Five Centuries of Global Transformation: A Chinese Perspective
Humanity is in the midst of a global upheaval, on a scale unseen in 500 years: namely, the relative decline of Europe and the United States, the rise of China and the Global South, and the resulting revolutionary transformation of the international landscape. Although the era of Western global dominance is often said to have lasted five centuries, precisely speaking this is an overstatement. In reality, Europe and the United States have occupied their positions as world hegemons for closer to 200 years, after reaching their initial stages of industrialisation. The first industrial revolution was a turning point in world history, significantly impacting the relationship between the West and the rest of the world. Today, the era of Western hegemony has run its course and a new world order is emerging, with China playing a major role in this development. This article explores how we arrived at the current global conjuncture examining the different stages in the relationship between China and the West.
▍Stage I: A Shifting Balance Between China and the?West
The first encounter between China and Europe dates back to the era of naval exploration of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, during which the Chinese navigator and diplomat Zheng He (1371–1433) embarked on his Voyages Down the Western Seas (鄭和下西洋, Zhèng Hé xià xīyáng) (1405–1433), followed by the Portuguese and Spanish naval expeditions to Asia.?From then on, China has established direct contact with Europe through ocean passages.
During this period China was ruled by the Ming dynasty (1388–1644), which adopted a worldview guided by the concept of?tianxia?(天下, tiānxià, ‘a(chǎn)ll under heaven’).?This belief system generally categorised humanity into two major civilisations: the Chinese who worshipped heaven, or the sky, and the West which, broadly, worshipped gods in a monotheistic sense.?It is important to note that, in this era, the Chinese had a broad conception of the West, considering it to encompass all the regions which expanded northwestward from Mesopotamia to the Mediterranean Sea and then to the Atlantic coast, rather than the contemporary notion which is generally limited to of the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Europe. On the other hand, Chinese civilisation spread to the southeast, from the reaches of the Yellow River to the Yangtze River Basin onward to the coast. The two civilisations would meet at the confluence of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, from which point there has been a complete world history to speak of. At the same time, however, tianxia put forward a universalist conception of the world, in which China and the West were considered to share the same ‘world island’. Separated by the ‘Onion Mountains’ (the Pamir Mountains of Central Asia), each civilisation was thought to have its own history, though there was not yet a unified world history, and each maintained, based on their own knowledge, the tianxia order at their respective ends of the world island.
Although the Ming dynasty discontinued its sea voyages after Zheng He’s seventh mission in 1433, some islands in the South Seas (南洋, nányáng, roughly corresponding to contemporary Southeast Asia) became incorporated into the imperial Chinese tributary system (朝貢, cháogòng). This constituted a major change in the tianxia order, compared with the prior Han (202 BCE–CE 9, 25–220 CE) and Tang (618–907 CE) dynasties in which tribute was mainly received from states of the Western Regions (西域, xīyù, roughly corresponding to contemporary Central Asia). More importantly, this southeastward expansion opened a road into the seas for China, as Chinese people of the southeast coast migrated to the South Seas, and with them goods such as silk, porcelain, and tea entered the maritime trade system. Compared with the prosperous Tang and Song (960–1279) periods, overseas trade expanded, with the Jiangnan (江南, jiāngnán, ‘south of the Yangtze River’) economy, which was largely centred on exports, being particularly dynamic; consequently, industrialisation accelerated and China, for the first time, became the ‘factory of the world’.
European nations did not have the upper hand in their trade with China, however they offset their deficit with the silver that they mined in the newly conquered Americas. This silver flowed into China in large quantities and became a major trading currency, leading to the globalisation of silver. Meanwhile, the introduction of corn and sweet potato seeds, native to the Americas, to China contributed to the rapid growth of the nation’s population due to the suitability of these crops to harsh conditions.
However, China’s involvement in shaping a maritime-linked world order also brought about unexpected problems for the country; namely, an imbalance between its economy, which penetrated the maritime system, and its political and military institutions, which remained continental. This contradiction between the land and the sea produced significant tensions within China, eventually leading to the demise of the Ming dynasty. Border conflicts in the north and northeast required significant financial resources, however most of China’s wealth at that time came from maritime trade and was concentrated in the southeast. Consequently, education thrived in this coastal region, resulting in scholar-officials (士大夫, shìdàfū) from the southeast coming to dominate China’s political processes and prevent tax reforms to better distribute wealth – instead, the traditional tax system was strengthened, imposing larger burdens on the peasantry.?These tensions would eventually come to a head; taxation weighed particularly heavily on northern peasants who mainly lived off farming, leading to their displacement and becoming migrants who eventually overthrew the Ming regime. At the same time, military resources in the north were insufficient, leading to the growing influence of Qing rebel forces in the northeast and their opportunistic advances to the south, culminating in the establishment of the Qing dynasty’s (1636–1912) rule over the entire country.
The Qing dynasty originated among the Manchu people of northeast China, who had agricultural and nomadic cultural roots. As Qing forces marched southwards and founded their empire, they made great efforts to establish control over the regions flanking China from the west and north, an arc extending from the Mongolian Plateau to the Tianshan Mountains and to the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau. For thousands of years, these northwest regions were a source of political instability, with successive dynasties trying and failing to unify the whole of China. By integrating these areas into the Chinese state, the Qing dynasty was thus able to achieve this historic political aim of unification. This domestic integration also had an impact on China’s international position, with Russia now becoming the country’s most important neighbour as the overland Silk Road was rerouted northwards, via the Mongolian steppe, through Russia to northern Europe.
By the mid-to-late eighteenth century, these two ‘a(chǎn)rcs’ of development, on the land and sea respectively, held equal weight but differing significance for China: the land provided security, while the seas were the source of vitality. However, both the land and sea developments contained contradictory dynamics: the regions of the northwestern steppe were not very stable internally while relations with neighbouring Russia and the Islamic world remained stable, on the other hand, the southeastern seas were stable internally but introduced new challenges for China in the form of relations with Europe and the United States. These land-sea dynamics have historically presented China with unique trade-offs and, to this day, they remain a fundamental strategic issue.
In contrast, European countries benefited more from direct trade with China, and rose to a dominant position within the new global order.
During the sixteenth century, under the increasingly decadent Roman Catholic Church, ethnic nationalism brewed up in Europe, culminating in Martin Luther’s Reformation in Germany. Subsequently, Europe entered an era of nation-state building known as the early modern period, characterised by the break-up of the authority of the Roman Catholic Church and the establishment of the sovereignty of secular monarchies, which overcame some of the hierarchies and divisions created by the feudal lords and made all subjects equal under the king’s law. The first country to achieve this was England, where Henry VIII banned the Church of England from paying annual tribute to the Papacy in 1533 and passed the Act of Supremacy the following year, establishing the king as the supreme head of the English Church which was made the state religion. This is why England is recognised as the first modern nation, while the constitutional changes were secondary.
The Roman Catholic Church, facing a ruling crisis, sought to open up new pastoral avenues, and began to preach outside of Europe through the voyages of ‘discovery’. Christianity gradually became a world religion, one of the most important developments in the last five centuries, with missionaries finally making their way to China, after many twists and turns, in the late sixteenth century.
The Christian missionaries had prepared to spread their message of truth to the Chinese, who they had expected to be ‘barbarians’. However, to their surprise, they discovered that China was a powerful civilisation with a sophisticated governance system and religious traditions. Although not believing in the personal gods of the missionaries, the Chinese people had a system of moral principles, a highly developed economy, and an established order. This inspired some missionaries to develop a serious appreciation for China, including translating Chinese classics and sending the texts back to Europe, where they would have a notable impact on the Enlightenment in Paris.
During the Enlightenment, Western philosophers developed ideas of humanism and rationalism, including notions that human beings are the subject and a ‘creator’ does not exist; humans should seek their own happiness instead of trying to ascend to the kingdom of God; humans can have sound moral beliefs and relations without relying on religion; the state can establish order without relying on religion; direct rule by the king over all subjects is the best political system, and so on. It is important to note, however, that these Enlightenment ideals, which are said to have formed the basis for Western modernity, had been common knowledge in China for thousands of years. As such, the flow of Chinese ideas and teachings to the West through Christian missionaries can be considered an important, if not the only, influence in the development of Western modernisation. Of course, the Western countries have been the main drivers of global modernisation over the last two centuries, but the modernity that it advocates has long been embedded in other cultures, including China. It is necessary to recognise and affirm this fact to understand the evolution of the world today.
In short, during the first stage of world history, which spanned more than 300 years from the early-to-mid fifteenth century to the mid-to-late eighteenth century, an integrated world system began to form, with both China and the West adjusting, changing, and benefiting in their interactions. From the Chinese perspective, this world order was largely fair.
▍Stage II: Reversals of Fortunes Between China and the West
In the mid-to-late eighteenth century, Western countries utilised their higher levels of industrialisation to secure decisive military superiority, which they abused to conquer and colonise nearly the entire Global South. This brought the world closer together than ever before, but in a union that was unjust and, therefore, unsustainable.
Among the Western countries, England was the first to achieve an advanced stage of industrialisation, for which there was a special reason: colonisation. The British empire appropriated massive amounts of wealth from its colonies, which also served as captive markets for British manufactures. This wealth and market demand, along with England’s relatively small population, drove scientific and technological development, and ultimately industrialisation based on the mining of fossil fuels (namely, coal), and production of steel and machinery. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, England would become the wealthiest and most powerful country in the world, with its wealth spreading to western Europe and its colonial settlements such as the United States and Australia. The thriving European powers violently conquered and colonised the outside world through military force including most of Africa, Asia, and the Americas, eventually reaching China’s doorstep in the early-to-mid nineteenth century. In the preceding centuries of peaceful trading with China, the Western powers accumulated a large trade deficit, which they now sought to balance through the opium trade. However, due to the severe social consequences of this drug trade, China outlawed the importation of opium in 1800; in response the Western powers launched two wars against China – the First Opium War (1839–1842) and the Second Opium War (1856–1860) – to violently open the country’s markets up. After China was defeated, various Western countries, including England, France, Germany, and the United States, forced China to sign unequal treaties granting these nations trade concessions and territories, including Hong Kong. As a result, the tianxia order began to crumble and China entered a period referred to as the ‘century of humiliation’ (百年國恥, bǎinián guóchǐ).
China’s setback was rooted in the long-standing imbalance between its marine-oriented economy and continental military-political system. First, China’s market relied heavily on foreign trade, but the Qing government failed to develop a sovereign monetary policy, resulting in the trade flow being constantly controlled by foreign powers. Silver from abroad became China’s de facto currency and, with the government unable to exercise effective supervision, the country lost monetary sovereignty and was vulnerable to the fluctuations of silver supplies, destabilising the economy. Second, China’s natural resources were over-exploited to produce large amounts of exports; as a result, the country’s ecological environment was severely damaged. Constrained by both market and resource limitations, China’s endogenous growth hit a chokepoint, as productivity plateaued, employment declined, and surplus populations became displaced, leading to a series of major rebellions in the early-to-mid nineteenth century. It was in this context that the West showed up at China’s doorstep.
