濟、政治自主性要想進一步提升，新興經濟體要想在世界體系中獲得與其經濟總量相稱的政治影響力，必須擺脫對西方國家的金融和貨幣依賴。因此，構建“新三環”國際體系，不僅需要考量傳統的地緣因素，也要將幣緣及信（息）緣作為重要考量。過去一些年，中國與一些新興市場經濟體開展貨幣互換，已在這方面做出探索。廣大發展中國家之間應該發展出更高層次、更廣范圍的金融和貨幣合作。為此，需要利用好現有的一些平臺和機制，將南南合作提升到新的層次，包括升級和改造亞投行、金磚國家銀行，完善自主可控的國際支付體系；加強上海合作組織的安全合作及其框架下的中俄印伊合作尤其是金融合作，需要看到俄羅斯也是發展中國家，中國和俄羅期之間在經濟上也是高度互補的；在“一帶一路”框架下深入推進東亞經濟一體化，特別是鞏固RCEP的成果；構建亞洲共同能源市場，使東亞和南亞的能源買方市場與中東、中亞、俄羅斯的能源賣方市場共在一張能源買賣和支付網絡；善用金磚國家會議機制，以此引領南南合作的深化；推動國際貨幣體系多元化和南南合作范疇下的人民幣國際化，在對沖美元霸權的同時適當對歐元的國際地位提供支持。

一百年前，中國共產黨的領導者們提出了“農村包圍城市”的革命之路。在當今“百年未有之大變局”之際，中國和發展中國家要破解當代世界的中心-邊緣秩序和西方國家對非西方國家的防范打壓，同樣要搞好全球“農村”地帶的團結合作。新全球性體系的出現和南南合作的深化，將為中國進入世界經濟、政治最前臺，以及調度全球資源構建“三環”國際體系，化解國際壓力和突破重圍，創造良好可用條件。在經歷四十多年的改革開放后，中國須調整對“開放”的理解，在對外往來的思維上實現新的突破。當然，在盡可能的情況下，中國仍要努力維持與西方國家的合作，只要后者不做出完全與中國為敵的選擇，中國就不要放棄與之相向而行。

本文發表于《文化縱橫》2022年6月刊，該期目錄如下，歡迎訂閱紙刊查看更多內容：

— ?2022年6月新刊目錄??—

▍編輯手記

烏克蘭危機與新型國際體系構建

《文化縱橫》編輯部

▍域外

擺脫“資源詛咒”？——海灣六國的工業化與經濟多元化

張若楓

白宮新一代對華戰略操盤手的思想素描

楊博文

▍封面選題：巨變來臨——俄烏沖突改變世界

俄烏沖突在2022 年爆發，以出人意料的方式改變著整個世界格局。沖突爆發以來，以美國為首的西方把國際規則作為武器對俄進行輪番制裁，深刻且全面地動搖“二戰”后幾十年來的國際治理體系，和平與發展的時代主題面臨前所未有的挑戰。俄烏沖突后的世界將向何處去？

跨越俄烏沖突陷阱：重新思考以規則為核心的國際秩序

曹遠征

構建“新三環”：面對全面脫鉤可能的中國選擇

程亞文

作為帝國間沖突的俄烏戰爭

張昕

歐洲為什么不能掌控自己的命運？

魏南枝

重振領導力：俄烏沖突中的英國戰略

孔元

▍專題：人類文明新形態

強世功

正是在這短短十幾年中，中國看待世界的眼光和心態也悄然發生了變化：從凸顯中國特色的特殊主義敘事，轉向更為包容世界的普遍主義敘事；從追求被西方承認的刻意努力，轉向平和心態的自我認同。這種變化最直觀地體現在兩次奧運會的開幕式上。

王立勝、晏擴明

▍觀念

史觀重建：從“主旋律”到“新主流”

陶慶梅

2021年《覺醒年代》《山海情》等作品的出現，不但打破了“主旋律”與大眾文化之間的界限，在市場上創造出良好的口碑；更重要的是，它們通過開辟一種新的歷史敘事方式，呼應了這個時代被掩藏著的某種社會情緒，帶動了更多年輕觀眾的情感，造就了屬于這個時代的主流價值。

周安安、吳靖

從“未來人”到“頑童”——日本動漫與社會秩序的張力

潘妮妮

從不同時期的代表性作者與作品中，我們看到了日本動漫文化中未成年人位置的變遷：從改造世界的“未來人”，到被教養的未成年人，再到輕視成人世界并主動疏離的“頑童”。這反映了并不存在一個價值統一的日本動漫文化，正如戰后日本成人社會的思潮也并非始終如一。

▍社會結構變遷

“波蘭尼時刻”在當代中國

酈菁

中國無法避免全球“波蘭尼時刻”重現帶來的社會壓力和不確定性；并且，由于自身龐大的經濟體量和重要的政治地位，中國必將在其中扮演重要的角色。

▍公益理論與公益實踐

社會組織專業化的中國實踐：慈弘基金會的探索

張婧

▍反思美國模式

重新審視“地緣政治學”——一個世界史的視角

方旭

韓國“單一民族”的神話與現實

鄭立菲

《文化縱橫》國際傳播系列由三大洲社會研究所（Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, 網站：www.thetricontinental.org）和東聲（Dongsheng News，網站：www.dongshengnews.org)協作翻譯并制作，有英語、西語、葡語三個版本。每期根據不同主題，從《文化縱橫》雜志過往發表文章中，選擇3-5篇文章進行編譯，預計每季度發布一期。2023年第1期主題為“重構現代世界體系”，主要分析全球緊張局勢加劇背景下的俄烏戰爭的全球影響，追溯中西關系的歷史軌跡，并探討團結廣大第三世界國家、推動構建新型國際體系的可能性。

Five Centuries of Global Transformation: A Chinese Perspective

Humanity is in the midst of a global upheaval, on a scale unseen in 500 years: namely, the relative decline of Europe and the United States, the rise of China and the Global South, and the resulting revolutionary transformation of the international landscape. Although the era of Western global dominance is often said to have lasted five centuries, precisely speaking this is an overstatement. In reality, Europe and the United States have occupied their positions as world hegemons for closer to 200 years, after reaching their initial stages of industrialisation. The first industrial revolution was a turning point in world history, significantly impacting the relationship between the West and the rest of the world. Today, the era of Western hegemony has run its course and a new world order is emerging, with China playing a major role in this development. This article explores how we arrived at the current global conjuncture examining the different stages in the relationship between China and the West.

▍Stage I: A Shifting Balance Between China and the?West

The first encounter between China and Europe dates back to the era of naval exploration of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, during which the Chinese navigator and diplomat Zheng He (1371–1433) embarked on his Voyages Down the Western Seas (鄭和下西洋, Zhèng Hé xià xīyáng) (1405–1433), followed by the Portuguese and Spanish naval expeditions to Asia.?From then on, China has established direct contact with Europe through ocean passages.

During this period China was ruled by the Ming dynasty (1388–1644), which adopted a worldview guided by the concept of?tianxia?(天下, tiānxià, ‘all under heaven’).?This belief system generally categorised humanity into two major civilisations: the Chinese who worshipped heaven, or the sky, and the West which, broadly, worshipped gods in a monotheistic sense.?It is important to note that, in this era, the Chinese had a broad conception of the West, considering it to encompass all the regions which expanded northwestward from Mesopotamia to the Mediterranean Sea and then to the Atlantic coast, rather than the contemporary notion which is generally limited to of the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Europe. On the other hand, Chinese civilisation spread to the southeast, from the reaches of the Yellow River to the Yangtze River Basin onward to the coast. The two civilisations would meet at the confluence of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, from which point there has been a complete world history to speak of. At the same time, however, tianxia put forward a universalist conception of the world, in which China and the West were considered to share the same ‘world island’. Separated by the ‘Onion Mountains’ (the Pamir Mountains of Central Asia), each civilisation was thought to have its own history, though there was not yet a unified world history, and each maintained, based on their own knowledge, the tianxia order at their respective ends of the world island.

Although the Ming dynasty discontinued its sea voyages after Zheng He’s seventh mission in 1433, some islands in the South Seas (南洋, nányáng, roughly corresponding to contemporary Southeast Asia) became incorporated into the imperial Chinese tributary system (朝貢, cháogòng). This constituted a major change in the tianxia order, compared with the prior Han (202 BCE–CE 9, 25–220 CE) and Tang (618–907 CE) dynasties in which tribute was mainly received from states of the Western Regions (西域, xīyù, roughly corresponding to contemporary Central Asia). More importantly, this southeastward expansion opened a road into the seas for China, as Chinese people of the southeast coast migrated to the South Seas, and with them goods such as silk, porcelain, and tea entered the maritime trade system. Compared with the prosperous Tang and Song (960–1279) periods, overseas trade expanded, with the Jiangnan (江南, jiāngnán, ‘south of the Yangtze River’) economy, which was largely centred on exports, being particularly dynamic; consequently, industrialisation accelerated and China, for the first time, became the ‘factory of the world’.

European nations did not have the upper hand in their trade with China, however they offset their deficit with the silver that they mined in the newly conquered Americas. This silver flowed into China in large quantities and became a major trading currency, leading to the globalisation of silver. Meanwhile, the introduction of corn and sweet potato seeds, native to the Americas, to China contributed to the rapid growth of the nation’s population due to the suitability of these crops to harsh conditions.