Under the pressure of both domestic problems and external aggression, China embarked on the path of ‘learning from the outside world to defend against foreign intervention’ (師夷長技以制夷, shī yí zhǎng jì yǐ zhì yí), which has been fundamental theme of Chinese history over the past century or so. This formulation, despite having been ridiculed by many since the 1980s following the initiation of China’s economic reforms, epitomises the country’s strategy. On the one hand, China has closely studied the key drivers of Western power, namely industrial production, technological development, economic organisation, and military capability, as well as methods for social mobilisation based on the nation-state. On the other hand, China has sought to learn from other countries for the purpose of advancing its development, securing its independence, and building upon its own heritage.
Until the mid-twentieth century, however, this path did not yield significant changes for China, fundamentally due to its inadequate state capacity, which deteriorated even further after the Qing dynasty fell in 1911. In fact, several initiatives undertaken in the late Qing period to strengthen the state, generated new problems in turn; for example, the ‘New Army’ (新軍, xīnjūn) which was established in the late-nineteenth century in an effort to modernise China’s military would turn into a secessionist force. Meanwhile, theories of development advocated by scholar-officials in this period, such as the concept of ‘national salvation through industry’ (實(shí)業(yè)救國, shíyè jiùguó), were impossible to implement due to the state’s inability to provide institutional support. As such, trade remained China’s fastest growing economic sector, which, despite bringing short-term economic benefits, resulted in China becoming further subordinated to the West.
However, by the time of the Second World War, which was preceded by China’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (1937–1945), the country’s international position began to improve, while the West experienced a relative decline. The Second World War and anti-colonial struggles for national liberation dealt a crushing blow to the old imperialist order, as the Western powers were forced to retreat, initiating a decline as they were no longer able to reap colonial dividends. Countries across Asia, Africa, and Latin America, including China, won their independence; meanwhile, the Soviet Union, stretching across Eurasia, emerged as a significant rival to the West. Amid these global convulsions, China’s weight on the international stage dramatically increased and it became an important force.
In this global context, China began its journey toward national rejuvenation, with two main priorities. The first priority was political; emulating the Soviet Union, China’s Nationalist and the Communist parties established a strong state, which had been the cornerstone of Western economic development, while the lack of state organisation and mobilisation capacity was the greatest weakness of the Qing dynasty in the face of Western powers. The second priority was industrialisation, which advanced in a step by step manner in three phrases.
The first breakthrough in industrialisation took place after the Chinese Revolution in 1949 and was made possible by the help of the Soviet Union, which exported a complete basic industrial system to China. Although this system had serious limitations, which came to a head by the 1970s and 1980s, it allowed China to develop a comprehensive understanding of the systematic nature of industry, especially the underlying structure of industrialisation, that is, heavy industry.
The second breakthrough in industrialisation came after China established diplomatic relations with the United States in the 1970s and began to import technologies from the US and European countries. During this phase, China focused on the development of its southeast coast, a region which had a longstanding history of rural commerce and industry. With the support of machinery and knowledge gained during the first round of industrialisation, the consumer goods sector in the southeast coastal areas was able to develop rapidly at the township level, the level of government which had the most flexibility. By absorbing a large amount of workers, the labour-intensive industrial system significantly improved livelihood for the people.
The third breakthrough in industrialisation, beginning at the turn of the century, was driven by the traditional emphasis for a strong state and a desire to continue the revolution, saw the government devote its capacity to building infrastructure and steering industrial development. As a result, China experienced continuous growth in industrial output and kept moving upwards along the industrial chain, creating the largest and most comprehensive manufacturing sector in the world. The global economic landscape thus changed dramatically.
Today, China is in the midst of its fourth breakthrough in industrialisation, which revolves around the application of information technology to industry. In the current period, the United States is worried about being overtaken by China, which has prompted a fundamental change in bilateral relations and ushered in an era of global change.
In short, at the heart of the second stage of world history were the shifting dynamics between China and the West. For more than 100 years since the early nineteenth century, the Western powers were on the upswing while China experienced a downturn; since the Second World War, however, the trends have reversed, with China on the rise and the West declining. Now it appears that the critical point in this relationship is approaching, where the two sides will reach equivalent positions, exhausting the limits of the old world order.
▍Stage III: The Decline of the US-Led Order
In the wake of China’s rise, the old, Western-dominated world order has been overwhelmed, however, the real trigger for its collapse is the instability resulting from the fact that the United States has been unable to secure the unipolar global dominance which it pursued after the end of the Cold War.
Historically, the Roman empire could not reach India, let alone venture beyond the Onion Mountains; in the other direction, the Han and Tang dynasties could have hardly maintained their power even if they had managed to cross this range. The structural equilibrium for the world is for nations to stay in balance, rather than be ruled by a single centre.
Even the immense technological advances in transportation and warfare have been unable to change this iron law. Prior to the Second World War, the Western powers had penetrated nearly all corners of the world; despite their competing interests and the force needed to maintain their colonies, this system of rule was, in a way, more stable than the current order by distributing power more broadly across the several countries. Meanwhile, in the postwar period, the Soviet Union and the West formed opposing Cold War blocs, with each camp having its own scope of influence and balanced, to an extent, by the other.
In contrast, following the end of the Cold War, the United States became the sole superpower, dominating the entire world. The United States, as the most recently established Western country, the last ‘New World’ to be ‘discovered’ by the Europeans, and the most populous of these powers, was destined to be the final chapter in the West’s efforts to dominate the world. The United States confidently announced that their victory over the Soviet Union constituted ‘the end of history’. However, ambition cannot bypass the hard constraint of reality. Under the sole domination of the United States, the world order immediately became unstable and fragmented; the so-called?Pax Americana?was too short-lived to be written into the pages of history. After the brief ‘end of history’ euphoria under the Clinton and Bush administrations, the Obama era saw the United States initiate a ‘strategic contraction’, seeking to unload its burdens of global rule one after another.
In addition to external costs, Washington’s fleeting pursuit of global hegemony also induced internal strains. Although the United States reaped many dividends from its imperial rule by developing a financial system in which capital could be globally allocated, this came with a cost; as a Chinese saying goes, ‘a(chǎn) blessing might be a misfortune in disguise’ (福兮禍所依, fú xī huò suǒ yī). The boom of the US financial sector, along with the volatile speculation that feeds off it, has caused the country to become deindustrialised, with the livelihoods of the working and middle classes bearing the brunt. Due to the self-protective measures of emerging countries such as China, it was impossible for this financial system to fully extract sufficient external gains to cover the domestic losses suffered by the popular classes due to deindustrialisation. Consequently, the US has developed extreme levels of income inequality, and become sharply polarised, with increasing division and antagonism between different classes and social groups.
Deindustrialisation is at the root of the US crisis. Western superpowers were able to tyrannise the world during the nineteenth century, including their bullying of China, mainly due to their industrial superiority, which allowed them produce the most powerful ships and cannons; deindustrialisation causes the supply of those ‘ships and cannons’ to become inadequate. Even the US military-industrial system has become fragmentary and excessively costly due to the decline of supporting industries. The US elite realises the gravity of this problem, but successive administrations have struggled to address the issue; Obama called for reindustrialisation but made no progress due to the deep impasse between Republicans and Democrats, a dynamic that inhibits effective government action, which Francis Fukuyama termed the ‘vetocracy’; Trump followed this up with the timely slogan ‘Make America Great Again’, promising to make the US the world’s strongest industrial power once more; and this intention can also be seen in the incumbent Biden administration’s push for the enactment of the CHIPS and Science Act and other initiatives aimed at boosting domestic industrial development. However, as long as US finance capital can continue to take advantage of the global system to obtain high profits abroad, it cannot possibly return to domestic US industry and infrastructure. The United States would have to break the power of the financial magnates in order to revive its industry, but how could this even be possible?
In contrast to the deindustrialisation which has taken place in the United States, China is steadily advancing through its fourth breakthrough of industrialisation and rising towards the top of global manufacturing, relying on the solid foundation of a complete industrial chain. Fearing that they will be surpassed in terms of ‘hard power’, the US elite has declared China to be a ‘competitor’ and the nature of relations between the two countries has fundamentally changed.
The US elite have long referred to their country as the ‘City upon a Hill’, a Christian notion by which it is meant that the United States holds an exceptional status in the world and is a ‘beacon’ for other nations to follow. This deep-seated belief of superiority means that Washington cannot accept the ascendance of other nations or civilisations, such as China, which has been following its own path for thousands of years. China’s economic rise and, consequently, its growing influence in reshaping the US-led global order is nothing more than the world returning to a more balanced state; however, this is sacrilegious to Washington, comparable to the rejection of religious conversion for missionaries. It is clear that the US elite have exhausted their goodwill for China, are united in pursuing a hostile strategy against it, and will use all means to disrupt China’s development and influence on the world stage. Washington’s aggressive approach has, in turn, hardened the resolve of China to extricate itself from the confines of the US-led global system.?Pax Americana?will only allow China to develop in a manner which is subordinated to the rule of the United States, and so China has no choice but to take a new path and work to establish a new international order. This struggle between the United States and China is certain to dominate world headlines for the foreseeable future.
Nevertheless, there are several factors which decrease the likelihood that the struggle will develop in a catastrophic manner. First, the two countries are geographically separated by the Pacific ocean; and, second, although the United States is a maritime nation adept at offshore balancing, it is much less capable of launching land-based incursions, particularly against a country such as China which is a composite land-sea power with enormous strategic depth. As a result, US efforts to launch a full-scale war against China would be nonviable; even if Washington instigated a naval war in the Western Pacific, the odds would not be in its favour. On top of these two considerations, the United States is, in essence, a ‘commercial republic’ (the initial definition given for the country by one of its Founding Fathers, Alexander Hamilton), meaning that its actions are fundamentally based on cost-benefit calculations; China, on the contrary, is highly experienced in dealing with aggressive external forces.?Altogether, these factors all but guarantee that a full-frontal war between the two countries can be entirely avoided.
In this regard, the shifting positions of China and the United States vary greatly from similar dynamics in the past, such as the evolving hegemony on the European continent in recent centuries. In the latter context, the narrow confines of Europe cannot allow for multiple major powers, whereas the vast Pacific Ocean certainly can. This situation constitutes the bottom line of the relationship between the two countries. Therefore, while China and the United States will compete on all fronts, as long as China continues to increase its economic and military strength and clearly demonstrates its willingness to use that power, the United States will retreat in the same rational manner as its former suzerain, Britain, did. Once the United States withdraws from East Asia and the Western Pacific, a new world order will begin to take shape.
Over the past few years, China’s efforts in this respect have paid off, causing some within the United States to recognise China’s power and determination, and adjust their strategy accordingly, pressuring allied countries to bear greater costs to uphold the Western-led order. Despite the posturing of the Western countries, there is, in fact, no such ‘a(chǎn)lliance of democracies’; the US has always based its alliance system on common interests, of which the most important is to work together, not to advance any high-minded ideal, but to bleed other countries dry. Once these countries can no longer secure external profits together, they will have to compete with each other and their alliance system will promptly break up. In such a situation, the Western countries would return to a state similar to the period before the Second World War; fighting each other for survival rather than to carve the world into colonies. This battle of nations, although not necessarily through hot war, could cause the Western countries to backslide to their early modern state.
The willingness of the United States to do anything in its pursuit of profit, has led to the rapid crumbling of its value system. Since former President Woodrow Wilson led the country to its position as the leader of the world system, values have been at the core of the US appeal. At that time, Wilson held sway with many Chinese intellectuals, though disillusion soon followed; meanwhile, today, the myth of the ‘American dream’ and universal values of the United States remains charismatic to a considerable proportion of Chinese elites, however, the experience of the Trump presidency has torn the mask off these purported values. The United States has openly returned to the vulgarity and brutality of colonial conquest and westward expansion.
In addition, the current generation of Western elites suffers from a deficit in its capacity for strategic thinking. Many of the leading strategists and tacticians of the Cold War have now died, and amid hubris and dominance of the two decade ‘end of history’ era, the United States and European countries did not really produce a new generation of sharp intellectual figures. Consequently, in the face of their current dilemmas, the best that this generation of elites can offer is nothing more than repurposing old solutions and returning to the vulgarity of the colonial period.
This kind of vulgarity may be shocking to some, however it has deep roots in US history: from the Puritan colonists genocide against indigenous peoples in order to build their so-called ‘City upon a Hill’; to many of its founding fathers having been slave owners, who enshrined slavery in the Constitution; to the Federalist Papers which designed a complex system of separation of powers to guarantee freedom, but coldly discussed war and trade between countries; and to the country’s obsession with the right to bear arms, giving each person the right to kill in the name of freedom. Thus, we can see that Trump did not bring vulgarity to the United States, but only revealed the hidden tradition of the ‘commercial republic’ (it is worth noting that, in the Western tradition, merchants also tended to be plunderers and pirates).
Today, the United States has nearly completed this transformation of its identity: from a republic of values to a republic of commerce. This version of the country does not possess the united will to resume its position as leader of the world order, as evidenced by the strong and continued influence of the ‘America First’ rhetoric. The rising support among certain sections of the US population for such political vulgarity will encourage more politicians to follow this example.
The world order continues to be led by a number of powerful states, but is in the midst of great instability as efforts to strengthen the European Union have failed, Russia is likely to continue to decline, China is growing, Japan and South Korea lack real autonomy, and the United States, due to financial pressures, is rapidly shedding its responsibilities to support the network of post-war global multilateral institutions and alliances and instead seeks to build bilateral systems to maximise its specific interests. Put simply, the world order is falling apart; presently, the relevant questions are related to how rapid this breakdown will be, what an alternative new order should look like, and whether this new order can emerge and take effect in time to avoid widespread serious global instability.
▍China’s Role in Reshaping the World Order
A new international order has begun to emerge amid the disintegration of the old system. The main generative force in this dynamic is China, which is already the second largest economy in the world and is a civilisation that is distinct from the West.
China is one of the largest countries in the world and its long history has endowed it with experiences that are relevant to matters of global governance. With its immense size and diversity, China contains a world order within itself and has historically played a leading role in establishing a tianxia system that stretched over land and sea, from Central Asia to the South Seas. Alongside its rich history, China has also transformed itself into a modern country over the past century, having learned from Western experiences and its own tradition of modernity. By sharing the wisdom of its ancient history and the lessons of its modern development, China can play a constructive role in global efforts to address imbalances in the world order and build a new system in three major ways.
1. The restoration of balanced global development.?The classical order on the ‘world island’ (世界島, shì jiè daǒ, roughly corresponding to Eurasia) leaned toward the continental nations, while the modern world order has been largely dominated by Western maritime powers. As a result, the world island became fractured, with the former centre of civilisation becoming a site of chaos and unending wars.?Pax Americana?was unable to establish a stable form of rule over the world island, as the United States was separated from this region by the sea and was unable to form constructive relations with non-Western countries. Therefore, the United States was only able to maintain a maritime order, rather than a world order. It relied on brutal military interventions into the centre of the world island, hastily retreating after wreaking havoc and leaving the region in a perpetual state of rupture.
Conversely, China’s approach to the construction of a new international order is that of ‘listening to both sides and choosing the middle course’ (執(zhí)兩用中, zhí liǎng yòng zhōng). Historically, China successfully balanced the land and sea; during the Han and Tang dynasties, for instance, China accumulated experience in interacting with land-based civilisations, meanwhile, since the Song and Ming dynasties, China has been deeply involved in the maritime trade system. It is based on this historical experience that China has proposed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), of which the most important aspect is the incorporation of the world island and the oceans, accommodating both the ancient and modern orders. The BRI offers a proposal to develop an integrated and balanced world system, with the ‘Belt’ aiming to restore order on the world island, while the ‘Road’ is oriented towards the order on the seas. Alongside this initiative, China has built corresponding institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
2. Moving beyond capitalism and promoting people-centred development.?The system on which Western power and prosperity has been built is capitalism, rooted in European legacies of the merchant-marauder duality and colonial conquest, driven by the pursuit of monetary profits, managing capital with a monstrously developed financial system, and hinging on trade. Under capitalism, the Western powers have viewed countries of the Global South as ‘others’, treating them as hunting grounds for cheap resources or markets. Although the Western powers have been able to occupy and spread capitalism to much of the world, they have not been able to widely cultivate prosperity, too often tending towards malicious opportunism; for those countries that do not profit from colonialism, but suffer from its brutal oppression, the system is nonviable. As a result, since the Western powers took charge of the world in the nineteenth century, the vast majority of non-Western countries have been unable to attain industrial or modern development, a track record which disproves the purported universality of capitalism.
The ancient Chinese sages advocated for a socioeconomic model that Dr. Sun Yat-sen, a leader in the 1911 revolution to overthrow of the Qing dynasty and the first president of the Republic of China, called the ‘Principles of People’s Livelihood’ (民生主義, mínshēng zhǔyì) which can be rephrased as ‘the philosophy of benefiting the people’ (厚生主義, Hòushēng zhǔyì). This philosophy, which values the production, utilisation, and distribution of material to allow people to live better and in a sustainable manner, dates back over 2000 years, appearing as early as the?Book of Documents?(尚書, shàngshū), an ancient Confucian text. Guided by this philosophy, a policy of ‘promoting the fundamental and suppressing the incidental’ (崇本抑末, chóngběn yìmò) was adopted in ancient China to orient commercial and financial activities towards production and people’s livelihood. Today, China has rejuvenated this model and begun to share it with other countries through the BRI, which has taken the approach of teaching others ‘how to fish’, emphasising the improvement of infrastructure and advancement of industrialisation.
China, which is now the world’s factory and continues to upgrade its industries, is also driving a reconfiguration of the world’s division of labour: upstream, accepting components produced by cutting-edge manufacturing in Western countries; downstream, transferring productive and manufacturing capacity to underdeveloped countries, particularly in Africa. As the world’s largest consumer market, China should access energy from different parts of the world in a fair and even manner, and promote global policies which emphasise production (‘the fundamental’) and minimise financial speculation (‘the incidental’).
3. Towards a world of unity and diversity.?When the European powers established the current world order, they generally pursued ‘homogenisation’, inclined to use violence to impose their system on other countries and inevitably creating enemies. The United States, influenced by Christian Puritanism, tends to believe in the uniformity of values, imposing its purported ‘universal values’ on the world, and denouncing any nation that differs from its conceptions as ‘evil’ and an enemy. During ‘the end of history’ period, this tendency was exemplified by the so-called War on Terror which launched invasions and missiles throughout the Middle East. Despite this preoccupation with homogenisation, the US-led order is being unravelled by rampant polarisation, broken apart by intensifying cultural and political divisions.
China, on the other hand, tells a different story. For millennia, based on the principle of ‘multiple gods united in one heaven’ or ‘one culture and multiple deisms’, various religious and ethnic groups have been integrated within China through the worship of heaven or the culture, thus developing the nation and the tianxia system of unity and diversity. Universal order or harmony can neither be attained through violent conquest nor through the preaching and imposition of values to change ‘the other’ into ‘self’, but rather by recognising the autonomy of ‘the other’; as emphasised in?The Analects of Confucius?(論語·季氏, lúnyǔ·jìshì), ‘…all the influences of civil culture and virtue are to be cultivated to attract them to be so; and when they have been so attracted, they must be made contented and tranquil’ (修文德以來之，既來之，則安之, xiūwén dé yǐlái zhī, jì lái zhī, zé ānzhī). By and large, it is along this path of harmony in diversity that China today conducts international relations.
China should understand the building of a new international order through the lens of revitalising the tianxia order, and its approach should be guided by the sages’ way of ‘harmonising all nations’ (協(xié)和萬邦, xiéhé wànbāng) to pacify the tianxia. The process of constructing a new international order, or a revitalised tianxia order, should adhere to the following considerations:
1. A tianxia order will not be built at once but progressively.?A Chinese idiom can be used to describe the China-led process of forming a new global system: ‘Although Zhou was an old country, the (favouring) appointment alighted on it recently’ (周雖舊邦,其命維新, zhōu suī jiù bāng, qí mìng wéixīn). Zhou was an old kingdom that was governed by moral edification; its influence gradually expanded, first to neighbouring states and then beyond, until two thirds of the tianxia paid allegiance to the kingdom and the existing Yin dynasty (c. 1600–1045 BCE) was replaced by the Zhou dynasty (c.?1045– 256 BCE). In approaching the construction of a new international order and revitalising the concept of tianxia, China should follow this progressive approach to avoiding a collision with the existing hegemonic system. The concept of tianxia refers to a historical process without end.
2. Virtue and propriety are the first priority in maintaining the emerging tianxia system.?A tianxia system aims to ‘harmonise all nations’, not to establish closed alliances or demand homogeneity. China should promote morality, decency, and shared economic prosperity in relations between nations and international law. What distinguishes this approach from the existing system of international law is that, in addition to clarifying the rights and obligations of each party, it also emphasises building mutual affection and rapport between nations.