However, China’s involvement in shaping a maritime-linked world order also brought about unexpected problems for the country; namely, an imbalance between its economy, which penetrated the maritime system, and its political and military institutions, which remained continental. This contradiction between the land and the sea produced significant tensions within China, eventually leading to the demise of the Ming dynasty. Border conflicts in the north and northeast required significant financial resources, however most of China’s wealth at that time came from maritime trade and was concentrated in the southeast. Consequently, education thrived in this coastal region, resulting in scholar-officials (士大夫, shìdàfū) from the southeast coming to dominate China’s political processes and prevent tax reforms to better distribute wealth – instead, the traditional tax system was strengthened, imposing larger burdens on the peasantry.?These tensions would eventually come to a head; taxation weighed particularly heavily on northern peasants who mainly lived off farming, leading to their displacement and becoming migrants who eventually overthrew the Ming regime. At the same time, military resources in the north were insufficient, leading to the growing influence of Qing rebel forces in the northeast and their opportunistic advances to the south, culminating in the establishment of the Qing dynasty’s (1636–1912) rule over the entire country.

The Qing dynasty originated among the Manchu people of northeast China, who had agricultural and nomadic cultural roots. As Qing forces marched southwards and founded their empire, they made great efforts to establish control over the regions flanking China from the west and north, an arc extending from the Mongolian Plateau to the Tianshan Mountains and to the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau. For thousands of years, these northwest regions were a source of political instability, with successive dynasties trying and failing to unify the whole of China. By integrating these areas into the Chinese state, the Qing dynasty was thus able to achieve this historic political aim of unification. This domestic integration also had an impact on China’s international position, with Russia now becoming the country’s most important neighbour as the overland Silk Road was rerouted northwards, via the Mongolian steppe, through Russia to northern Europe.

By the mid-to-late eighteenth century, these two ‘arcs’ of development, on the land and sea respectively, held equal weight but differing significance for China: the land provided security, while the seas were the source of vitality. However, both the land and sea developments contained contradictory dynamics: the regions of the northwestern steppe were not very stable internally while relations with neighbouring Russia and the Islamic world remained stable, on the other hand, the southeastern seas were stable internally but introduced new challenges for China in the form of relations with Europe and the United States. These land-sea dynamics have historically presented China with unique trade-offs and, to this day, they remain a fundamental strategic issue.

In contrast, European countries benefited more from direct trade with China, and rose to a dominant position within the new global order.

During the sixteenth century, under the increasingly decadent Roman Catholic Church, ethnic nationalism brewed up in Europe, culminating in Martin Luther’s Reformation in Germany. Subsequently, Europe entered an era of nation-state building known as the early modern period, characterised by the break-up of the authority of the Roman Catholic Church and the establishment of the sovereignty of secular monarchies, which overcame some of the hierarchies and divisions created by the feudal lords and made all subjects equal under the king’s law. The first country to achieve this was England, where Henry VIII banned the Church of England from paying annual tribute to the Papacy in 1533 and passed the Act of Supremacy the following year, establishing the king as the supreme head of the English Church which was made the state religion. This is why England is recognised as the first modern nation, while the constitutional changes were secondary.

The Roman Catholic Church, facing a ruling crisis, sought to open up new pastoral avenues, and began to preach outside of Europe through the voyages of ‘discovery’. Christianity gradually became a world religion, one of the most important developments in the last five centuries, with missionaries finally making their way to China, after many twists and turns, in the late sixteenth century.

The Christian missionaries had prepared to spread their message of truth to the Chinese, who they had expected to be ‘barbarians’. However, to their surprise, they discovered that China was a powerful civilisation with a sophisticated governance system and religious traditions. Although not believing in the personal gods of the missionaries, the Chinese people had a system of moral principles, a highly developed economy, and an established order. This inspired some missionaries to develop a serious appreciation for China, including translating Chinese classics and sending the texts back to Europe, where they would have a notable impact on the Enlightenment in Paris.

During the Enlightenment, Western philosophers developed ideas of humanism and rationalism, including notions that human beings are the subject and a ‘creator’ does not exist; humans should seek their own happiness instead of trying to ascend to the kingdom of God; humans can have sound moral beliefs and relations without relying on religion; the state can establish order without relying on religion; direct rule by the king over all subjects is the best political system, and so on. It is important to note, however, that these Enlightenment ideals, which are said to have formed the basis for Western modernity, had been common knowledge in China for thousands of years. As such, the flow of Chinese ideas and teachings to the West through Christian missionaries can be considered an important, if not the only, influence in the development of Western modernisation. Of course, the Western countries have been the main drivers of global modernisation over the last two centuries, but the modernity that it advocates has long been embedded in other cultures, including China. It is necessary to recognise and affirm this fact to understand the evolution of the world today.

In short, during the first stage of world history, which spanned more than 300 years from the early-to-mid fifteenth century to the mid-to-late eighteenth century, an integrated world system began to form, with both China and the West adjusting, changing, and benefiting in their interactions. From the Chinese perspective, this world order was largely fair.

▍Stage II: Reversals of Fortunes Between China and the West

In the mid-to-late eighteenth century, Western countries utilised their higher levels of industrialisation to secure decisive military superiority, which they abused to conquer and colonise nearly the entire Global South. This brought the world closer together than ever before, but in a union that was unjust and, therefore, unsustainable.

Among the Western countries, England was the first to achieve an advanced stage of industrialisation, for which there was a special reason: colonisation. The British empire appropriated massive amounts of wealth from its colonies, which also served as captive markets for British manufactures. This wealth and market demand, along with England’s relatively small population, drove scientific and technological development, and ultimately industrialisation based on the mining of fossil fuels (namely, coal), and production of steel and machinery. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, England would become the wealthiest and most powerful country in the world, with its wealth spreading to western Europe and its colonial settlements such as the United States and Australia. The thriving European powers violently conquered and colonised the outside world through military force including most of Africa, Asia, and the Americas, eventually reaching China’s doorstep in the early-to-mid nineteenth century. In the preceding centuries of peaceful trading with China, the Western powers accumulated a large trade deficit, which they now sought to balance through the opium trade. However, due to the severe social consequences of this drug trade, China outlawed the importation of opium in 1800; in response the Western powers launched two wars against China – the First Opium War (1839–1842) and the Second Opium War (1856–1860) – to violently open the country’s markets up. After China was defeated, various Western countries, including England, France, Germany, and the United States, forced China to sign unequal treaties granting these nations trade concessions and territories, including Hong Kong. As a result, the tianxia order began to crumble and China entered a period referred to as the ‘century of humiliation’ (百年國恥, bǎinián guóchǐ).

China’s setback was rooted in the long-standing imbalance between its marine-oriented economy and continental military-political system. First, China’s market relied heavily on foreign trade, but the Qing government failed to develop a sovereign monetary policy, resulting in the trade flow being constantly controlled by foreign powers. Silver from abroad became China’s de facto currency and, with the government unable to exercise effective supervision, the country lost monetary sovereignty and was vulnerable to the fluctuations of silver supplies, destabilising the economy. Second, China’s natural resources were over-exploited to produce large amounts of exports; as a result, the country’s ecological environment was severely damaged. Constrained by both market and resource limitations, China’s endogenous growth hit a chokepoint, as productivity plateaued, employment declined, and surplus populations became displaced, leading to a series of major rebellions in the early-to-mid nineteenth century. It was in this context that the West showed up at China’s doorstep.

Under the pressure of both domestic problems and external aggression, China embarked on the path of ‘learning from the outside world to defend against foreign intervention’ (師夷長技以制夷, shī yí zhǎng jì yǐ zhì yí), which has been fundamental theme of Chinese history over the past century or so. This formulation, despite having been ridiculed by many since the 1980s following the initiation of China’s economic reforms, epitomises the country’s strategy. On the one hand, China has closely studied the key drivers of Western power, namely industrial production, technological development, economic organisation, and military capability, as well as methods for social mobilisation based on the nation-state. On the other hand, China has sought to learn from other countries for the purpose of advancing its development, securing its independence, and building upon its own heritage.

Until the mid-twentieth century, however, this path did not yield significant changes for China, fundamentally due to its inadequate state capacity, which deteriorated even further after the Qing dynasty fell in 1911. In fact, several initiatives undertaken in the late Qing period to strengthen the state, generated new problems in turn; for example, the ‘New Army’ (新軍, xīnjūn) which was established in the late-nineteenth century in an effort to modernise China’s military would turn into a secessionist force. Meanwhile, theories of development advocated by scholar-officials in this period, such as the concept of ‘national salvation through industry’ (實業救國, shíyè jiùguó), were impossible to implement due to the state’s inability to provide institutional support. As such, trade remained China’s fastest growing economic sector, which, despite bringing short-term economic benefits, resulted in China becoming further subordinated to the West.

However, by the time of the Second World War, which was preceded by China’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (1937–1945), the country’s international position began to improve, while the West experienced a relative decline. The Second World War and anti-colonial struggles for national liberation dealt a crushing blow to the old imperialist order, as the Western powers were forced to retreat, initiating a decline as they were no longer able to reap colonial dividends. Countries across Asia, Africa, and Latin America, including China, won their independence; meanwhile, the Soviet Union, stretching across Eurasia, emerged as a significant rival to the West. Amid these global convulsions, China’s weight on the international stage dramatically increased and it became an important force.

In this global context, China began its journey toward national rejuvenation, with two main priorities. The first priority was political; emulating the Soviet Union, China’s Nationalist and the Communist parties established a strong state, which had been the cornerstone of Western economic development, while the lack of state organisation and mobilisation capacity was the greatest weakness of the Qing dynasty in the face of Western powers. The second priority was industrialisation, which advanced in a step by step manner in three phrases.

The first breakthrough in industrialisation took place after the Chinese Revolution in 1949 and was made possible by the help of the Soviet Union, which exported a complete basic industrial system to China. Although this system had serious limitations, which came to a head by the 1970s and 1980s, it allowed China to develop a comprehensive understanding of the systematic nature of industry, especially the underlying structure of industrialisation, that is, heavy industry.

The second breakthrough in industrialisation came after China established diplomatic relations with the United States in the 1970s and began to import technologies from the US and European countries. During this phase, China focused on the development of its southeast coast, a region which had a longstanding history of rural commerce and industry. With the support of machinery and knowledge gained during the first round of industrialisation, the consumer goods sector in the southeast coastal areas was able to develop rapidly at the township level, the level of government which had the most flexibility. By absorbing a large amount of workers, the labour-intensive industrial system significantly improved livelihood for the people.