3. A tianxia order will not seek to monopolise the entire world.?The world is too large to be effectively governed by any country alone. The sages understood this and so their tianxia order never attempted to expand all over the known world at the time, nor did later generations; for instance, Zheng He came across many nations during his voyages to the Western Seas, but the Ming dynasty did not colonise and conquer them, nor did he include them all in the tributary system, but instead allowed them to make their own choices. Today, China does not seek to impose any system onto other countries; with such moderation, the struggle for hegemony can be avoided.
4. A new international order will consist of several regional systems.?Instead of a world system governed by one dominant country or a small group of powers, a new global order will likely be made up of several regional systems. Across the world, countries with common geographies, cultures, belief systems, and interests have already begun to form their own regional organisations, such as in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and the Atlantic states; China should focus on the Western Pacific and Eurasia.
The concept of regional systems shares some similarities with Samuel Huntington’s division of civilisations, however, importantly, it does not necessitate any clash between them. As a large country and land-sea power, China will likely overlap with multiple regional systems, including both maritime- and land-based regional systems. China, which literally means ‘the country of the middle’, should serve as a harmoniser between different regional systems and act to mitigate conflict and confrontation; in this way, a new international order of both unity and diversity can emerge.
A new architecture of global governance will be built gradually, with layers nested upon each other from the inside out. To this end, China’s efforts should begin in the innermost layer to which it belongs, East Asia. Traditionally, China, the Korean peninsula, Vietnam, Japan, and other countries in this region formed a Confucian cultural sphere; however, after the Second World War, despite these nations successfully modernising, relations between them have deteriorated due to the pressures of foreign powers, such as the United States and Soviet Union. China’s efforts to reorganise the world order must start from here, by revitalising this shared heritage, developing coordinated regional policies based on the ‘Principles of People’s Livelihood’, and demonstrating improved standards of prosperity and civility for the world. As the achievements and strength of such regional efforts grow, the power of the United States and its world order will inevitably fade out, and the process of global transformation will rapidly accelerate.
After the inner layer of East Asia, the next-most nested layer, or middle layer, that China should focus on is the heart of the world island, Eurasia. Central to these regional efforts is the SCO, in which China, Russia, India, and Pakistan are already member states, Iran and Afghanistan are observer states, and Turkey and Germany can be invited. Due to its economic decline and weakening global influence, Russia is likely to increase its focus on its neighbouring regions, namely Central Asia, and to participate more actively in the SCO, including assisting in efforts to promote harmonious relations and development in the region and minimising conflict. The stability of Eurasia is key, not only to the security and prosperity of China, particularly its western regions, but to overall global peace.
Finally, the outermost layer for China is the institutionalised BRI, which connects nations and regions across the world. Proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013, to date China has signed more than 200 BRI cooperation agreements with 149 countries and 32 international organisations.
▍Concluding Remarks
The evolution and future direction of the world order cannot be understood without examining the shifting relationship between China and the West over the past five centuries. In the early modern era, the Western powers were inspired by China in their pursuit of modernisation; in the past century, China has learned from the West. The reemergence of China has shaken the foundations of the old Western-dominated world order and is a driving force in the formation of a new international system. Amid the momentous changes in the global landscape, it is necessary to recognise the strengths and limits of Western modernity, ideologies, and institutions, while also appreciating the Chinese tradition of modernity and its developments in the current era. For China, this requires a restructuring of its knowledge system, guided by a new vision which is inspired by classical Chinese wisdom: ‘Chinese learning as substance, Western learning for application’ (中學(xué)為體，西學(xué)為用, Zhōngxué wèi tǐ, xīxué wèi yòng).