The third breakthrough in industrialisation, beginning at the turn of the century, was driven by the traditional emphasis for a strong state and a desire to continue the revolution, saw the government devote its capacity to building infrastructure and steering industrial development. As a result, China experienced continuous growth in industrial output and kept moving upwards along the industrial chain, creating the largest and most comprehensive manufacturing sector in the world. The global economic landscape thus changed dramatically.

Today, China is in the midst of its fourth breakthrough in industrialisation, which revolves around the application of information technology to industry. In the current period, the United States is worried about being overtaken by China, which has prompted a fundamental change in bilateral relations and ushered in an era of global change.

In short, at the heart of the second stage of world history were the shifting dynamics between China and the West. For more than 100 years since the early nineteenth century, the Western powers were on the upswing while China experienced a downturn; since the Second World War, however, the trends have reversed, with China on the rise and the West declining. Now it appears that the critical point in this relationship is approaching, where the two sides will reach equivalent positions, exhausting the limits of the old world order.

▍Stage III: The Decline of the US-Led Order

In the wake of China’s rise, the old, Western-dominated world order has been overwhelmed, however, the real trigger for its collapse is the instability resulting from the fact that the United States has been unable to secure the unipolar global dominance which it pursued after the end of the Cold War.

Historically, the Roman empire could not reach India, let alone venture beyond the Onion Mountains; in the other direction, the Han and Tang dynasties could have hardly maintained their power even if they had managed to cross this range. The structural equilibrium for the world is for nations to stay in balance, rather than be ruled by a single centre.

Even the immense technological advances in transportation and warfare have been unable to change this iron law. Prior to the Second World War, the Western powers had penetrated nearly all corners of the world; despite their competing interests and the force needed to maintain their colonies, this system of rule was, in a way, more stable than the current order by distributing power more broadly across the several countries. Meanwhile, in the postwar period, the Soviet Union and the West formed opposing Cold War blocs, with each camp having its own scope of influence and balanced, to an extent, by the other.

In contrast, following the end of the Cold War, the United States became the sole superpower, dominating the entire world. The United States, as the most recently established Western country, the last ‘New World’ to be ‘discovered’ by the Europeans, and the most populous of these powers, was destined to be the final chapter in the West’s efforts to dominate the world. The United States confidently announced that their victory over the Soviet Union constituted ‘the end of history’. However, ambition cannot bypass the hard constraint of reality. Under the sole domination of the United States, the world order immediately became unstable and fragmented; the so-called?Pax Americana?was too short-lived to be written into the pages of history. After the brief ‘end of history’ euphoria under the Clinton and Bush administrations, the Obama era saw the United States initiate a ‘strategic contraction’, seeking to unload its burdens of global rule one after another.

In addition to external costs, Washington’s fleeting pursuit of global hegemony also induced internal strains. Although the United States reaped many dividends from its imperial rule by developing a financial system in which capital could be globally allocated, this came with a cost; as a Chinese saying goes, ‘a blessing might be a misfortune in disguise’ (福兮禍所依, fú xī huò suǒ yī). The boom of the US financial sector, along with the volatile speculation that feeds off it, has caused the country to become deindustrialised, with the livelihoods of the working and middle classes bearing the brunt. Due to the self-protective measures of emerging countries such as China, it was impossible for this financial system to fully extract sufficient external gains to cover the domestic losses suffered by the popular classes due to deindustrialisation. Consequently, the US has developed extreme levels of income inequality, and become sharply polarised, with increasing division and antagonism between different classes and social groups.

Deindustrialisation is at the root of the US crisis. Western superpowers were able to tyrannise the world during the nineteenth century, including their bullying of China, mainly due to their industrial superiority, which allowed them produce the most powerful ships and cannons; deindustrialisation causes the supply of those ‘ships and cannons’ to become inadequate. Even the US military-industrial system has become fragmentary and excessively costly due to the decline of supporting industries. The US elite realises the gravity of this problem, but successive administrations have struggled to address the issue; Obama called for reindustrialisation but made no progress due to the deep impasse between Republicans and Democrats, a dynamic that inhibits effective government action, which Francis Fukuyama termed the ‘vetocracy’; Trump followed this up with the timely slogan ‘Make America Great Again’, promising to make the US the world’s strongest industrial power once more; and this intention can also be seen in the incumbent Biden administration’s push for the enactment of the CHIPS and Science Act and other initiatives aimed at boosting domestic industrial development. However, as long as US finance capital can continue to take advantage of the global system to obtain high profits abroad, it cannot possibly return to domestic US industry and infrastructure. The United States would have to break the power of the financial magnates in order to revive its industry, but how could this even be possible?

In contrast to the deindustrialisation which has taken place in the United States, China is steadily advancing through its fourth breakthrough of industrialisation and rising towards the top of global manufacturing, relying on the solid foundation of a complete industrial chain. Fearing that they will be surpassed in terms of ‘hard power’, the US elite has declared China to be a ‘competitor’ and the nature of relations between the two countries has fundamentally changed.

The US elite have long referred to their country as the ‘City upon a Hill’, a Christian notion by which it is meant that the United States holds an exceptional status in the world and is a ‘beacon’ for other nations to follow. This deep-seated belief of superiority means that Washington cannot accept the ascendance of other nations or civilisations, such as China, which has been following its own path for thousands of years. China’s economic rise and, consequently, its growing influence in reshaping the US-led global order is nothing more than the world returning to a more balanced state; however, this is sacrilegious to Washington, comparable to the rejection of religious conversion for missionaries. It is clear that the US elite have exhausted their goodwill for China, are united in pursuing a hostile strategy against it, and will use all means to disrupt China’s development and influence on the world stage. Washington’s aggressive approach has, in turn, hardened the resolve of China to extricate itself from the confines of the US-led global system.?Pax Americana?will only allow China to develop in a manner which is subordinated to the rule of the United States, and so China has no choice but to take a new path and work to establish a new international order. This struggle between the United States and China is certain to dominate world headlines for the foreseeable future.

Nevertheless, there are several factors which decrease the likelihood that the struggle will develop in a catastrophic manner. First, the two countries are geographically separated by the Pacific ocean; and, second, although the United States is a maritime nation adept at offshore balancing, it is much less capable of launching land-based incursions, particularly against a country such as China which is a composite land-sea power with enormous strategic depth. As a result, US efforts to launch a full-scale war against China would be nonviable; even if Washington instigated a naval war in the Western Pacific, the odds would not be in its favour. On top of these two considerations, the United States is, in essence, a ‘commercial republic’ (the initial definition given for the country by one of its Founding Fathers, Alexander Hamilton), meaning that its actions are fundamentally based on cost-benefit calculations; China, on the contrary, is highly experienced in dealing with aggressive external forces.?Altogether, these factors all but guarantee that a full-frontal war between the two countries can be entirely avoided.

In this regard, the shifting positions of China and the United States vary greatly from similar dynamics in the past, such as the evolving hegemony on the European continent in recent centuries. In the latter context, the narrow confines of Europe cannot allow for multiple major powers, whereas the vast Pacific Ocean certainly can. This situation constitutes the bottom line of the relationship between the two countries. Therefore, while China and the United States will compete on all fronts, as long as China continues to increase its economic and military strength and clearly demonstrates its willingness to use that power, the United States will retreat in the same rational manner as its former suzerain, Britain, did. Once the United States withdraws from East Asia and the Western Pacific, a new world order will begin to take shape.

Over the past few years, China’s efforts in this respect have paid off, causing some within the United States to recognise China’s power and determination, and adjust their strategy accordingly, pressuring allied countries to bear greater costs to uphold the Western-led order. Despite the posturing of the Western countries, there is, in fact, no such ‘alliance of democracies’; the US has always based its alliance system on common interests, of which the most important is to work together, not to advance any high-minded ideal, but to bleed other countries dry. Once these countries can no longer secure external profits together, they will have to compete with each other and their alliance system will promptly break up. In such a situation, the Western countries would return to a state similar to the period before the Second World War; fighting each other for survival rather than to carve the world into colonies. This battle of nations, although not necessarily through hot war, could cause the Western countries to backslide to their early modern state.

The willingness of the United States to do anything in its pursuit of profit, has led to the rapid crumbling of its value system. Since former President Woodrow Wilson led the country to its position as the leader of the world system, values have been at the core of the US appeal. At that time, Wilson held sway with many Chinese intellectuals, though disillusion soon followed; meanwhile, today, the myth of the ‘American dream’ and universal values of the United States remains charismatic to a considerable proportion of Chinese elites, however, the experience of the Trump presidency has torn the mask off these purported values. The United States has openly returned to the vulgarity and brutality of colonial conquest and westward expansion.

In addition, the current generation of Western elites suffers from a deficit in its capacity for strategic thinking. Many of the leading strategists and tacticians of the Cold War have now died, and amid hubris and dominance of the two decade ‘end of history’ era, the United States and European countries did not really produce a new generation of sharp intellectual figures. Consequently, in the face of their current dilemmas, the best that this generation of elites can offer is nothing more than repurposing old solutions and returning to the vulgarity of the colonial period.

This kind of vulgarity may be shocking to some, however it has deep roots in US history: from the Puritan colonists genocide against indigenous peoples in order to build their so-called ‘City upon a Hill’; to many of its founding fathers having been slave owners, who enshrined slavery in the Constitution; to the Federalist Papers which designed a complex system of separation of powers to guarantee freedom, but coldly discussed war and trade between countries; and to the country’s obsession with the right to bear arms, giving each person the right to kill in the name of freedom. Thus, we can see that Trump did not bring vulgarity to the United States, but only revealed the hidden tradition of the ‘commercial republic’ (it is worth noting that, in the Western tradition, merchants also tended to be plunderers and pirates).

Today, the United States has nearly completed this transformation of its identity: from a republic of values to a republic of commerce. This version of the country does not possess the united will to resume its position as leader of the world order, as evidenced by the strong and continued influence of the ‘America First’ rhetoric. The rising support among certain sections of the US population for such political vulgarity will encourage more politicians to follow this example.

The world order continues to be led by a number of powerful states, but is in the midst of great instability as efforts to strengthen the European Union have failed, Russia is likely to continue to decline, China is growing, Japan and South Korea lack real autonomy, and the United States, due to financial pressures, is rapidly shedding its responsibilities to support the network of post-war global multilateral institutions and alliances and instead seeks to build bilateral systems to maximise its specific interests. Put simply, the world order is falling apart; presently, the relevant questions are related to how rapid this breakdown will be, what an alternative new order should look like, and whether this new order can emerge and take effect in time to avoid widespread serious global instability.

▍China’s Role in Reshaping the World Order

A new international order has begun to emerge amid the disintegration of the old system. The main generative force in this dynamic is China, which is already the second largest economy in the world and is a civilisation that is distinct from the West.

China is one of the largest countries in the world and its long history has endowed it with experiences that are relevant to matters of global governance. With its immense size and diversity, China contains a world order within itself and has historically played a leading role in establishing a tianxia system that stretched over land and sea, from Central Asia to the South Seas. Alongside its rich history, China has also transformed itself into a modern country over the past century, having learned from Western experiences and its own tradition of modernity. By sharing the wisdom of its ancient history and the lessons of its modern development, China can play a constructive role in global efforts to address imbalances in the world order and build a new system in three major ways.

1. The restoration of balanced global development.?The classical order on the ‘world island’ (世界島, shì jiè daǒ, roughly corresponding to Eurasia) leaned toward the continental nations, while the modern world order has been largely dominated by Western maritime powers. As a result, the world island became fractured, with the former centre of civilisation becoming a site of chaos and unending wars.?Pax Americana?was unable to establish a stable form of rule over the world island, as the United States was separated from this region by the sea and was unable to form constructive relations with non-Western countries. Therefore, the United States was only able to maintain a maritime order, rather than a world order. It relied on brutal military interventions into the centre of the world island, hastily retreating after wreaking havoc and leaving the region in a perpetual state of rupture.

Conversely, China’s approach to the construction of a new international order is that of ‘listening to both sides and choosing the middle course’ (執兩用中, zhí liǎng yòng zhōng). Historically, China successfully balanced the land and sea; during the Han and Tang dynasties, for instance, China accumulated experience in interacting with land-based civilisations, meanwhile, since the Song and Ming dynasties, China has been deeply involved in the maritime trade system. It is based on this historical experience that China has proposed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), of which the most important aspect is the incorporation of the world island and the oceans, accommodating both the ancient and modern orders. The BRI offers a proposal to develop an integrated and balanced world system, with the ‘Belt’ aiming to restore order on the world island, while the ‘Road’ is oriented towards the order on the seas. Alongside this initiative, China has built corresponding institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

2. Moving beyond capitalism and promoting people-centred development.?The system on which Western power and prosperity has been built is capitalism, rooted in European legacies of the merchant-marauder duality and colonial conquest, driven by the pursuit of monetary profits, managing capital with a monstrously developed financial system, and hinging on trade. Under capitalism, the Western powers have viewed countries of the Global South as ‘others’, treating them as hunting grounds for cheap resources or markets. Although the Western powers have been able to occupy and spread capitalism to much of the world, they have not been able to widely cultivate prosperity, too often tending towards malicious opportunism; for those countries that do not profit from colonialism, but suffer from its brutal oppression, the system is nonviable. As a result, since the Western powers took charge of the world in the nineteenth century, the vast majority of non-Western countries have been unable to attain industrial or modern development, a track record which disproves the purported universality of capitalism.

The ancient Chinese sages advocated for a socioeconomic model that Dr. Sun Yat-sen, a leader in the 1911 revolution to overthrow of the Qing dynasty and the first president of the Republic of China, called the ‘Principles of People’s Livelihood’ (民生主義, mínshēng zhǔyì) which can be rephrased as ‘the philosophy of benefiting the people’ (厚生主義, Hòushēng zhǔyì). This philosophy, which values the production, utilisation, and distribution of material to allow people to live better and in a sustainable manner, dates back over 2000 years, appearing as early as the?Book of Documents?(尚書, shàngshū), an ancient Confucian text. Guided by this philosophy, a policy of ‘promoting the fundamental and suppressing the incidental’ (崇本抑末, chóngběn yìmò) was adopted in ancient China to orient commercial and financial activities towards production and people’s livelihood. Today, China has rejuvenated this model and begun to share it with other countries through the BRI, which has taken the approach of teaching others ‘how to fish’, emphasising the improvement of infrastructure and advancement of industrialisation.

China, which is now the world’s factory and continues to upgrade its industries, is also driving a reconfiguration of the world’s division of labour: upstream, accepting components produced by cutting-edge manufacturing in Western countries; downstream, transferring productive and manufacturing capacity to underdeveloped countries, particularly in Africa. As the world’s largest consumer market, China should access energy from different parts of the world in a fair and even manner, and promote global policies which emphasise production (‘the fundamental’) and minimise financial speculation (‘the incidental’).

3. Towards a world of unity and diversity.?When the European powers established the current world order, they generally pursued ‘homogenisation’, inclined to use violence to impose their system on other countries and inevitably creating enemies. The United States, influenced by Christian Puritanism, tends to believe in the uniformity of values, imposing its purported ‘universal values’ on the world, and denouncing any nation that differs from its conceptions as ‘evil’ and an enemy. During ‘the end of history’ period, this tendency was exemplified by the so-called War on Terror which launched invasions and missiles throughout the Middle East. Despite this preoccupation with homogenisation, the US-led order is being unravelled by rampant polarisation, broken apart by intensifying cultural and political divisions.

China, on the other hand, tells a different story. For millennia, based on the principle of ‘multiple gods united in one heaven’ or ‘one culture and multiple deisms’, various religious and ethnic groups have been integrated within China through the worship of heaven or the culture, thus developing the nation and the tianxia system of unity and diversity. Universal order or harmony can neither be attained through violent conquest nor through the preaching and imposition of values to change ‘the other’ into ‘self’, but rather by recognising the autonomy of ‘the other’; as emphasised in?The Analects of Confucius?(論語·季氏, lúnyǔ·jìshì), ‘…all the influences of civil culture and virtue are to be cultivated to attract them to be so; and when they have been so attracted, they must be made contented and tranquil’ (修文德以來之，既來之，則安之, xiūwén dé yǐlái zhī, jì lái zhī, zé ānzhī). By and large, it is along this path of harmony in diversity that China today conducts international relations.

China should understand the building of a new international order through the lens of revitalising the tianxia order, and its approach should be guided by the sages’ way of ‘harmonising all nations’ (協和萬邦, xiéhé wànbāng) to pacify the tianxia. The process of constructing a new international order, or a revitalised tianxia order, should adhere to the following considerations:

1. A tianxia order will not be built at once but progressively.?A Chinese idiom can be used to describe the China-led process of forming a new global system: ‘Although Zhou was an old country, the (favouring) appointment alighted on it recently’ (周雖舊邦,其命維新, zhōu suī jiù bāng, qí mìng wéixīn). Zhou was an old kingdom that was governed by moral edification; its influence gradually expanded, first to neighbouring states and then beyond, until two thirds of the tianxia paid allegiance to the kingdom and the existing Yin dynasty (c. 1600–1045 BCE) was replaced by the Zhou dynasty (c.?1045– 256 BCE). In approaching the construction of a new international order and revitalising the concept of tianxia, China should follow this progressive approach to avoiding a collision with the existing hegemonic system. The concept of tianxia refers to a historical process without end.

2. Virtue and propriety are the first priority in maintaining the emerging tianxia system.?A tianxia system aims to ‘harmonise all nations’, not to establish closed alliances or demand homogeneity. China should promote morality, decency, and shared economic prosperity in relations between nations and international law. What distinguishes this approach from the existing system of international law is that, in addition to clarifying the rights and obligations of each party, it also emphasises building mutual affection and rapport between nations.

3. A tianxia order will not seek to monopolise the entire world.?The world is too large to be effectively governed by any country alone. The sages understood this and so their tianxia order never attempted to expand all over the known world at the time, nor did later generations; for instance, Zheng He came across many nations during his voyages to the Western Seas, but the Ming dynasty did not colonise and conquer them, nor did he include them all in the tributary system, but instead allowed them to make their own choices. Today, China does not seek to impose any system onto other countries; with such moderation, the struggle for hegemony can be avoided.

4. A new international order will consist of several regional systems.?Instead of a world system governed by one dominant country or a small group of powers, a new global order will likely be made up of several regional systems. Across the world, countries with common geographies, cultures, belief systems, and interests have already begun to form their own regional organisations, such as in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and the Atlantic states; China should focus on the Western Pacific and Eurasia.

The concept of regional systems shares some similarities with Samuel Huntington’s division of civilisations, however, importantly, it does not necessitate any clash between them. As a large country and land-sea power, China will likely overlap with multiple regional systems, including both maritime- and land-based regional systems. China, which literally means ‘the country of the middle’, should serve as a harmoniser between different regional systems and act to mitigate conflict and confrontation; in this way, a new international order of both unity and diversity can emerge.