人類正在經(jīng)歷五百年未有之大變局：歐美相對(duì)衰落，中國等非西方世界興起，世界格局因此出現(xiàn)革命性變化。
不過，嚴(yán)格說來，言“五百年”之大變局，或許有點(diǎn)夸張。略加考察即可發(fā)現(xiàn)，歐美之強(qiáng)不過持續(xù)兩百年而已，以其初步完成工業(yè)化為開端。
故五百年來之世界史，可以工業(yè)化為限，粗劃為兩階段，其間中、西之勢有較大變化。
西方今日已至其兩百年強(qiáng)弩之末，新世界秩序已在構(gòu)建之中，中國是主要塑造者。
▍世界史第一階段：中西平衡，各得其所
名副其實(shí)的“世界歷史”始于鄭和下西洋，時(shí)當(dāng)十五世紀(jì)初，略早于葡萄牙、西班牙人的大航海。隨著中國與歐洲通過海洋通道直接聯(lián)系，世界第一次連為一體。
本乎各自終極信念，人類文明約有兩大類型：中國人敬天，中國以外各族群普遍信神，一神教是其較成熟者，是為廣義的西方。
中國與西方共在“世界島”，但蔥嶺（即帕米爾高原）隔絕中、西，各有其歷史而無世界史?；谄浼扔兄R(shí)，中國人、西方人在世界島兩端分別維護(hù)天下秩序和普世秩序。
廣義西方演進(jìn)之大勢是向西、北移動(dòng)，發(fā)端于從兩河流域，然后到地中海周邊，再到大西洋濱海，而有狹義的西方即歐美。
中國文明演進(jìn)大勢是逐漸向東、南移動(dòng)，由黃河流域至于長江流域，以至于東南沿海，明太祖定都南京，即體現(xiàn)了這一趨勢，由此必定經(jīng)營海洋經(jīng)濟(jì)。
兩者先后下海，人類文明兩大類型直接相會(huì)于印太交匯處，此后則有完整世界歷史可言。
鄭和下西洋雖然中止，但一些南洋島國進(jìn)入朝貢秩序，此為天下秩序之重大變化，漢唐是以西域邦國為主的。
更重要的是，中國人下海之路已打通，東南沿海民眾移民南洋，絲綢、瓷器、茶葉等貨物進(jìn)入海洋貿(mào)易體系。相比于唐宋時(shí)代，海外貿(mào)易規(guī)模擴(kuò)大，江南經(jīng)濟(jì)在很大程度上圍繞出口展開，其工業(yè)化進(jìn)程加快，中國成為“世界工廠”。
歐人在中西貿(mào)易中不占優(yōu)勢，乃以其在新征服的美洲所開采之白銀彌補(bǔ)逆差。白銀大量流入中國，成為大宗交易貨幣。由此而有“白銀全球化”。
原產(chǎn)于美洲的玉米、白薯種子陸續(xù)傳入中國，適宜條件比較惡劣的土地，中國人口迅速增長。
然而，中國參與塑造海洋聯(lián)結(jié)的世界秩序，給自己帶來了意料之外的麻煩：中國經(jīng)濟(jì)已深入海洋體系，政治軍事安排卻仍是大陸體系，兩者緊張、撕裂。
明朝即亡于海、陸間之緊張：中國邊患在北方、東北，此為明成祖遷都北京之主要考量，而一旦遷都北京，國家戰(zhàn)略重心轉(zhuǎn)移，必然停止經(jīng)營南洋；應(yīng)對(duì)北方邊患為國家財(cái)政重點(diǎn)，而當(dāng)時(shí)財(cái)富多來自海洋貿(mào)易，集中于東南；
其地教育發(fā)達(dá)，東南士大夫得以主宰政治進(jìn)程，為自身利益，阻礙稅制調(diào)整，反而強(qiáng)化傳統(tǒng)稅制，強(qiáng)加于農(nóng)民；以耕種為主業(yè)的北方農(nóng)民負(fù)擔(dān)沉重，淪為流民，轉(zhuǎn)成流寇，最終顛覆明鼎；同時(shí)，北方軍需供應(yīng)不足，滿清在東北日益坐大，趁機(jī)南下取天下。
滿清成長于東北，長期與農(nóng)耕、游牧兩類文明區(qū)打交道，故南下立國之后，在南面治中原之外，積極經(jīng)營“中國弧”地帶，即在北、西兩邊環(huán)繞中國的蒙古高原、天山南北與青藏高原。
幾千年來，在此地帶此起彼伏的游牧民族不斷進(jìn)入中原，擾亂天下。滿清在漢唐元明苦心經(jīng)營的基礎(chǔ)上，以復(fù)雜靈活的政治機(jī)制把西、北中國弧完整納入中國政治體，初步解決了困擾中國四千年的大難題。
由此，國際格局也有改變：俄羅斯成為中國鄰國，并最為緊要；陸上絲綢之路轉(zhuǎn)而取道蒙古草原北上，經(jīng)俄羅斯，終于北歐。
綜合以上兩大趨勢可見，至十八世紀(jì)中后期，中國為海、陸兩個(gè)弧面所合，兩者分量相當(dāng)，但對(duì)中國的作用不同：中國生機(jī)在海上，安全系于陸地。
西北草原弧內(nèi)部不甚穩(wěn)定，外接的俄羅斯和伊斯蘭世界尚較傳統(tǒng)；東南海洋弧內(nèi)部穩(wěn)定，外接的歐美有新因素涌現(xiàn)。中國涵攝海陸的格局在全世界大國中是獨(dú)一無二的，其后至今，根本戰(zhàn)略問題是權(quán)衡取舍者兩者。
相對(duì)而言，歐洲從與中國的直接交往、也即從新世界秩序中受益更大。
進(jìn)入十六世紀(jì)，羅馬教會(huì)日益腐朽，歐洲民族-國家主義（nationalism）發(fā)酵，終由馬丁?路德在日耳曼掀起宗教改革大潮。由此，歐洲進(jìn)入國民-民族國家構(gòu)建（nation-state building）時(shí)代，史稱“早期現(xiàn)代”。
早期現(xiàn)代之歷史主題是打破羅馬教會(huì)一統(tǒng)權(quán)威，確立世俗王權(quán)之主權(quán)地位，此主權(quán)打破封建領(lǐng)主所造成的等級(jí)和分割，所有臣民在國王法律下平等。
最先取得成功的是英格蘭，1533年，亨利八世禁止英格蘭教會(huì)向教廷繳納歲貢，次年通過《至尊法案》，確立國王為教會(huì)最高領(lǐng)袖，并以之為國教。英國被公認(rèn)為第一個(gè)現(xiàn)代國家之理由在此，憲制變革則在從屬地位。
面臨統(tǒng)治危機(jī)的羅馬教會(huì)尋求開辟新的靈牧場，乃沿大航海所發(fā)現(xiàn)的航路向歐洲以外傳教，耶教逐漸成為世界性宗教，此為近五百年之大事件。十六世紀(jì)后期，傳教士幾經(jīng)輾轉(zhuǎn)，進(jìn)入中國。
傳教士本來準(zhǔn)備向其想象中野蠻的中國人傳播真理，但很快發(fā)現(xiàn)中國是高度文明的大國，中國政教之美超出其神學(xué)知識(shí)范圍：中國人不信奉其所熟悉的人格神，卻普遍有道德，有高度發(fā)達(dá)的經(jīng)濟(jì)和井然有序的秩序。有些人受到觸動(dòng)，乃轉(zhuǎn)而認(rèn)真對(duì)待中國，翻譯中國經(jīng)典，送回巴黎。
由此而有巴黎的啟蒙運(yùn)動(dòng)。此前一千五百年，歐洲鎖死在神教蒙昧中，即便中世紀(jì)重新發(fā)現(xiàn)古希臘哲學(xué)，也只作為神學(xué)的侍婢，用來證明人格神是存在的。
中國的國家及其思想則向西人展示了人生、秩序的另一可能，依西人關(guān)于現(xiàn)代一詞的定義，中國文明自誕生起就是現(xiàn)代的。可以想見初次接觸中學(xué)的西人之心靈震撼。
由此，西方哲人走上人文主義、理性主義，形成所謂現(xiàn)代觀念和制度。啟蒙哲人宣布：人是主體，沒有造物主；人應(yīng)求自身幸福，而非升入神的國；人完全可以不依神教而有健全道德和良好人際關(guān)系，國家完全可以不依神教而有良好秩序，國王直接統(tǒng)治全體臣民是最好的政治等等。西人在啟蒙運(yùn)動(dòng)中所倡導(dǎo)的所謂現(xiàn)代觀念和制度，在中國早已是幾千年的常識(shí)。
故“中學(xué)西漸”大潮推動(dòng)了西方的現(xiàn)代化，不可謂之唯一力量，但可謂之重要力量，中國思想啟發(fā)了西方哲人或鞏固了其苦思所得之靈感。
就現(xiàn)實(shí)表現(xiàn)看，西方是過去兩百年全球現(xiàn)代化的主要推動(dòng)者，但中國文化已內(nèi)在其中，西人以其蠻力向全世界傳播中國觀念，當(dāng)然是西方化的。認(rèn)識(shí)和肯定這一點(diǎn)，才能理解今日世界演變之大勢。
總之，在十五世紀(jì)初中期到十八世紀(jì)中后期三百多年的世界歷史第一階段，完整的世界初步形成，中國和西方在互動(dòng)中皆有調(diào)整、變化，各有所得。從中國人角度看，如此世界秩序大體是公平的。
▍世界史第二階段：中西之位的往復(fù)
十八世紀(jì)中后期，西方通過工業(yè)化獲得軍事優(yōu)勢，乃加以濫用，四處征服、殖民。世界固然因此而空前緊密地連為一體，但其秩序不公，因而最終難以持續(xù)，中國是重要的改變力量。
世界歷史進(jìn)入第二階段的關(guān)鍵因素是西方實(shí)現(xiàn)工業(yè)化，中西之勢的轉(zhuǎn)移之源在此。
不過，細(xì)加分析即可發(fā)現(xiàn)，西方工業(yè)化多有得益于中國之處：在知識(shí)上，西人曾長期致力于思辨現(xiàn)實(shí)以外的存在，當(dāng)其哲學(xué)轉(zhuǎn)而肯定人為主體，則有“認(rèn)識(shí)論轉(zhuǎn)向”，轉(zhuǎn)而面向現(xiàn)存之物，發(fā)展出分解-重構(gòu)的方法，以之發(fā)現(xiàn)物之構(gòu)造機(jī)理，進(jìn)而運(yùn)用技術(shù)手段制造人造物。
在制度上，啟蒙哲人受中國啟發(fā)而有“開明專制”觀念，支持強(qiáng)大王權(quán)，西方乃超越古典城邦和教會(huì)政治，建立大范圍國民-民族國家；又受重農(nóng)學(xué)派等中國化思想影響，此國家重視工業(yè)生產(chǎn)，而傳統(tǒng)上西方城邦多重貿(mào)易。
在西方各國中，英格蘭率先推進(jìn)工業(yè)化，則另有原因：殖民征服造就巨大海外市場需求，而英格蘭人口有限，不能不尋找新技術(shù)；技術(shù)需求推動(dòng)科學(xué)發(fā)展，科學(xué)、技術(shù)、工業(yè)良性互動(dòng)，最終摸索到基于石化能源、鋼鐵機(jī)器生產(chǎn)的工業(yè)化之路。
英格蘭率先富強(qiáng)，隨后其技術(shù)、制度傳如歐洲大陸。富強(qiáng)的歐洲列強(qiáng)憑其堅(jiān)船利炮，對(duì)外征服、殖民。西方列強(qiáng)陸續(xù)征服非洲、中東、印度等地，終至中國門口。
西方在此前三百年與中國的和平通商中始終有巨額逆差，乃通過鴉片貿(mào)易彌補(bǔ)；遭中國抵制后則發(fā)動(dòng)戰(zhàn)爭。中國遭遇失敗，以中國為中心的普遍世界秩序——天下體系，趨于解體，被迫降格為民族國家，以救亡圖存。
中國失敗的原因主要在海洋型經(jīng)濟(jì)與大陸型軍政體制的嚴(yán)重錯(cuò)位：第一，中國市場嚴(yán)重依賴海外，但政府未能及時(shí)轉(zhuǎn)型，貿(mào)易流始終在他人控制下。
第二，海外白銀流入為貨幣，政府未予有效管理，喪失貨幣主權(quán)，當(dāng)其供應(yīng)量波動(dòng)時(shí)束手無策，經(jīng)濟(jì)無法正常運(yùn)作。
第三，中國是世界工廠，產(chǎn)品大量出口，卻未及時(shí)打開從外部獲取資源的通道。以一國有限資源支撐世界工廠運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)，資源過度開發(fā)，生態(tài)遭嚴(yán)重破壞。
受制于市場和資源的雙重約束，中國的內(nèi)生性增長遭遇瓶頸，生產(chǎn)率不再增長，就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)減少，新增人口成為流民，終致十九世紀(jì)初中期連續(xù)發(fā)生流民大叛亂。西方人正在此時(shí)來到中國門口。