A new architecture of global governance will be built gradually, with layers nested upon each other from the inside out. To this end, China’s efforts should begin in the innermost layer to which it belongs, East Asia. Traditionally, China, the Korean peninsula, Vietnam, Japan, and other countries in this region formed a Confucian cultural sphere; however, after the Second World War, despite these nations successfully modernising, relations between them have deteriorated due to the pressures of foreign powers, such as the United States and Soviet Union. China’s efforts to reorganise the world order must start from here, by revitalising this shared heritage, developing coordinated regional policies based on the ‘Principles of People’s Livelihood’, and demonstrating improved standards of prosperity and civility for the world. As the achievements and strength of such regional efforts grow, the power of the United States and its world order will inevitably fade out, and the process of global transformation will rapidly accelerate.

After the inner layer of East Asia, the next-most nested layer, or middle layer, that China should focus on is the heart of the world island, Eurasia. Central to these regional efforts is the SCO, in which China, Russia, India, and Pakistan are already member states, Iran and Afghanistan are observer states, and Turkey and Germany can be invited. Due to its economic decline and weakening global influence, Russia is likely to increase its focus on its neighbouring regions, namely Central Asia, and to participate more actively in the SCO, including assisting in efforts to promote harmonious relations and development in the region and minimising conflict. The stability of Eurasia is key, not only to the security and prosperity of China, particularly its western regions, but to overall global peace.

Finally, the outermost layer for China is the institutionalised BRI, which connects nations and regions across the world. Proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013, to date China has signed more than 200 BRI cooperation agreements with 149 countries and 32 international organisations.

▍Concluding Remarks

The evolution and future direction of the world order cannot be understood without examining the shifting relationship between China and the West over the past five centuries. In the early modern era, the Western powers were inspired by China in their pursuit of modernisation; in the past century, China has learned from the West. The reemergence of China has shaken the foundations of the old Western-dominated world order and is a driving force in the formation of a new international system. Amid the momentous changes in the global landscape, it is necessary to recognise the strengths and limits of Western modernity, ideologies, and institutions, while also appreciating the Chinese tradition of modernity and its developments in the current era. For China, this requires a restructuring of its knowledge system, guided by a new vision which is inspired by classical Chinese wisdom: ‘Chinese learning as substance, Western learning for application’ (中學為體，西學為用, Zhōngxué wèi tǐ, xīxué wèi yòng).

人類正在經歷五百年未有之大變局：歐美相對衰落，中國等非西方世界興起，世界格局因此出現革命性變化。

不過，嚴格說來，言“五百年”之大變局，或許有點夸張。略加考察即可發現，歐美之強不過持續兩百年而已，以其初步完成工業化為開端。

故五百年來之世界史，可以工業化為限，粗劃為兩階段，其間中、西之勢有較大變化。

西方今日已至其兩百年強弩之末，新世界秩序已在構建之中，中國是主要塑造者。

▍世界史第一階段：中西平衡，各得其所

名副其實的“世界歷史”始于鄭和下西洋，時當十五世紀初，略早于葡萄牙、西班牙人的大航海。隨著中國與歐洲通過海洋通道直接聯系，世界第一次連為一體。

本乎各自終極信念，人類文明約有兩大類型：中國人敬天，中國以外各族群普遍信神，一神教是其較成熟者，是為廣義的西方。

中國與西方共在“世界島”，但蔥嶺（即帕米爾高原）隔絕中、西，各有其歷史而無世界史。基于其既有知識，中國人、西方人在世界島兩端分別維護天下秩序和普世秩序。

廣義西方演進之大勢是向西、北移動，發端于從兩河流域，然后到地中海周邊，再到大西洋濱海，而有狹義的西方即歐美。

中國文明演進大勢是逐漸向東、南移動，由黃河流域至于長江流域，以至于東南沿海，明太祖定都南京，即體現了這一趨勢，由此必定經營海洋經濟。

兩者先后下海，人類文明兩大類型直接相會于印太交匯處，此后則有完整世界歷史可言。

鄭和下西洋雖然中止，但一些南洋島國進入朝貢秩序，此為天下秩序之重大變化，漢唐是以西域邦國為主的。

更重要的是，中國人下海之路已打通，東南沿海民眾移民南洋，絲綢、瓷器、茶葉等貨物進入海洋貿易體系。相比于唐宋時代，海外貿易規模擴大，江南經濟在很大程度上圍繞出口展開，其工業化進程加快，中國成為“世界工廠”。

歐人在中西貿易中不占優勢，乃以其在新征服的美洲所開采之白銀彌補逆差。白銀大量流入中國，成為大宗交易貨幣。由此而有“白銀全球化”。

原產于美洲的玉米、白薯種子陸續傳入中國，適宜條件比較惡劣的土地，中國人口迅速增長。

然而，中國參與塑造海洋聯結的世界秩序，給自己帶來了意料之外的麻煩：中國經濟已深入海洋體系，政治軍事安排卻仍是大陸體系，兩者緊張、撕裂。

明朝即亡于海、陸間之緊張：中國邊患在北方、東北，此為明成祖遷都北京之主要考量，而一旦遷都北京，國家戰略重心轉移，必然停止經營南洋；應對北方邊患為國家財政重點，而當時財富多來自海洋貿易，集中于東南；

其地教育發達，東南士大夫得以主宰政治進程，為自身利益，阻礙稅制調整，反而強化傳統稅制，強加于農民；以耕種為主業的北方農民負擔沉重，淪為流民，轉成流寇，最終顛覆明鼎；同時，北方軍需供應不足，滿清在東北日益坐大，趁機南下取天下。

滿清成長于東北，長期與農耕、游牧兩類文明區打交道，故南下立國之后，在南面治中原之外，積極經營“中國弧”地帶，即在北、西兩邊環繞中國的蒙古高原、天山南北與青藏高原。

幾千年來，在此地帶此起彼伏的游牧民族不斷進入中原，擾亂天下。滿清在漢唐元明苦心經營的基礎上，以復雜靈活的政治機制把西、北中國弧完整納入中國政治體，初步解決了困擾中國四千年的大難題。

由此，國際格局也有改變：俄羅斯成為中國鄰國，并最為緊要；陸上絲綢之路轉而取道蒙古草原北上，經俄羅斯，終于北歐。

綜合以上兩大趨勢可見，至十八世紀中后期，中國為海、陸兩個弧面所合，兩者分量相當，但對中國的作用不同：中國生機在海上，安全系于陸地。

西北草原弧內部不甚穩定，外接的俄羅斯和伊斯蘭世界尚較傳統；東南海洋弧內部穩定，外接的歐美有新因素涌現。中國涵攝海陸的格局在全世界大國中是獨一無二的，其后至今，根本戰略問題是權衡取舍者兩者。

相對而言，歐洲從與中國的直接交往、也即從新世界秩序中受益更大。

進入十六世紀，羅馬教會日益腐朽，歐洲民族-國家主義（nationalism）發酵，終由馬丁?路德在日耳曼掀起宗教改革大潮。由此，歐洲進入國民-民族國家構建（nation-state building）時代，史稱“早期現代”。

早期現代之歷史主題是打破羅馬教會一統權威，確立世俗王權之主權地位，此主權打破封建領主所造成的等級和分割，所有臣民在國王法律下平等。

最先取得成功的是英格蘭，1533年，亨利八世禁止英格蘭教會向教廷繳納歲貢，次年通過《至尊法案》，確立國王為教會最高領袖，并以之為國教。英國被公認為第一個現代國家之理由在此，憲制變革則在從屬地位。

面臨統治危機的羅馬教會尋求開辟新的靈牧場，乃沿大航海所發現的航路向歐洲以外傳教，耶教逐漸成為世界性宗教，此為近五百年之大事件。十六世紀后期，傳教士幾經輾轉，進入中國。

傳教士本來準備向其想象中野蠻的中國人傳播真理，但很快發現中國是高度文明的大國，中國政教之美超出其神學知識范圍：中國人不信奉其所熟悉的人格神，卻普遍有道德，有高度發達的經濟和井然有序的秩序。有些人受到觸動，乃轉而認真對待中國，翻譯中國經典，送回巴黎。

由此而有巴黎的啟蒙運動。此前一千五百年，歐洲鎖死在神教蒙昧中，即便中世紀重新發現古希臘哲學，也只作為神學的侍婢，用來證明人格神是存在的。

中國的國家及其思想則向西人展示了人生、秩序的另一可能，依西人關于現代一詞的定義，中國文明自誕生起就是現代的。可以想見初次接觸中學的西人之心靈震撼。

由此，西方哲人走上人文主義、理性主義，形成所謂現代觀念和制度。啟蒙哲人宣布：人是主體，沒有造物主；人應求自身幸福，而非升入神的國；人完全可以不依神教而有健全道德和良好人際關系，國家完全可以不依神教而有良好秩序，國王直接統治全體臣民是最好的政治等等。西人在啟蒙運動中所倡導的所謂現代觀念和制度，在中國早已是幾千年的常識。

故“中學西漸”大潮推動了西方的現代化，不可謂之唯一力量，但可謂之重要力量，中國思想啟發了西方哲人或鞏固了其苦思所得之靈感。

就現實表現看，西方是過去兩百年全球現代化的主要推動者，但中國文化已內在其中，西人以其蠻力向全世界傳播中國觀念，當然是西方化的。認識和肯定這一點，才能理解今日世界演變之大勢。

總之，在十五世紀初中期到十八世紀中后期三百多年的世界歷史第一階段，完整的世界初步形成，中國和西方在互動中皆有調整、變化，各有所得。從中國人角度看，如此世界秩序大體是公平的。

▍世界史第二階段：中西之位的往復

十八世紀中后期，西方通過工業化獲得軍事優勢，乃加以濫用，四處征服、殖民。世界固然因此而空前緊密地連為一體，但其秩序不公，因而最終難以持續，中國是重要的改變力量。

世界歷史進入第二階段的關鍵因素是西方實現工業化，中西之勢的轉移之源在此。

不過，細加分析即可發現，西方工業化多有得益于中國之處：在知識上，西人曾長期致力于思辨現實以外的存在，當其哲學轉而肯定人為主體，則有“認識論轉向”，轉而面向現存之物，發展出分解-重構的方法，以之發現物之構造機理，進而運用技術手段制造人造物。

在制度上，啟蒙哲人受中國啟發而有“開明專制”觀念，支持強大王權，西方乃超越古典城邦和教會政治，建立大范圍國民-民族國家；又受重農學派等中國化思想影響，此國家重視工業生產，而傳統上西方城邦多重貿易。

在西方各國中，英格蘭率先推進工業化，則另有原因：殖民征服造就巨大海外市場需求，而英格蘭人口有限，不能不尋找新技術；技術需求推動科學發展，科學、技術、工業良性互動，最終摸索到基于石化能源、鋼鐵機器生產的工業化之路。

英格蘭率先富強，隨后其技術、制度傳如歐洲大陸。富強的歐洲列強憑其堅船利炮，對外征服、殖民。西方列強陸續征服非洲、中東、印度等地，終至中國門口。

西方在此前三百年與中國的和平通商中始終有巨額逆差，乃通過鴉片貿易彌補；遭中國抵制后則發動戰爭。中國遭遇失敗，以中國為中心的普遍世界秩序——天下體系，趨于解體，被迫降格為民族國家，以救亡圖存。

中國失敗的原因主要在海洋型經濟與大陸型軍政體制的嚴重錯位：第一，中國市場嚴重依賴海外，但政府未能及時轉型，貿易流始終在他人控制下。

第二，海外白銀流入為貨幣，政府未予有效管理，喪失貨幣主權，當其供應量波動時束手無策，經濟無法正常運作。

第三，中國是世界工廠，產品大量出口，卻未及時打開從外部獲取資源的通道。以一國有限資源支撐世界工廠運轉，資源過度開發，生態遭嚴重破壞。

受制于市場和資源的雙重約束，中國的內生性增長遭遇瓶頸，生產率不再增長，就業機會減少，新增人口成為流民，終致十九世紀初中期連續發生流民大叛亂。西方人正在此時來到中國門口。

在內憂外患壓力下，中國走上“師夷長技以制夷”之路，此為過去一百多年來中國歷史之基本主題。八十年代以來很多人嘲笑這句話，但它確足以概括百多年來中國人之所為：

一方面學習西方之術，首先是軍事技術，其次是支撐它的工業生產和組織技術，還有基于國民-民族國家的社會動員技術，此為西方力量所在，中國人努力學習之。另一方面，中國有悠久深厚的文明傳統，學習目的始終是自強、自立。

到直到二十世紀中期的一百年，中國變化不大。根本原因仍在于國家能力低下，尤其是滿清覆亡，本已低下的國家能力頹然解體，于是，晚清建設的某些現代機制反成禍亂之源，如新軍墮落為分裂國家的力量。

晚清士大夫曾倡導“實業救國”，因為缺乏國家的制度支撐，根本無從展開。經濟領域發展最快的仍為貿易，固然暫時帶來經濟好處，但長遠而言，中國更深地淪為西方依附者。

到了以抗日戰爭為先導的二戰時，中國國運終于開始上升，而西方則開始相對衰落：二戰打垮老式帝國主義，原來統治全世界的西方列強退守本土，無從獲得殖民紅利，緩慢走上衰落之路。

包括中國在內的亞非拉國家實現獨立自主。介乎歐亞之間的蘇聯崛起，與西方分庭抗禮；在兩大陣營之間的中國的分量陡然加重，成為決定性第三方。

在此格局中，中國走上強國復興之路：首先，政治上，國共兩黨共同學習蘇聯，終于建立強國家，西方經濟發展是以此為基礎的。滿清面對西方列強的最大劣勢就是國家組織力低下而缺乏動員能力。其次，工業化得以循序推進，可分為三個階段：

工業化第一輪突破得益于蘇聯的幫助。面對中國，重貿易的歐美海洋國家主要看重中國的龐大市場，故與中國的關系始終淺嘗輒止，隨時可以退出。

蘇聯作為有野心的中國陸上鄰國，當海洋國家欲控制中國時通常支持中國以抗衡之，晚清以來即是如此，五六十年代的支持力度最大，向中國輸入全套工業體系。

此體系確有嚴重偏頗，故至七、八十年代陷入困境，但國人畢竟由此完整認識了工業的體系性，尤其觸及工業化底層架構即能源和重工業，而明清時代的工業化就卡在這一環節上，而漸顯落后。

尤其是這些工業大量布局于大陸深處的西北弧面，在一定程度上逆轉了中唐以來日益嚴重的經濟重心失衡局面，這是今天以至未來長時期內恢復國家經濟布局平衡之基礎。此為中國工業化第一輪突破。

第二輪突破在中美建交后。中美聯手，致蘇聯崩潰，中國免去北顧之憂，側重發展東南沿海，這就回到了明清時代的工業化模式：工業化以家戶為基本單位分散在鄉村，以海洋為通道借重歐美海洋國家之技術和市場。

當然，第一輪工業化成果又可提供一定機器和知識支持，消費品工業得以在機制最為靈活的鄉鎮層面迅速發展。此為中國工業化第二輪突破，相對于第一輪，實際上在技術上降級了，但大量吸納勞動力，大幅度改善民生。

第三輪突破始于新世紀之初。傳統政府觀念開始發揮作用，本來熱衷于繼續革命的強政府，將其能力用于建設基礎設施，輔導產業發展。于是，工業產值持續增長，并沿產業鏈向上攀爬，終于形成全球規模最大、體系最完整的制造業部門，世界經濟版圖因此而大變。

今日中國已在工業化第四輪突破中，美國人因此而恐懼，從而改變了兩國關系的基調，世界秩序進入大調整期。

總之，世界歷史第二階段兩百年間歷史的樞軸是中西位置的反轉：十九世紀初期以降的一百多年，西方向上走，中國往下走；二戰以后，中國向上走，西方往下走。今日似已逼近雙方移位之臨界點，逐漸突破世界舊秩序的容納力。

▍美國民粹化，世界舊秩序崩潰

世界舊秩序正在崩潰中。其源在中國的興起，既有世界秩序架構難以容納；但導火索則是冷戰后美國一家獨大及其無法承受成本之后的倉皇失措。

歷史上，羅馬的力量不能及于印度，更無法越過蔥嶺；在另一方向上，漢唐的力量即便勉強越過蔥嶺，也難保持。故世界保持基本秩序的結構性條件是，不由單一中心統治。

工業化之后交通和戰爭技術的提升亦未改變這一鐵律：二戰以前，西方列強散布世界各地，相互爭奪，看似混亂，實則分擔全球統治成本，西方作為整體反而可對世界實施有效統治。二戰后，蘇聯興起，與西方形成冷戰格局。兩個陣營各有其經營范圍，同樣有效維護了世界秩序。

冷戰結束，世界進入一霸獨強的格局。美國在西方文明中立國最晚，也是西方人發現的最后的“新大陸”，其人口最多，注定成為西方文明統治世界之最后一站。

它確實得到了這個機會，也曾信心十足地宣稱歷史已經終結。然而，雄心繞不過成本的硬約束，當美國一家統治，世界秩序立刻走向松動、潰散，所謂“美國治下的和平”（Pax Americana）短暫得不足以寫入未來的世界史。

回顧歷史即可發現，美國之崛起大部分因為其遠在世界島外的地緣優勢：列強爭奪世界島控制權，接連引爆一戰、二戰，美國在列強殘破時介入而僥幸取勝。此后，西方列強實力喪盡、精神崩潰，不得不把西方文明的“家父權”交給美國，并從各個方面積極配合美國對抗蘇聯陣營。

即便如此，在朝鮮半島上，美國拼湊的所謂“聯合國軍”與國力貧弱的中國直接交手，亦無力取勝。所謂美國世紀的歷史證明，其實在沒有直接統治世界島的能力，只能實施離岸平衡，如同當年英國平衡歐陸。只要世界島上諸強相安，不給其操縱機會，其統治力散布全世界，必耗散至于虛脫。

此即當下美國之困境所在，面對獨家維護世界秩序的責任，美國人力不從心，在小布什、克林頓短暫的歷史終結快感后，奧巴馬時代即開始戰略收縮，逐個拋棄其統治全球的重負：拋棄非洲，對南美心不在焉；在重返中東還是亞太再平衡之間搖擺不定。

全球統治權的短暫榮耀也誘發其內潰：美國發展出在全球范圍內配置資本的金融體系，由此收獲不少帝國統治紅利。但“福兮禍之所倚”，金融業與其所豢養的全球性快錢行業，即以網絡和醫藥為主的所謂高科技產業畸形繁榮，帶來“去工業化”，其所培育的中下階層生計大受影響。

受制于中國等新興國家的自保措施，此金融體系又無法有效榨取全部帝國紅利，外部收益不足以填補國內去工業化各階層的損失。結果，美國內部的收入分配結構趨于兩極化，階層、集團間的撕裂、對立日益嚴重。

尤其嚴重的是，其國家主體族群白人清教徒比例快速萎縮，焦慮心態使其政治行為日益激進，如茶黨興起、支持特朗普，對非主流人群和外部世界的敵意持續強化；而這必將刺激非主流人群的激進化，很快就會有民主黨的特朗普出現。

去工業化是美國危機的根源。西方列強之所以在十九世紀可橫行全球，包括欺辱中國，主要因為其有強大工業體系所生產之堅船利炮。去工業化意味著其堅船利炮的供應不足，即便在美國，其軍事工業體系也已殘缺，或由于配套不全而成本過高，以至于完全無力投入另一場軍備競賽中。

美國精英已意識到此問題之嚴重性，奧巴馬有心推動再工業化，但在“否決政治”僵局中無任何進展。特朗普應運而生，解決此問題的愿望更為急迫，“讓美國再次強大”首先就是讓美國再次成為第一工業國。為此，特朗普的施政風格打破成例，別創一格。