在內(nèi)憂外患?jí)毫ο?，中國走上“師夷長技以制夷”之路，此為過去一百多年來中國歷史之基本主題。八十年代以來很多人嘲笑這句話，但它確足以概括百多年來中國人之所為：
一方面學(xué)習(xí)西方之術(shù)，首先是軍事技術(shù)，其次是支撐它的工業(yè)生產(chǎn)和組織技術(shù)，還有基于國民-民族國家的社會(huì)動(dòng)員技術(shù)，此為西方力量所在，中國人努力學(xué)習(xí)之。另一方面，中國有悠久深厚的文明傳統(tǒng)，學(xué)習(xí)目的始終是自強(qiáng)、自立。
到直到二十世紀(jì)中期的一百年，中國變化不大。根本原因仍在于國家能力低下，尤其是滿清覆亡，本已低下的國家能力頹然解體，于是，晚清建設(shè)的某些現(xiàn)代機(jī)制反成禍亂之源，如新軍墮落為分裂國家的力量。
晚清士大夫曾倡導(dǎo)“實(shí)業(yè)救國”，因?yàn)槿狈业闹贫戎危緹o從展開。經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)域發(fā)展最快的仍為貿(mào)易，固然暫時(shí)帶來經(jīng)濟(jì)好處，但長遠(yuǎn)而言，中國更深地淪為西方依附者。
到了以抗日戰(zhàn)爭為先導(dǎo)的二戰(zhàn)時(shí)，中國國運(yùn)終于開始上升，而西方則開始相對(duì)衰落：二戰(zhàn)打垮老式帝國主義，原來統(tǒng)治全世界的西方列強(qiáng)退守本土，無從獲得殖民紅利，緩慢走上衰落之路。
包括中國在內(nèi)的亞非拉國家實(shí)現(xiàn)獨(dú)立自主。介乎歐亞之間的蘇聯(lián)崛起，與西方分庭抗禮；在兩大陣營之間的中國的分量陡然加重，成為決定性第三方。
在此格局中，中國走上強(qiáng)國復(fù)興之路：首先，政治上，國共兩黨共同學(xué)習(xí)蘇聯(lián)，終于建立強(qiáng)國家，西方經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展是以此為基礎(chǔ)的。滿清面對(duì)西方列強(qiáng)的最大劣勢就是國家組織力低下而缺乏動(dòng)員能力。其次，工業(yè)化得以循序推進(jìn)，可分為三個(gè)階段：
工業(yè)化第一輪突破得益于蘇聯(lián)的幫助。面對(duì)中國，重貿(mào)易的歐美海洋國家主要看重中國的龐大市場，故與中國的關(guān)系始終淺嘗輒止，隨時(shí)可以退出。
蘇聯(lián)作為有野心的中國陸上鄰國，當(dāng)海洋國家欲控制中國時(shí)通常支持中國以抗衡之，晚清以來即是如此，五六十年代的支持力度最大，向中國輸入全套工業(yè)體系。
此體系確有嚴(yán)重偏頗，故至七、八十年代陷入困境，但國人畢竟由此完整認(rèn)識(shí)了工業(yè)的體系性，尤其觸及工業(yè)化底層架構(gòu)即能源和重工業(yè)，而明清時(shí)代的工業(yè)化就卡在這一環(huán)節(jié)上，而漸顯落后。
尤其是這些工業(yè)大量布局于大陸深處的西北弧面，在一定程度上逆轉(zhuǎn)了中唐以來日益嚴(yán)重的經(jīng)濟(jì)重心失衡局面，這是今天以至未來長時(shí)期內(nèi)恢復(fù)國家經(jīng)濟(jì)布局平衡之基礎(chǔ)。此為中國工業(yè)化第一輪突破。
第二輪突破在中美建交后。中美聯(lián)手，致蘇聯(lián)崩潰，中國免去北顧之憂，側(cè)重發(fā)展東南沿海，這就回到了明清時(shí)代的工業(yè)化模式：工業(yè)化以家戶為基本單位分散在鄉(xiāng)村，以海洋為通道借重歐美海洋國家之技術(shù)和市場。
當(dāng)然，第一輪工業(yè)化成果又可提供一定機(jī)器和知識(shí)支持，消費(fèi)品工業(yè)得以在機(jī)制最為靈活的鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)層面迅速發(fā)展。此為中國工業(yè)化第二輪突破，相對(duì)于第一輪，實(shí)際上在技術(shù)上降級(jí)了，但大量吸納勞動(dòng)力，大幅度改善民生。
第三輪突破始于新世紀(jì)之初。傳統(tǒng)政府觀念開始發(fā)揮作用，本來熱衷于繼續(xù)革命的強(qiáng)政府，將其能力用于建設(shè)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，輔導(dǎo)產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展。于是，工業(yè)產(chǎn)值持續(xù)增長，并沿產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈向上攀爬，終于形成全球規(guī)模最大、體系最完整的制造業(yè)部門，世界經(jīng)濟(jì)版圖因此而大變。
今日中國已在工業(yè)化第四輪突破中，美國人因此而恐懼，從而改變了兩國關(guān)系的基調(diào)，世界秩序進(jìn)入大調(diào)整期。
總之，世界歷史第二階段兩百年間歷史的樞軸是中西位置的反轉(zhuǎn)：十九世紀(jì)初期以降的一百多年，西方向上走，中國往下走；二戰(zhàn)以后，中國向上走，西方往下走。今日似已逼近雙方移位之臨界點(diǎn)，逐漸突破世界舊秩序的容納力。
▍美國民粹化，世界舊秩序崩潰
世界舊秩序正在崩潰中。其源在中國的興起，既有世界秩序架構(gòu)難以容納；但導(dǎo)火索則是冷戰(zhàn)后美國一家獨(dú)大及其無法承受成本之后的倉皇失措。
歷史上，羅馬的力量不能及于印度，更無法越過蔥嶺；在另一方向上，漢唐的力量即便勉強(qiáng)越過蔥嶺，也難保持。故世界保持基本秩序的結(jié)構(gòu)性條件是，不由單一中心統(tǒng)治。
工業(yè)化之后交通和戰(zhàn)爭技術(shù)的提升亦未改變這一鐵律：二戰(zhàn)以前，西方列強(qiáng)散布世界各地，相互爭奪，看似混亂，實(shí)則分擔(dān)全球統(tǒng)治成本，西方作為整體反而可對(duì)世界實(shí)施有效統(tǒng)治。二戰(zhàn)后，蘇聯(lián)興起，與西方形成冷戰(zhàn)格局。兩個(gè)陣營各有其經(jīng)營范圍，同樣有效維護(hù)了世界秩序。
冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束，世界進(jìn)入一霸獨(dú)強(qiáng)的格局。美國在西方文明中立國最晚，也是西方人發(fā)現(xiàn)的最后的“新大陸”，其人口最多，注定成為西方文明統(tǒng)治世界之最后一站。
它確實(shí)得到了這個(gè)機(jī)會(huì)，也曾信心十足地宣稱歷史已經(jīng)終結(jié)。然而，雄心繞不過成本的硬約束，當(dāng)美國一家統(tǒng)治，世界秩序立刻走向松動(dòng)、潰散，所謂“美國治下的和平”（Pax Americana）短暫得不足以寫入未來的世界史。
回顧歷史即可發(fā)現(xiàn)，美國之崛起大部分因?yàn)槠溥h(yuǎn)在世界島外的地緣優(yōu)勢：列強(qiáng)爭奪世界島控制權(quán)，接連引爆一戰(zhàn)、二戰(zhàn)，美國在列強(qiáng)殘破時(shí)介入而僥幸取勝。此后，西方列強(qiáng)實(shí)力喪盡、精神崩潰，不得不把西方文明的“家父權(quán)”交給美國，并從各個(gè)方面積極配合美國對(duì)抗蘇聯(lián)陣營。
即便如此，在朝鮮半島上，美國拼湊的所謂“聯(lián)合國軍”與國力貧弱的中國直接交手，亦無力取勝。所謂美國世紀(jì)的歷史證明，其實(shí)在沒有直接統(tǒng)治世界島的能力，只能實(shí)施離岸平衡，如同當(dāng)年英國平衡歐陸。只要世界島上諸強(qiáng)相安，不給其操縱機(jī)會(huì)，其統(tǒng)治力散布全世界，必耗散至于虛脫。
此即當(dāng)下美國之困境所在，面對(duì)獨(dú)家維護(hù)世界秩序的責(zé)任，美國人力不從心，在小布什、克林頓短暫的歷史終結(jié)快感后，奧巴馬時(shí)代即開始戰(zhàn)略收縮，逐個(gè)拋棄其統(tǒng)治全球的重負(fù)：拋棄非洲，對(duì)南美心不在焉；在重返中東還是亞太再平衡之間搖擺不定。
全球統(tǒng)治權(quán)的短暫榮耀也誘發(fā)其內(nèi)潰：美國發(fā)展出在全球范圍內(nèi)配置資本的金融體系，由此收獲不少帝國統(tǒng)治紅利。但“福兮禍之所倚”，金融業(yè)與其所豢養(yǎng)的全球性快錢行業(yè)，即以網(wǎng)絡(luò)和醫(yī)藥為主的所謂高科技產(chǎn)業(yè)畸形繁榮，帶來“去工業(yè)化”，其所培育的中下階層生計(jì)大受影響。
受制于中國等新興國家的自保措施，此金融體系又無法有效榨取全部帝國紅利，外部收益不足以填補(bǔ)國內(nèi)去工業(yè)化各階層的損失。結(jié)果，美國內(nèi)部的收入分配結(jié)構(gòu)趨于兩極化，階層、集團(tuán)間的撕裂、對(duì)立日益嚴(yán)重。
尤其嚴(yán)重的是，其國家主體族群白人清教徒比例快速萎縮，焦慮心態(tài)使其政治行為日益激進(jìn)，如茶黨興起、支持特朗普，對(duì)非主流人群和外部世界的敵意持續(xù)強(qiáng)化；而這必將刺激非主流人群的激進(jìn)化，很快就會(huì)有民主黨的特朗普出現(xiàn)。
去工業(yè)化是美國危機(jī)的根源。西方列強(qiáng)之所以在十九世紀(jì)可橫行全球，包括欺辱中國，主要因?yàn)槠溆袕?qiáng)大工業(yè)體系所生產(chǎn)之堅(jiān)船利炮。去工業(yè)化意味著其堅(jiān)船利炮的供應(yīng)不足，即便在美國，其軍事工業(yè)體系也已殘缺，或由于配套不全而成本過高，以至于完全無力投入另一場軍備競賽中。
美國精英已意識(shí)到此問題之嚴(yán)重性，奧巴馬有心推動(dòng)再工業(yè)化，但在“否決政治”僵局中無任何進(jìn)展。特朗普應(yīng)運(yùn)而生，解決此問題的愿望更為急迫，“讓美國再次強(qiáng)大”首先就是讓美國再次成為第一工業(yè)國。為此，特朗普的施政風(fēng)格打破成例，別創(chuàng)一格。
但特朗普能實(shí)現(xiàn)其意圖否？很難。只要金融等“末業(yè)”依然可借全球體系從外部獲取高額利潤，資本就不可能轉(zhuǎn)入國內(nèi)工業(yè)和基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。美國欲復(fù)興其工業(yè)，得像漢武帝那樣，先摧破金融豪強(qiáng)，但這可能嗎？
與美國的去工業(yè)化相反，中國依托堅(jiān)實(shí)的全產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈基礎(chǔ)，穩(wěn)步推進(jìn)其工業(yè)化第四輪突破，攀升制造業(yè)頂端。美國人終究是相信硬力量的，而中國的力量即將壓倒美國。美國精英不能不產(chǎn)生恐懼之情，乃宣布中國為“對(duì)手”，中國關(guān)系的性質(zhì)由之大變。
長期以來，在西方列強(qiáng)中，美國人對(duì)中國似有特殊好感，頗多憐憫之心，有時(shí)頗為慷慨。這可能源于其神教福音派心態(tài)：他們相信自己在山巔之城，有責(zé)任傳播神的真理，而中國是世界上最大的國家，中國人看起來文明、溫順，或可順受其信仰和價(jià)值。當(dāng)初美國的G2提議也是讓中國擔(dān)當(dāng)其統(tǒng)治世界的服帖助手。顯然，此期待出于其一神教的傲慢與對(duì)歷史的無知。
中國是人類文明兩大類型之一，幾千年都在走自己的路，即便在其最艱難時(shí)刻，即便在其全力學(xué)習(xí)蘇聯(lián)、西方之術(shù)時(shí)，仍保有文明自覺，未脫出其道。今天經(jīng)濟(jì)上的成功以及由此而有的重整世界秩序的牛刀小試，只是歷史恢復(fù)其常態(tài)而已。
但缺乏歷史感的美國人無法接受這一點(diǎn)，對(duì)中國的憐憫之情一轉(zhuǎn)而為怨恨之意，一如傳教者遭遇拒絕皈依者的反應(yīng)。大體可以確認(rèn)，美國精英群體對(duì)中國的好感已流失殆盡，怨恨中國已成共識(shí)——還有恐懼。故美國將會(huì)運(yùn)用一切手段擾亂中國的發(fā)展和影響力擴(kuò)大。
當(dāng)然，美國的做法讓正在恢復(fù)其力量和自信的中國堅(jiān)定了擺脫美國體系的決心?？梢源_信：未來中美之間將以斗爭為主。
由此，世界舊秩序的根基已經(jīng)搖動(dòng)：“美國治下的和平”意味著美國容許中國在其所維護(hù)的體系中發(fā)展，現(xiàn)在美國已不欲容納中國，則中國不能不另起爐灶，自行建立世界新秩序。美國人宣布，其國家戰(zhàn)略重歸于應(yīng)對(duì)“大國競爭”——說對(duì)了。
盡管如此，兩國的歷史和經(jīng)驗(yàn)將使此斗爭不成為毀滅性的。首先，在地理上，兩國相隔過于遼遠(yuǎn)；其次，就國家結(jié)構(gòu)而言，美國為海洋國家，長于離岸平衡，無力深入大陸；中國是海陸復(fù)合型國家，戰(zhàn)略縱深極大。
這兩個(gè)因素讓美國無力對(duì)中國發(fā)動(dòng)全面戰(zhàn)爭；即便其在西太發(fā)動(dòng)海戰(zhàn)，亦無勝算。
第三，就國性而言，美國的底色是“商業(yè)共和國”，基于成本收益計(jì)算行動(dòng)；中國則有處理蠻夷戎狄問題的豐富經(jīng)驗(yàn)。這些決定了兩國間直接決戰(zhàn)完全可以避免。
就此而言，中美易位，大大不同于過去幾百年發(fā)生在歐洲大陸的霸權(quán)易位。狹窄的歐洲確不能兼容二主，但寬闊的太平洋卻完全可以。這構(gòu)成兩國關(guān)系的底線。
故中美兩國將會(huì)展開全方位的大國競爭，而只要中國的經(jīng)濟(jì)和軍事力量持續(xù)提升，并在具體問題上充分展示自己有動(dòng)用使用這些毀滅性力量的堅(jiān)定決心，美國將會(huì)如其原宗主國英國一樣，在恰當(dāng)?shù)臅r(shí)間，在其無力立足的地方理性退卻。
直白而言，美國將會(huì)在中國的擠壓下，從東亞、西太退出，那將是世界新秩序告成之時(shí)。
這幾年來，中國之所為已使美國部分收效，部分美國人已認(rèn)識(shí)到中國的力量和決心，并調(diào)整戰(zhàn)略，轉(zhuǎn)而對(duì)盟國下手，在同盟體系上開源節(jié)流。
這正是川普上任以來對(duì)盟國之所為：為美國短暫利益，川普毫不猶豫地退出、破壞其自二戰(zhàn)以來所建立的聯(lián)盟體系，反復(fù)要求盟國分擔(dān)其維護(hù)秩序的成本，進(jìn)而對(duì)其盟國提出“公平貿(mào)易”的要求。
世間本無所謂基于共同價(jià)值的“民主聯(lián)盟”，美國建立聯(lián)盟體系之目的從來是為了追求自己的利益，只不過借助盟友應(yīng)對(duì)強(qiáng)大的敵人，但維護(hù)同盟是需要成本的。一旦同盟的成本大于收益，聯(lián)盟體系即走向解體。
由此，西方將被打回原形，重回二戰(zhàn)之前的狀態(tài)，而且更糟糕：這一次，不是為爭奪殖民地、瓜分世界，而是為了本國的生存。因而，西方世界有可能退回早期現(xiàn)代列國爭雄狀態(tài)，盡管未必通過熱戰(zhàn)。
美國為獲利而不擇手段，致其價(jià)值體系迅速崩潰。自威爾遜帶領(lǐng)美國走上世界體系領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的地位始，價(jià)值觀成為美國感召力之淵藪：當(dāng)年威爾遜曾感動(dòng)過無數(shù)中國知識(shí)分子，盡管很快就幻滅；今天在中國，美國的普世價(jià)值神話在相當(dāng)比例中國精英中仍有感召力，但川普讓其一一現(xiàn)形。美國回到其進(jìn)行殖民征服、開發(fā)西部的鄙陋狀態(tài)。
美國的思想力也明顯不濟(jì)。當(dāng)然，美國人本無深刻思想，惟歐洲兩次大戰(zhàn)迫使眾多思想者流亡美國，在美國發(fā)展出若干思想。
但冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束后，其人紛紛離世，此后在所謂歷史終結(jié)的二十年中，美國與西方未再涌現(xiàn)卓越的思想人物；以至于面對(duì)當(dāng)下困境，其應(yīng)對(duì)策略無非是翻出過去的方案或重新組合，日顯鄙陋——川普及其支持者最為典型。
對(duì)此鄙陋，有人作震驚狀，但這本是美國傳統(tǒng)：清教徒為建立所謂山巔之城，消滅了印第安人；為美國制定所謂自由憲法的立國者中頗多奴隸主，并把奴隸制堂皇寫入憲法；《聯(lián)邦黨人文集》為了保障自由設(shè)計(jì)了復(fù)雜的分權(quán)制度，但論及國家間戰(zhàn)爭和貿(mào)易則冷酷無情；美國人迷信持槍權(quán)，為自由賦予每人以殺人權(quán)。
所以，川普沒有發(fā)明美國，只是讓其隱而不彰的“商業(yè)共和國”傳統(tǒng)再度顯明，這是漢密爾頓當(dāng)初對(duì)美國的定性，而在西方，商人經(jīng)常同時(shí)是劫掠者、海盜。
上任不到兩年，特朗普已帶領(lǐng)美國大體完成其面孔轉(zhuǎn)換：快速褪去涂抹在其外表的理想主義光彩，從所謂的“價(jià)值共和國”轉(zhuǎn)為貨真價(jià)實(shí)的“商業(yè)共和國”。這個(gè)美國不準(zhǔn)備繼續(xù)承擔(dān)維護(hù)世界秩序的責(zé)任，“美國優(yōu)先”口號(hào)清楚表明這一點(diǎn)——而此孤立主義、也即赤裸裸的利己主義同樣在美國傳統(tǒng)中。
或許可以說，內(nèi)外情形使得美國政治和民情正在民粹化和法西斯化的下坡路上狂奔，特朗普不過踩了幾腳油門而已。
法西斯主義產(chǎn)生的前提是本來處在中間的諸階層在復(fù)雜難測的全球化網(wǎng)絡(luò)遭受損害而陷于絕望，煽動(dòng)者沖破政治建制，刻意秉持反智姿態(tài)，直接訴諸“人民”，承諾拋開一切成規(guī)，作出超人的雄姿拯救“人民”。
還有，反復(fù)指控前任的愚蠢懦弱，用幼稚的詞匯描述國際關(guān)系，把內(nèi)部分配不公解釋為外部對(duì)本國的掠奪，不惜與全世界為敵，情緒化地拋棄盟約。此即法西斯主義之構(gòu)成要素，今日美國不已幾乎全部具備？
回顧歷史即可發(fā)現(xiàn)，美國立國與德國納粹成立之根本價(jià)值，只有一紙之隔：“美國例外論”近似于德國納粹的“雅利安種族優(yōu)越論”，這是美國法西斯化之精神根基。
特朗普是美國法西斯化之始作俑者，其他政客在震驚之余，見其獲得越來越多支持，大眾政治的機(jī)制必將誘導(dǎo)其群起效仿，法西斯化程度將日益加深。
只是由于美國規(guī)模遠(yuǎn)大于當(dāng)年的德國、意大利，內(nèi)部族群也較為多元，故其法西斯化或許難以席卷全國，而很可能致其潰解。
世界秩序由強(qiáng)國維系。幾個(gè)主要角色中，歐盟的進(jìn)一步凝聚已不可能，將日益碎片化；俄羅斯將持續(xù)衰落，日益成為原材料出口國；美國已無意、也無力支撐戰(zhàn)后全球各領(lǐng)域多邊體系和同盟，轉(zhuǎn)向重建雙邊體系，以最大化其具體利益。而在原來的體系中并不居于中心的中國，卻正在快速壯大。
可見，二戰(zhàn)后形成的世界秩序，或者說，兩百年來的世界秩序，已走向崩解，問題只在于崩解速度有多快，替代的新秩序是什么，能否及時(shí)涌現(xiàn)、起效以免出現(xiàn)大范圍的嚴(yán)重失序。
▍中國重構(gòu)世界秩序
在舊秩序解體的同時(shí)，世界新秩序已在醞釀中，主要的生成性力量是經(jīng)濟(jì)總量已居第二、而文明類型不同的中國。
此系“天降大任于斯人也”，無可推脫。對(duì)世界日趨失序，列國中最不能無視者，中國也；因?yàn)槭澜绻媸颍袊鴮⑹亲畲笫芎φ?，上升之路將止步，且未來治理世界的成本將大增?？傆腥苏f中國應(yīng)繼續(xù)韜光養(yǎng)晦，此乃刻舟求劍耳。
《中庸》曰：“君子之中庸也，君子而時(shí)中?！泵骱踔杏怪勒?，當(dāng)止則止，當(dāng)行則行。韜光養(yǎng)晦者，時(shí)也；起而重整秩序，時(shí)也。不知時(shí)者，不足與論國事。
今世惟有中國有重整新秩序之能力。一方面，中國是世界上最大的國家，更在其悠久中有治理世界的充分經(jīng)驗(yàn)：以中國之大而多樣，本身就是天下或曰世界秩序；中國曾建立從中亞到南洋、橫跨陸海的天下秩序，此經(jīng)驗(yàn)在世界歷史上是罕見的。
另一方面，中國也是現(xiàn)代的。西人塑造世界秩序，憑其現(xiàn)代力量，而過去一百年間，中國循西方邏輯變法。而中國之所以成功，因?yàn)槲鞣降默F(xiàn)代觀念和制度至少部分地淵源于中國，中國內(nèi)在于現(xiàn)代性中。
由此可以理解一個(gè)引人注目的事實(shí)：環(huán)顧全球，惟有東亞儒家文化圈各國完成了工業(yè)化，比較順利地建立類似于西方的現(xiàn)代治理體系。
因此，中國正在塑造的世界新秩序不是全新的，因?yàn)閮烧咴诂F(xiàn)代性上是相通的，可保持連續(xù)性。
當(dāng)然，西方接受中國思想必加以西方化，故多有偏而不正之處。中國塑造新世界秩序可對(duì)其予以矯正，綜合運(yùn)用古典、現(xiàn)代智慧，矯正現(xiàn)有世界秩序之偏失，其大義有三：
第一，恢復(fù)全球均衡發(fā)展。
世界島上展開的古典秩序偏于大陸一端；西方列強(qiáng)普遍為海洋國家，其所主導(dǎo)的世界秩序偏于海洋一端，由此導(dǎo)致世界島逐漸塌陷，昔日文明中心反成世界禍亂之源。
美國治下的和平未能解決這一問題，其孤懸世界島外，慣于離岸平衡，不能深入內(nèi)陸，沒有與文明傳統(tǒng)深厚之各國打交道的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。
故其只能維護(hù)海洋秩序，不能維護(hù)世界秩序，甚至經(jīng)常因?yàn)闊o知，貿(mào)然闖入世界島中央，以粗暴手法操作；引發(fā)混亂之后，又束手無策，迅速撤離，世界之腹心乃長期處在潰瘍、潰爛、失血狀態(tài)。