但特朗普能實現其意圖否？很難。只要金融等“末業”依然可借全球體系從外部獲取高額利潤，資本就不可能轉入國內工業和基礎設施。美國欲復興其工業，得像漢武帝那樣，先摧破金融豪強，但這可能嗎？

與美國的去工業化相反，中國依托堅實的全產業鏈基礎，穩步推進其工業化第四輪突破，攀升制造業頂端。美國人終究是相信硬力量的，而中國的力量即將壓倒美國。美國精英不能不產生恐懼之情，乃宣布中國為“對手”，中國關系的性質由之大變。

長期以來，在西方列強中，美國人對中國似有特殊好感，頗多憐憫之心，有時頗為慷慨。這可能源于其神教福音派心態：他們相信自己在山巔之城，有責任傳播神的真理，而中國是世界上最大的國家，中國人看起來文明、溫順，或可順受其信仰和價值。當初美國的G2提議也是讓中國擔當其統治世界的服帖助手。顯然，此期待出于其一神教的傲慢與對歷史的無知。

中國是人類文明兩大類型之一，幾千年都在走自己的路，即便在其最艱難時刻，即便在其全力學習蘇聯、西方之術時，仍保有文明自覺，未脫出其道。今天經濟上的成功以及由此而有的重整世界秩序的牛刀小試，只是歷史恢復其常態而已。

但缺乏歷史感的美國人無法接受這一點，對中國的憐憫之情一轉而為怨恨之意，一如傳教者遭遇拒絕皈依者的反應。大體可以確認，美國精英群體對中國的好感已流失殆盡，怨恨中國已成共識——還有恐懼。故美國將會運用一切手段擾亂中國的發展和影響力擴大。

當然，美國的做法讓正在恢復其力量和自信的中國堅定了擺脫美國體系的決心。可以確信：未來中美之間將以斗爭為主。

由此，世界舊秩序的根基已經搖動：“美國治下的和平”意味著美國容許中國在其所維護的體系中發展，現在美國已不欲容納中國，則中國不能不另起爐灶，自行建立世界新秩序。美國人宣布，其國家戰略重歸于應對“大國競爭”——說對了。

盡管如此，兩國的歷史和經驗將使此斗爭不成為毀滅性的。首先，在地理上，兩國相隔過于遼遠；其次，就國家結構而言，美國為海洋國家，長于離岸平衡，無力深入大陸；中國是海陸復合型國家，戰略縱深極大。

這兩個因素讓美國無力對中國發動全面戰爭；即便其在西太發動海戰，亦無勝算。

第三，就國性而言，美國的底色是“商業共和國”，基于成本收益計算行動；中國則有處理蠻夷戎狄問題的豐富經驗。這些決定了兩國間直接決戰完全可以避免。

就此而言，中美易位，大大不同于過去幾百年發生在歐洲大陸的霸權易位。狹窄的歐洲確不能兼容二主，但寬闊的太平洋卻完全可以。這構成兩國關系的底線。

故中美兩國將會展開全方位的大國競爭，而只要中國的經濟和軍事力量持續提升，并在具體問題上充分展示自己有動用使用這些毀滅性力量的堅定決心，美國將會如其原宗主國英國一樣，在恰當的時間，在其無力立足的地方理性退卻。

直白而言，美國將會在中國的擠壓下，從東亞、西太退出，那將是世界新秩序告成之時。

這幾年來，中國之所為已使美國部分收效，部分美國人已認識到中國的力量和決心，并調整戰略，轉而對盟國下手，在同盟體系上開源節流。

這正是川普上任以來對盟國之所為：為美國短暫利益，川普毫不猶豫地退出、破壞其自二戰以來所建立的聯盟體系，反復要求盟國分擔其維護秩序的成本，進而對其盟國提出“公平貿易”的要求。

世間本無所謂基于共同價值的“民主聯盟”，美國建立聯盟體系之目的從來是為了追求自己的利益，只不過借助盟友應對強大的敵人，但維護同盟是需要成本的。一旦同盟的成本大于收益，聯盟體系即走向解體。

由此，西方將被打回原形，重回二戰之前的狀態，而且更糟糕：這一次，不是為爭奪殖民地、瓜分世界，而是為了本國的生存。因而，西方世界有可能退回早期現代列國爭雄狀態，盡管未必通過熱戰。

美國為獲利而不擇手段，致其價值體系迅速崩潰。自威爾遜帶領美國走上世界體系領導者的地位始，價值觀成為美國感召力之淵藪：當年威爾遜曾感動過無數中國知識分子，盡管很快就幻滅；今天在中國，美國的普世價值神話在相當比例中國精英中仍有感召力，但川普讓其一一現形。美國回到其進行殖民征服、開發西部的鄙陋狀態。

美國的思想力也明顯不濟。當然，美國人本無深刻思想，惟歐洲兩次大戰迫使眾多思想者流亡美國，在美國發展出若干思想。

但冷戰結束后，其人紛紛離世，此后在所謂歷史終結的二十年中，美國與西方未再涌現卓越的思想人物；以至于面對當下困境，其應對策略無非是翻出過去的方案或重新組合，日顯鄙陋——川普及其支持者最為典型。

對此鄙陋，有人作震驚狀，但這本是美國傳統：清教徒為建立所謂山巔之城，消滅了印第安人；為美國制定所謂自由憲法的立國者中頗多奴隸主，并把奴隸制堂皇寫入憲法；《聯邦黨人文集》為了保障自由設計了復雜的分權制度，但論及國家間戰爭和貿易則冷酷無情；美國人迷信持槍權，為自由賦予每人以殺人權。

所以，川普沒有發明美國，只是讓其隱而不彰的“商業共和國”傳統再度顯明，這是漢密爾頓當初對美國的定性，而在西方，商人經常同時是劫掠者、海盜。

上任不到兩年，特朗普已帶領美國大體完成其面孔轉換：快速褪去涂抹在其外表的理想主義光彩，從所謂的“價值共和國”轉為貨真價實的“商業共和國”。這個美國不準備繼續承擔維護世界秩序的責任，“美國優先”口號清楚表明這一點——而此孤立主義、也即赤裸裸的利己主義同樣在美國傳統中。

或許可以說，內外情形使得美國政治和民情正在民粹化和法西斯化的下坡路上狂奔，特朗普不過踩了幾腳油門而已。

法西斯主義產生的前提是本來處在中間的諸階層在復雜難測的全球化網絡遭受損害而陷于絕望，煽動者沖破政治建制，刻意秉持反智姿態，直接訴諸“人民”，承諾拋開一切成規，作出超人的雄姿拯救“人民”。

還有，反復指控前任的愚蠢懦弱，用幼稚的詞匯描述國際關系，把內部分配不公解釋為外部對本國的掠奪，不惜與全世界為敵，情緒化地拋棄盟約。此即法西斯主義之構成要素，今日美國不已幾乎全部具備？

回顧歷史即可發現，美國立國與德國納粹成立之根本價值，只有一紙之隔：“美國例外論”近似于德國納粹的“雅利安種族優越論”，這是美國法西斯化之精神根基。

特朗普是美國法西斯化之始作俑者，其他政客在震驚之余，見其獲得越來越多支持，大眾政治的機制必將誘導其群起效仿，法西斯化程度將日益加深。

只是由于美國規模遠大于當年的德國、意大利，內部族群也較為多元，故其法西斯化或許難以席卷全國，而很可能致其潰解。

世界秩序由強國維系。幾個主要角色中，歐盟的進一步凝聚已不可能，將日益碎片化；俄羅斯將持續衰落，日益成為原材料出口國；美國已無意、也無力支撐戰后全球各領域多邊體系和同盟，轉向重建雙邊體系，以最大化其具體利益。而在原來的體系中并不居于中心的中國，卻正在快速壯大。

可見，二戰后形成的世界秩序，或者說，兩百年來的世界秩序，已走向崩解，問題只在于崩解速度有多快，替代的新秩序是什么，能否及時涌現、起效以免出現大范圍的嚴重失序。

▍中國重構世界秩序

在舊秩序解體的同時，世界新秩序已在醞釀中，主要的生成性力量是經濟總量已居第二、而文明類型不同的中國。

此系“天降大任于斯人也”，無可推脫。對世界日趨失序，列國中最不能無視者，中國也；因為世界果真失序，中國將是最大受害者，上升之路將止步，且未來治理世界的成本將大增。總有人說中國應繼續韜光養晦，此乃刻舟求劍耳。

《中庸》曰：“君子之中庸也，君子而時中。”明乎中庸之道者，當止則止，當行則行。韜光養晦者，時也；起而重整秩序，時也。不知時者，不足與論國事。

今世惟有中國有重整新秩序之能力。一方面，中國是世界上最大的國家，更在其悠久中有治理世界的充分經驗：以中國之大而多樣，本身就是天下或曰世界秩序；中國曾建立從中亞到南洋、橫跨陸海的天下秩序，此經驗在世界歷史上是罕見的。

另一方面，中國也是現代的。西人塑造世界秩序，憑其現代力量，而過去一百年間，中國循西方邏輯變法。而中國之所以成功，因為西方的現代觀念和制度至少部分地淵源于中國，中國內在于現代性中。

由此可以理解一個引人注目的事實：環顧全球，惟有東亞儒家文化圈各國完成了工業化，比較順利地建立類似于西方的現代治理體系。

因此，中國正在塑造的世界新秩序不是全新的，因為兩者在現代性上是相通的，可保持連續性。

當然，西方接受中國思想必加以西方化，故多有偏而不正之處。中國塑造新世界秩序可對其予以矯正，綜合運用古典、現代智慧，矯正現有世界秩序之偏失，其大義有三：

第一，恢復全球均衡發展。

世界島上展開的古典秩序偏于大陸一端；西方列強普遍為海洋國家，其所主導的世界秩序偏于海洋一端，由此導致世界島逐漸塌陷，昔日文明中心反成世界禍亂之源。

美國治下的和平未能解決這一問題，其孤懸世界島外，慣于離岸平衡，不能深入內陸，沒有與文明傳統深厚之各國打交道的經驗。

故其只能維護海洋秩序，不能維護世界秩序，甚至經常因為無知，貿然闖入世界島中央，以粗暴手法操作；引發混亂之后，又束手無策，迅速撤離，世界之腹心乃長期處在潰瘍、潰爛、失血狀態。

中國塑造新世界秩序，必當執兩用中。中國自古即在陸海之際，兼顧海陸，最為均衡：漢唐中國積累了交往陸上文明的經驗，宋明以來中國深入海洋貿易體系。

正是據此歷史經驗，當代中國提出“一帶一路”倡議，其最大優點在于涵攝世界島和海洋，包容舊世界和新世界：“一帶”旨在恢復世界島秩序，“一路”旨在安頓海洋秩序。

這是人類提出的第一個完整的、均衡的世界秩序方案，中國已為此建立相應機制：上合組織初步形成解決世界島問題的架構，若納入德國，即告完備。至于安頓海洋秩序，不必建立專門組織，畢竟，美國的核心影響在海洋上，中國可與之協調海洋秩序。

第二，馴化資本主義，倡導厚生主義。

西方賴以強富強的體制為“資本主義”，扎根于西方海盜-商人傳統和殖民征服傳統，以獲取貨幣利潤為驅動力，以畸形發達的金融體系經營資本，以貿易為樞紐。對待他者，以離岸手法操作，以獵獲廉價資源或市場為樞紐。它可以占有世界，卻不能耕作世界，機會主義傾向嚴重。

西人將資本主義推到全世界，但在沒有殖民紅利的國家，這套制度是自相矛盾的，無從正常運作。故自十九世紀西方統治世界以來，西方以外實現工業化、現代化的國家，除儒家文化圈外幾乎沒有，這一事實表明，資本主義不是普世的。

中國圣賢所立經濟社會模式，用孫中山先生的詞說是“民生主義”，或可謂之“厚生主義”。其大綱為《尚書?大禹謨》“正德、利用、厚生、惟和”，重視“開物”、“利用”，也即重視物質的生產、利用和分配，以讓人改進生活，且生生不已。

為此采取“崇本抑末”政策，以使商業、金融活動服務于生產和民生。中國已初步應用這一模式于世界，“一帶一路”倡議中的經濟方略與此前西方國家有很大不同，重視授人以漁，改善基礎設施，推動工業化。

中國目前是世界工廠，產業正在升級，未來將重構世界分工體系：向上，接納西方國家尖端制造業提供的部件，向下，梯次轉移普通制造業到不發達國家，主要是非洲。

隨著中國成為全球最大消費市場，比較均衡地在發達國家和不發達國家之間分配這個市場，此即傳統“朝貢貿易”之要旨所在；比較均衡地從全世界不同地區獲得能源；在世界范圍內倡導崇本抑末政策。

第三，走向“一體多元”的世界格局。

歐洲列強建立世界秩序，普遍求“同”，傾向使用暴力，必定制造敵人。美國受其清教影響，熱衷于價值一律，以普世價值強加世界一致，凡與自己觀念不同者概斥為“邪惡”，視為敵人。

故當福山高談歷史終結時，導彈正橫飛于中東。西方文明以求同始，以撕裂終，根本無從建立普遍秩序。至于作為其反彈的文化多元主義，已致西方各國內部撕裂、解體，遑論世界秩序。

中國則不同，《尚書?堯典》描述堯舜締造中國和天下之道曰：“克明俊德，以親九族。九族既睦，平章百姓。百姓昭明，協和萬邦。”

幾千年來，中國人以“一個天、多個神，諸神統于天”或以“一個文教，多種神教”為本，吸納多元宗教、族群，而以敬天或文教一體之，從而構建“一體多元”的國家和天下格局，這是唯一可行的通往普遍秩序之道。

此秩序之構建不是通過暴力征服，也不通過傳教或推行普世價值讓他者變成自己，而是承認他者的自主，“修文德以來之，既來之，則安之”[6]。大體上，今天中國就是循此和而不同之道建立和維護國際組織，滋長世界新秩序，也即天下秩序。

依據圣人“協和萬邦”以平天下之道，可推定中國引領生成天下秩序的方式和基本特征如下：

第一，天下秩序不是一次性構建的而是漸進生成的。“周雖舊邦，其命維新”，可用以描述中國引領形成新秩序的程序：周本為舊邦，長期行德化，首先影響周邊邦國，逐漸擴大其影響力，到文王三分天下有其二，諸侯歸于周而不歸殷，乃有殷周之易位。中國人重整天下秩序亦將循此漸進之道，而避免與現有霸權對撞。

第二，維系正在形成的天下體系，以德禮為先。天下體系只是“協和萬邦”，而非建立緊密聯盟，更非強求同質化。

維系各國關系的首先是德、禮，“修文德以來之”，此文德包括道義，更包括經濟惠澤；同時，協同各國建立禮治。禮治區別于現有國際法體系之處在于，除明晰各主體之權利、義務，還強調互親敦睦，建立情感紐帶。

第三，天下秩序不求覆蓋全世界。世界太大，任何單一國家均無力有效治理。圣人深明此義，故天下體系從未試圖覆蓋當時所知全世界，后世亦然：鄭和下西洋遭遇眾多邦國，但天子未殖民征服之，亦未將其全部納入朝貢體系，而讓其自主抉擇。

中國人不追求所有國家立刻進入同一體系，天下秩序是沒有終點的歷史過程。只要臺灣統一、美國退出東亞、西太，對中國人而言，世界新秩序即告成型。中國如此節制，可避免魚死網破的霸權之爭。

第四，完整的世界新秩序將存在兩三個區域性體系。中國是海陸復合型國家，可運用其傳統智慧，領導西太、大半個世界島、非洲等區域為天下體系，美國等有共同耶教信仰的大西洋海洋國家將別成其普遍世界體系，世界島中央則可有伊斯蘭世界秩序。這樣，以其固有文明為本，未來世界可有2.5個區域性體系。

此類似于亨廷頓的文明劃分，但未必是文明沖突。亨廷頓以西人神教思維看待世界，不了解中國文明。

隨著中國影響力日益增長，可在塑造世界新秩序過程中發揮更大作用，則可以其智慧，避免與其他兩個體系陷入對抗，且緩解另兩個體系之對抗。

現實可能性在于，中國是海陸復合型國家，與另1.5個體系有價值和利益高度重疊之處，可作跨體系的“協和”。“中國”可以成為居于區域性體系之中的協和之國，從而形成多元一體的世界新秩序。

為此，中國可逐漸構建逐層嵌套、由內而外的復合的世界治理架構：

最內層，重建東亞秩序。傳統上，朝鮮半島、越南為中國最親近的藩屬，日本也深受影響。

二戰后，東亞儒家文化圈成為全球唯一成片完成現代化者，但其間關系破碎，聽命外人，與其經濟的發達繁榮形成鮮明對比。原因是中國貧弱，無力發揮主導作用，聽任美國、蘇聯等外部力量操縱。

中國整頓世界秩序，必由此開始，且其目標超越國際關系，而是帶領韓朝、新、越、日等國，依托共同的儒家文化傳統，逐漸恢復儒家式治理體系，協調采取民生主義政策，為全世界樹立全新的繁榮、文明標準，如同此前西方各國為全世界標桿。

隨著中國力量增強，美國不能不逐漸退出，這一進程將以出人意料的高速展開。

中間層以“上合組織”為依托，安頓世界島中央秩序。該組織已吸納印度、巴基斯坦、伊朗，進一步可吸納土耳其、德國。

俄羅斯的經濟缺乏潛力，其全球影響力將持續衰減，將收縮于中亞及其周邊，故將日益重視上合組織，可協與中國共同協和伊斯蘭世界各國，化解世界島上諸古典文明各國之間的緊張，避免沖突，進而尋求共同發展。

這是大大擴展了的“新西域”，關乎中國西部安全和繁榮；又在世界島中央，此處穩，則全球大局不亂；由此，美國無從施展其離岸操縱術，其全球支配力自然衰退，此為盡快形成世界新秩序之關鍵。

最外層是制度化的一帶一路倡議，涵括整個世界，“一帶”以上合組織為主要治理平臺，一路則以東南亞各國、非洲為重點。

尤其是非洲，人口眾多，自然條件尚可，位于歐洲之南緣，介于中國、美國之間，隨著中國工業體系向上升級，產能外溢，非洲是唯一可以接納的沃土，是為構造中國主導的全球生產體系之布局關鍵。

至于與西方體系的協和，則可在G20平臺上。

▍結語

人類文明大體可分兩大類型，故考察世界秩序之演變和前景當以中國和西方之浮沉升降為中心。

在早期現代，西方受中國啟發；一百多年前，中國學習西方；中國的復興，導致西方主導的世界舊秩序崩潰；新秩序的生成，必以中國為中心。

五百年必有王者興。把握這五百年的世界歷史，既要理解西方現代觀念和制度的優長與限度，也要理解中國文明內在的現代性質及其在現代之新生轉進。

《文化縱橫》國際傳播系列由三大洲社會研究所（Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, 網站：www.thetricontinental.org）和東聲（Dongsheng News，網站：www.dongshengnews.org)協作翻譯并制作，有英語、西語、葡語三個版本。每期根據不同主題，從《文化縱橫》雜志過往發表文章中，選擇3-5篇文章進行編譯，預計每季度發布一期。2023年第1期主題為“重構現代世界體系”，主要分析全球緊張局勢加劇背景下的俄烏戰爭的全球影響，追溯中西關系的歷史軌跡，并探討團結廣大第三世界國家、推動構建新型國際體系的可能性。