中國塑造新世界秩序，必當(dāng)執(zhí)兩用中。中國自古即在陸海之際，兼顧海陸，最為均衡：漢唐中國積累了交往陸上文明的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，宋明以來中國深入海洋貿(mào)易體系。
正是據(jù)此歷史經(jīng)驗(yàn)，當(dāng)代中國提出“一帶一路”倡議，其最大優(yōu)點(diǎn)在于涵攝世界島和海洋，包容舊世界和新世界：“一帶”旨在恢復(fù)世界島秩序，“一路”旨在安頓海洋秩序。
這是人類提出的第一個(gè)完整的、均衡的世界秩序方案，中國已為此建立相應(yīng)機(jī)制：上合組織初步形成解決世界島問題的架構(gòu)，若納入德國，即告完備。至于安頓海洋秩序，不必建立專門組織，畢竟，美國的核心影響在海洋上，中國可與之協(xié)調(diào)海洋秩序。
第二，馴化資本主義，倡導(dǎo)厚生主義。
西方賴以強(qiáng)富強(qiáng)的體制為“資本主義”，扎根于西方海盜-商人傳統(tǒng)和殖民征服傳統(tǒng)，以獲取貨幣利潤為驅(qū)動(dòng)力，以畸形發(fā)達(dá)的金融體系經(jīng)營資本，以貿(mào)易為樞紐。對(duì)待他者，以離岸手法操作，以獵獲廉價(jià)資源或市場為樞紐。它可以占有世界，卻不能耕作世界，機(jī)會(huì)主義傾向嚴(yán)重。
西人將資本主義推到全世界，但在沒有殖民紅利的國家，這套制度是自相矛盾的，無從正常運(yùn)作。故自十九世紀(jì)西方統(tǒng)治世界以來，西方以外實(shí)現(xiàn)工業(yè)化、現(xiàn)代化的國家，除儒家文化圈外幾乎沒有，這一事實(shí)表明，資本主義不是普世的。
中國圣賢所立經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)模式，用孫中山先生的詞說是“民生主義”，或可謂之“厚生主義”。其大綱為《尚書?大禹謨》“正德、利用、厚生、惟和”，重視“開物”、“利用”，也即重視物質(zhì)的生產(chǎn)、利用和分配，以讓人改進(jìn)生活，且生生不已。
為此采取“崇本抑末”政策，以使商業(yè)、金融活動(dòng)服務(wù)于生產(chǎn)和民生。中國已初步應(yīng)用這一模式于世界，“一帶一路”倡議中的經(jīng)濟(jì)方略與此前西方國家有很大不同，重視授人以漁，改善基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，推動(dòng)工業(yè)化。
中國目前是世界工廠，產(chǎn)業(yè)正在升級(jí)，未來將重構(gòu)世界分工體系：向上，接納西方國家尖端制造業(yè)提供的部件，向下，梯次轉(zhuǎn)移普通制造業(yè)到不發(fā)達(dá)國家，主要是非洲。
隨著中國成為全球最大消費(fèi)市場，比較均衡地在發(fā)達(dá)國家和不發(fā)達(dá)國家之間分配這個(gè)市場，此即傳統(tǒng)“朝貢貿(mào)易”之要旨所在；比較均衡地從全世界不同地區(qū)獲得能源；在世界范圍內(nèi)倡導(dǎo)崇本抑末政策。
第三，走向“一體多元”的世界格局。
歐洲列強(qiáng)建立世界秩序，普遍求“同”，傾向使用暴力，必定制造敵人。美國受其清教影響，熱衷于價(jià)值一律，以普世價(jià)值強(qiáng)加世界一致，凡與自己觀念不同者概斥為“邪惡”，視為敵人。
故當(dāng)福山高談歷史終結(jié)時(shí)，導(dǎo)彈正橫飛于中東。西方文明以求同始，以撕裂終，根本無從建立普遍秩序。至于作為其反彈的文化多元主義，已致西方各國內(nèi)部撕裂、解體，遑論世界秩序。
中國則不同，《尚書?堯典》描述堯舜締造中國和天下之道曰：“克明俊德，以親九族。九族既睦，平章百姓。百姓昭明，協(xié)和萬邦。”
幾千年來，中國人以“一個(gè)天、多個(gè)神，諸神統(tǒng)于天”或以“一個(gè)文教，多種神教”為本，吸納多元宗教、族群，而以敬天或文教一體之，從而構(gòu)建“一體多元”的國家和天下格局，這是唯一可行的通往普遍秩序之道。
此秩序之構(gòu)建不是通過暴力征服，也不通過傳教或推行普世價(jià)值讓他者變成自己，而是承認(rèn)他者的自主，“修文德以來之，既來之，則安之”[6]。大體上，今天中國就是循此和而不同之道建立和維護(hù)國際組織，滋長世界新秩序，也即天下秩序。
依據(jù)圣人“協(xié)和萬邦”以平天下之道，可推定中國引領(lǐng)生成天下秩序的方式和基本特征如下：
第一，天下秩序不是一次性構(gòu)建的而是漸進(jìn)生成的?！爸茈m舊邦，其命維新”，可用以描述中國引領(lǐng)形成新秩序的程序：周本為舊邦，長期行德化，首先影響周邊邦國，逐漸擴(kuò)大其影響力，到文王三分天下有其二，諸侯歸于周而不歸殷，乃有殷周之易位。中國人重整天下秩序亦將循此漸進(jìn)之道，而避免與現(xiàn)有霸權(quán)對(duì)撞。
第二，維系正在形成的天下體系，以德禮為先。天下體系只是“協(xié)和萬邦”，而非建立緊密聯(lián)盟，更非強(qiáng)求同質(zhì)化。
維系各國關(guān)系的首先是德、禮，“修文德以來之”，此文德包括道義，更包括經(jīng)濟(jì)惠澤；同時(shí)，協(xié)同各國建立禮治。禮治區(qū)別于現(xiàn)有國際法體系之處在于，除明晰各主體之權(quán)利、義務(wù)，還強(qiáng)調(diào)互親敦睦，建立情感紐帶。
第三，天下秩序不求覆蓋全世界。世界太大，任何單一國家均無力有效治理。圣人深明此義，故天下體系從未試圖覆蓋當(dāng)時(shí)所知全世界，后世亦然：鄭和下西洋遭遇眾多邦國，但天子未殖民征服之，亦未將其全部納入朝貢體系，而讓其自主抉擇。
中國人不追求所有國家立刻進(jìn)入同一體系，天下秩序是沒有終點(diǎn)的歷史過程。只要臺(tái)灣統(tǒng)一、美國退出東亞、西太，對(duì)中國人而言，世界新秩序即告成型。中國如此節(jié)制，可避免魚死網(wǎng)破的霸權(quán)之爭。
第四，完整的世界新秩序?qū)⒋嬖趦扇齻€(gè)區(qū)域性體系。中國是海陸復(fù)合型國家，可運(yùn)用其傳統(tǒng)智慧，領(lǐng)導(dǎo)西太、大半個(gè)世界島、非洲等區(qū)域?yàn)樘煜麦w系，美國等有共同耶教信仰的大西洋海洋國家將別成其普遍世界體系，世界島中央則可有伊斯蘭世界秩序。這樣，以其固有文明為本，未來世界可有2.5個(gè)區(qū)域性體系。
此類似于亨廷頓的文明劃分，但未必是文明沖突。亨廷頓以西人神教思維看待世界，不了解中國文明。
隨著中國影響力日益增長，可在塑造世界新秩序過程中發(fā)揮更大作用，則可以其智慧，避免與其他兩個(gè)體系陷入對(duì)抗，且緩解另兩個(gè)體系之對(duì)抗。
現(xiàn)實(shí)可能性在于，中國是海陸復(fù)合型國家，與另1.5個(gè)體系有價(jià)值和利益高度重疊之處，可作跨體系的“協(xié)和”。“中國”可以成為居于區(qū)域性體系之中的協(xié)和之國，從而形成多元一體的世界新秩序。
為此，中國可逐漸構(gòu)建逐層嵌套、由內(nèi)而外的復(fù)合的世界治理架構(gòu)：
最內(nèi)層，重建東亞秩序。傳統(tǒng)上，朝鮮半島、越南為中國最親近的藩屬，日本也深受影響。
二戰(zhàn)后，東亞儒家文化圈成為全球唯一成片完成現(xiàn)代化者，但其間關(guān)系破碎，聽命外人，與其經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)達(dá)繁榮形成鮮明對(duì)比。原因是中國貧弱，無力發(fā)揮主導(dǎo)作用，聽任美國、蘇聯(lián)等外部力量操縱。
中國整頓世界秩序，必由此開始，且其目標(biāo)超越國際關(guān)系，而是帶領(lǐng)韓朝、新、越、日等國，依托共同的儒家文化傳統(tǒng)，逐漸恢復(fù)儒家式治理體系，協(xié)調(diào)采取民生主義政策，為全世界樹立全新的繁榮、文明標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，如同此前西方各國為全世界標(biāo)桿。
隨著中國力量增強(qiáng)，美國不能不逐漸退出，這一進(jìn)程將以出人意料的高速展開。
中間層以“上合組織”為依托，安頓世界島中央秩序。該組織已吸納印度、巴基斯坦、伊朗，進(jìn)一步可吸納土耳其、德國。
俄羅斯的經(jīng)濟(jì)缺乏潛力，其全球影響力將持續(xù)衰減，將收縮于中亞及其周邊，故將日益重視上合組織，可協(xié)與中國共同協(xié)和伊斯蘭世界各國，化解世界島上諸古典文明各國之間的緊張，避免沖突，進(jìn)而尋求共同發(fā)展。
這是大大擴(kuò)展了的“新西域”，關(guān)乎中國西部安全和繁榮；又在世界島中央，此處穩(wěn)，則全球大局不亂；由此，美國無從施展其離岸操縱術(shù)，其全球支配力自然衰退，此為盡快形成世界新秩序之關(guān)鍵。
最外層是制度化的一帶一路倡議，涵括整個(gè)世界，“一帶”以上合組織為主要治理平臺(tái)，一路則以東南亞各國、非洲為重點(diǎn)。
尤其是非洲，人口眾多，自然條件尚可，位于歐洲之南緣，介于中國、美國之間，隨著中國工業(yè)體系向上升級(jí)，產(chǎn)能外溢，非洲是唯一可以接納的沃土，是為構(gòu)造中國主導(dǎo)的全球生產(chǎn)體系之布局關(guān)鍵。
至于與西方體系的協(xié)和，則可在G20平臺(tái)上。
▍結(jié)語
人類文明大體可分兩大類型，故考察世界秩序之演變和前景當(dāng)以中國和西方之浮沉升降為中心。
在早期現(xiàn)代，西方受中國啟發(fā)；一百多年前，中國學(xué)習(xí)西方；中國的復(fù)興，導(dǎo)致西方主導(dǎo)的世界舊秩序崩潰；新秩序的生成，必以中國為中心。
五百年必有王者興。把握這五百年的世界歷史，既要理解西方現(xiàn)代觀念和制度的優(yōu)長與限度，也要理解中國文明內(nèi)在的現(xiàn)代性質(zhì)及其在現(xiàn)代之新生轉(zhuǎn)進(jìn)。
《文化縱橫》國際傳播系列由三大洲社會(huì)研究所（Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, 網(wǎng)站：www.thetricontinental.org）和東聲（Dongsheng News，網(wǎng)站：www.dongshengnews.org)協(xié)作翻譯并制作，有英語、西語、葡語三個(gè)版本。每期根據(jù)不同主題，從《文化縱橫》雜志過往發(fā)表文章中，選擇3-5篇文章進(jìn)行編譯，預(yù)計(jì)每季度發(fā)布一期。2023年第1期主題為“重構(gòu)現(xiàn)代世界體系”，主要分析全球緊張局勢加劇背景下的俄烏戰(zhàn)爭的全球影響，追溯中西關(guān)系的歷史軌跡，并探討團(tuán)結(jié)廣大第三世界國家、推動(dòng)構(gòu)建新型國際體系的可能性。
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